From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Fri Mar 25 2005 - 18:35:49 GMT
Ham,
Ham said:
One of the few things in ZMM that resonated with me (tr. "appreciated") was
the author's invention and definition of the term Philosophology. I don't
have the novel at hand, but there's no doubt in my mind that Pirsig sought
to distinguish the philosopher -- one who creates philosophy -- from the
philosophologist -- one who talks about philosophy as if were a study in
"comparative analysis", and that he not only had contempt for the latter but
wished to be identified with the former. Yet, you appear to have glorified
Philosophology to the point of adopting the very methodology he describes.
Matt:
I have no doubt that what you described as Pirsig's intention was his
intention (I think you meant Lila, by the way). However, I should argue
that the only reason it appears that I glorify "philosophology" is because
you think the distinction can be held. I don't think it can, at least not
without some notion of philosophy as an ahistorical subject of study. And
even then, I don't think philosophy can be done without reference to the
historical tradition (in other words, without "comparative analysis")
without ceasing to be philosophy. The logical positivists tried to do this
and its strange to find Pirsig almost agreeing with them. The problem that
the logical positivists ran into was that its impossible to say you've
dissolved philosophy's problems without showing that you've done so. And
the only way I can see that this can be done is by tying in your product,
your philosophy, with the history of philosophy. Without so-called
"philosophology," comparative analysis, I think you've drained the content
out of philosophy. If there is a realistic target to Pirsig's aim, the only
one I can figure is philosophology-as-intellectual-history. But I don't
think anybody confuses philosophy with intellectual history. It does pay
though, given my analysis of philosophology, to learn some intellectual
history as you enter into the world of philosophy. In fact, given my
analysis, you can't help _but_ to learn some intellectual history. And I
think Pirsig's actual practice as a philosopher bears out these suggestions.
(Oh, and easy on the "superb scholar" comments. I have some experience with
philosophy; that's about it.)
Ham said:
Another point on which we are at odds is your position that the MoQ should
not be rooted in epistemology or ontology -- the basic "sciences" of
philosophy that you and I agreed were the "twin ventricles" that drive
metaphysics. For reasons that I still don't comprehend, you want to
reconstruct the MoQ so as to eliminate its fundamentals. It has been my
position that were the MoQ to have a fully developed, unambiguous
metaphysical thesis, along the lines Mr. Pirsig so competently outlined in
his SODV paper, it might well achieve the academic recognition he clearly
hoped for.
Matt:
The reason I don't want to reconstruct Pirsig's philosophy with
epistemological or ontological theses, in other words, without metaphysics,
is because, while I agree that _modern_ philosophy has taken epistemology
and metaphysics as its principle disciplines (and eventually just
epistemology, really), I think modern philosophy has shown itself to be a
dead end. We need to find something else for philosophy to be. (I am also
generally skeptical that Pirsig's philosophy would receive more academic
recognition _because_ he became more traditionally metaphysical. It seems
to me that the only reason he hasn't is because he wrote two novels, rather
than treatises. I also think that contemporary philosophy is moving in the
wrong direction for metaphysicians to receive more recognition. I think
he'd receive more recognition if he were connected more with pragmatism.)
Ham said:
One's philosophical position is more than "emphasis", Matt. I am much
closer to Scott because he believes in a transcendent reality (granted,
though, that he doesn't yet acknowledge it.)
Matt:
Sure, when you get down to the specifics, a position is more than emphasis.
On the other hand, if you take a more general view of philosophical
positions, similarities might jump out and the specifics might well look
less important. In my dialogue with Scott, the one part that I see standing
in our way (I think) is Scott's insistence on Peircian universal
commensuration, which is all, in my particular emphasis, his talk about
"rising out of sin" comes out to mean for philosophical positions. If Scott
believes in a transcendent reality (which, compared to me, its fairly safe
to say he does), the only thing that causes him to say is that there will be
ultimate commensuration at the end of inquiry. But until then, inquiry
rules and reference to a transcendent reality is fairly useless for helping
inquiry along--which we both agree on.
Antiessentially,
Matt
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