Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic

From: Ron Winchester (phaedruswolff@hotmail.com)
Date: Sat Feb 12 2005 - 01:57:55 GMT

  • Next message: Scott Roberts: "Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic"

    Scott said;
    They are about keeping the useful distinction between readily sharable
    experience and private experience.

    Ron said:
    What I feel you mean is that it is more useful to distinguish between
    generally accepted experience, and experience that is not so generally
    accepted.

    Scott:
    As to equating it with "generally accepted experience", no, that is not what
    I meant. I meant limiting it to knowledge that is validated by means of the
    senses (vision, hearing, taste, smell, touch).

    Ron;
    Let's do this one small step at a time.

    You sit on the beach and look out at the horizon. The horizon is set in a
    perfectly straight line. This would be empirical? The horizon you are
    looking at is a straight line?

    Ron said: The question I might have is Do you believe metaphysics and/or
    philsophy should be tied to the modern views of physicists?

    Scott: Metaphysics that is contradicted by empirical data should be
    rejected. Modern physics provides lots of empirical data. It also involves
    lots of interpretations of that data. A metaphysician may well reject some
    or all of those interpretations, but it can't ignore the data.

    Ron;
    The straight horizon is empirical data, but the fact that the horizon is not
    straight is also empirical data. We know the earth is round, and therefore,
    the horizon we are looking at is curved; not straight; not so empirical.

    If we keep the term empirical defined as you define it, it causes some
    confusion.

    Do you not think?

    >From: "Scott Roberts" <jse885@localnet.com>
    >Reply-To: moq_discuss@moq.org
    >To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    >Subject: Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic
    >Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2005 11:11:47 -0700
    >
    >Ron,
    >
    >Scott said;
    >Any time you want to address the reasons I gave for objecting to Pirsig's
    >expansion of the word "empirical", let me know. Those reasons have nothing
    >to do with SOM vs. MOQ, and the reasons apply to James' expansion as well.
    >They are about keeping the useful distinction between readily sharable
    >experience and private experience. This does not imply that private
    >experience should be dismissed, just that it is useful to distinguish
    >between them.
    >
    >Ron said:
    >What I feel you mean is that it is more useful to distinguish between
    >generally accepted experience, and experience that is not so generally
    >accepted. It is my belief that the generally accepted experience is
    >restricted to historical guidelines. This being the case, then you are
    >placing the metaphysics of static patterns above the metaphysics of
    >Quality.
    >Or, you are speaking in terms of philosophy?
    >
    >Scott:
    >I don't know what you are getting at with your last question. I am
    >certainly
    >speaking of the use of the word "empirical" in philosophical discourse.
    >
    >As to equating it with "generally accepted experience", no, that is not
    >what
    >I meant. I meant limiting it to knowledge that is validated by means of the
    >senses (vision, hearing, taste, smell, touch). You seem to be thinking that
    >I am claiming that only empirical knowledge, according to the unexpanded
    >sense of empirical, is valid for philosophical purposes. I have repeatedly
    >denied this, but here again you are saying "you are placing the metaphysics
    >of static patterns above the metaphysics of Quality". Look at my recent
    >posts to Marsha. None of that is empirical, but it is what I am putting
    >forth as my philosophy.
    >
    >Wilber [in Eye to Eye] identifies three kinds of inquiry:
    >empirical-analytic (the Eye of the Flesh)
    >mental-phenomonological (the Eye of the Mind)
    >transcendental (the Eye of Contemplation)
    >
    >All three are sources of data and knowledge, and all three (in my opinion,
    >as well as Wilber's) are legitimate input to one's philosophizing. So all I
    >am saying is that the MOQ does not need to expand "empirical", and in doing
    >so, creates unnecessary confusion, as Wilber said.
    >
    >Ron said:
    >All I ask is that you distinquish between the two, or acknowledge the two
    >are related, so I will know how to join in.
    >
    >Scott:
    >Which two are you referring to here? Maybe the following examples will
    >help:
    >
    >"The light is red" -- empirical
    >"People stop at red traffic lights" -- empirical
    >"Electrons have both wave-like characteristics and particle-like
    >characteristics" -- empirical
    >"The universe started with a Big Bang" -- not empirical (there is empirical
    >data to support this claim, but as a claim it also invokes some
    >nonempirical
    >assumptions, for example that physical laws remain constant throughout
    >space
    >and time).
    >
    >Now there is some fuzziness. For example, is "life forms evolve" empirical?
    >Strictly speaking, no, since I don't have a time machine by which I can see
    >dinosaurs come into and out of existence. But I would call it an empirical
    >claim, since the fossil record is empirical, and a theory that life forms
    >evolve makes a hell of a lot more sense of the fossil record than
    >creationism. Perhaps better is to call it, as Wilber says, an
    >empirical-analytic claim. One might say the same for the Big Bang theory,
    >though here I think the claim is weaker. A completely nonempirical claim,
    >that I happen to adopt, is "form is formlessness, formlessness is form".
    >
    >Ron said:
    >The question I might have is Do you believe metaphysics and/or philsophy
    >should be tied to the modern views of physicists?
    >
    >Scott:
    >Metaphysics that is contradicted by empirical data should be rejected.
    >Modern physics provides lots of empirical data. It also involves lots of
    >interpretations of that data. A metaphysician may well reject some or all
    >of
    >those interpretations, but it can't ignore the data.
    >
    >- Scott
    >
    >
    >
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