Re: MD Sense experience and the SOM problematic

From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Tue Feb 15 2005 - 21:20:29 GMT

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    Paul,

    Paul said:
    A brief interjection. As I understand it, it is Pirsig's claim that
    value is sense experience.

    "The Metaphysics of Quality follows the empirical tradition...in saying
    that the senses are the starting point of reality, but - all importantly
    - it includes a sense of value. Values are phenomena. To ignore them is
    to misread the world. It says this sense of value, of liking or
    disliking, is a primary sense that is a kind of gatekeeper for
    everything else an infant learns. At birth this sense of value is
    extremely Dynamic but as the infant grows up this sense of value becomes
    more and more influenced by accumulated static patterns." [SODV]

    "This value is more immediate, more directly sensed than any "self" or
    any "object" to which it might be later assigned." [LILA, p75]

    This is why he claims that art, morality and religious mysticism are
    empirically verifiable, because the essence of all of this experience is
    a sense of value. It's just that the values sensed aren't subjective or
    objective and have therefore been excluded due to the inadequacy of the
    prevailing system of metaphysical categorisation.

    It seems there may be confusion here between 'empirical' and
    'objective'.

    Scott:
    I appreciate that you are just trying to clarify what Pirsig said, and that
    is always helpful, but I can't help repeating my objections (that is, about
    his using the word 'empirical' -- I agree with your clarification.)

    You say "that ["This value is more immediate, more directly sensed than any
    "self" or any "object" to which it might be later assigned"] is why he
    claims that art, morality and religious mysticism are empirically
    verifiable" What I don't see established, other than by fiat, is that there
    is ever any "sense of value" that is not in conjunction with the experience
    of some object or event. I can agree that value is more immediate than any
    sense of "self", since one is not, or not usually, thinking of one's valuing
    something while one is valuing it. But I see no basis for saying that value
    is more immediate than that which is valued. If one says that mystics have
    an experience of "pure value", then one is arguing from anecdotal
    evidence -- the mystics say this -- should we believe them? How can our
    choice to believe them or not be considered empirical?

    As to the claim itself ("that art, morality and religious mysticism are
    empirically verifiable"). This completely ignores the problems of
    verifiability. Is satori an empirically verified experience? If so, is an
    experience of "Christ within me" also empirically verified? Can one
    empirically verify that art is high-quality endeavor? Can one empirically
    verify that it is better to kill the germ than let it kill the person? In
    short, what does this claim provide in building a metaphysics other than
    confusion? One can agree that mystical events occur, and we can draw
    conclusions from reports of such occurrences. But to claim that any such
    conclusions are "empirically verified" is to create a monstrous confusion.
    We can reason out why we think people's lives should trump germs' lives, but
    is this anything beyond "what we like"? There are some really deep
    ecologists who think it would be better if people disappeared. With what
    empirical evidence will one try to convince them otherwise?

    The value of the word 'empirical', and also 'objective', is that it referred
    to a means of verifiying: shared experience through use of the senses, as
    opposed to private experience which cannot be so shared. Granted, if we try
    to limit our metaphysics to such shared, sensory experience that we will
    have a grossly inadequate metaphysics. We can say value is real, but that
    was shown in ZAMM by the argument that if we pretend there is no value, we
    are left with nothing at all. That's a good argument. It does not need the
    blessing of the word 'empirical'. It just needs saying: we all value things.
    To say that value is a 'sense' doesn't help at all. As far as I can see, the
    only reason to say it is so one can claim one's metaphysics is empirical,
    and the only reason to do that is to sound respectable. Instead, as Wilber
    said, it invites mockery.

    - Scott

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