RE: MD Contradictions

From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sun Mar 06 2005 - 23:39:34 GMT

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    Scott, Max, Sam, Ant and all MOQians

    dmb opens:
    Welcome Max. That's my son's name. If I start talking to you like you're 4
    years old its only because of that. Just slap me and I'll remember who I'm
    talking to.

    Scott asked:
    Was there consciousness before the biological level came into being?

    dmb answered with quotes from Pirsig:

    "In the MOQ empirical experience begins with Quality which generates
    intellectual patterns. One of these intellectual patterns is named 'senses,'
    but this pattern is derived from the study of anatomy and is not primary in
    the actual empirical process."

    "The MOQ agrees that the senses are primary in an anatomical explanation of
    [the] empirical process. So the statement in Lila seems correct to me. But
    at the cutting edge of the actual Dynamic empirical moment these anatomical
    explanations are nowhere to be found."

    To which Scott replied:
    I fail to see how these quotes answer my question. Awareness does not
    require sense organs (we are aware of our thoughts, and there is mystical
    awareness).

    dmb says presently:
    I'm stunned by this glib dismissal and the failure even to see how the
    quotes address your question. At the risk of insulting your intelligence,
    let me spell out what it means. You'll notice in the quotes that the
    anatomical explanation of the empirical process is an intellectual pattern
    generated by a prior experience, and so are the biological sense organs
    themselves. As a form of idealism, there is a sense in which the entire
    world, the entire encyclopedia, is a construction of the intellect. Pirsig
    makes this same point in another place that is less specifically about sense
    organs. Maybe you recall. It asserts the same idea in broader terms,
    qualifying the idea of the inorganic coming before life, which came before
    society, which came before intellect. Within a static view, such basic
    common sense notions of time and space can't be abandon. And we can accept
    these ideas as very good and useful, true and correct in all practical
    matters. But ultimately, he says, all of those ideas of bodies and senses
    and the evolutionary history that produced them are just that. Ideas. You'll
    also notice it in these quotes too. "Experience begins with Quality which
    generates intellectual patterns." One of those intellectual static patterns
    says that bodies and sense organs are a pre-requisite for consciousness. But
    at the moment of Quality experience "these anatomical explanations are
    nowhere to be found". This is how the quotes answer your question. Yes,
    there is consciousness before the biological level. The biological level is
    a construct of the intellect, which is generated by a prior experience.
    Clearly this is a form of consciousness quite differnet from the SOM notion.
    It this confusion, I thought, that prompted the question and which leads me
    to conclude that you're sneaking the SOM self back in - inadvertantly.

    Ant McWatt said to Scott:
    A conflation of intellect (as understood by Pirsig) with Dynamic Quality
    will be confusing if applied to the MOQ. A real spanner in the works which
    I'm opposed to. (dmb added more of the same criticism.)

    Scott denied the charge:
    ...What I have said is that Quality and Intellect are two names for the same
    (non-)thing. This does NOT imply that the normal, S/O-based intellect can
    grasp Ultimate Reality. It does not even imply that a Buddha can
    intellectually grasp Ultimate Reality. It does imply that we can -- and I
    think we should -- think of everything as the play of Intellect. It was SOM
    that removed intellect from nature. The MOQ, by its definition of intellect,
    preserves that removal, by treating intellect in the same way that
    materialism does, assuming that it came into existence from a reality that
    didn't have it. I am arguing -- against materialism and against the MOQ --
    that it be restored.

    dmb says:
    Let me start with your assertion that the MOQ's version of the intellect is
    like the SOM materialist version. If you consider the Pirsig quotes and the
    explanation I provided, then you should be able to see that Pirsig version
    of the intellect is not removed from nature nor does it assume that
    intellect arises from material reality. Instead, nature is a construction of
    the intellect, a product of the intellect, synonymous with it in a very real
    sense. In the MOQ, the intellect creates the subject and the object, it
    creates the idea of a sensory creature in a material world. This very much
    turns SOM and materialism on its head, specifically with respect to the
    intellect. Unlike SOM, the MOQ puts both subjects and objects on one side of
    the metaphysical split. Unlike materialism, the MOQ doesn't put matter
    before mind or sense organs before consciousness. In other words, your
    assertion that the MOQ is like SOM materialism is WAY wrong.

    Thanks.
    dmb

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