Re: MD Contradictions

From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 02:20:21 BST

  • Next message: Mark Steven Heyman: "RE: MD Orpheus"

    Hey Ham,

    Ham said:
    I have before me a softbound book by Bertrand Russell that I've owned for
    nearly half a century. It was first published in 1912. Guess what its
    title is: . . . "The Problems of Philosophy". Sound familiar? Chances are
    you've read this introductory gem on the substance of philosophy – possibly
    as a textbook in Professor Picart's class.

    Now, you tell me which of these problems have been satisfactorily resolved,
    answered or are considered no longer worth discussing in the 83 years since
    this little volume was published.

    Matt:
    Actually, my first teacher, Kay, wasn’t much into analytic philosophy, which
    was a boon for me because she instead introduced me to Nietzsche, Kuhn, and
    Pirsig. But, yes, I do have Bertie’s book on my own shelf.

    So, my answer: all of them. You won’t accept them as resolutions,
    dissolutions, answers, or appropriate non-considerations, but that’s the way
    it goes. Nobody in philosophy has ever been able to convince every other
    philosopher that the answers, nor even the questions, he has are good ones.
    No, the question I haven’t been after is what these “problems of philosophy”
    are (which is why I’ve only listed one or two by example), but where they
    come from. You listed them from a historical source, which I gather is not
    your final answer. If it were, you’d be susceptible to the fullness of my
    argument. Rather, at root, you think these problems perennial to the
    condition of humankind. Right? So, how does that not beg the question?
    How would you prove that this were so? It seems to me that you can’t and
    that you must beg the question over your historicist opponents. So the
    question is: why? Why an ahistorical substance over a created, on-going
    dialogue? What’s going to happen if we become historicist?

    Ham said:
    These are not changes -- they're the topics of study which these particular
    philosophers happened to choose. This is not to say that one philosopher
    does not influence the next, or that a philosopher is not affected by other
    knowledge sources available in his time (scientism, politics, religion,
    etc.). But what you seem to be suggesting is that the history of
    philosophical thought represents a continuous advancement in human knowledge
    (or conceptual development), as does the history of science, technology, or
    music. Apart from a growing thesaurus of philosophical terms, and some
    novel, off-the-track approaches like semiotics and symbolic logic, I guess I
    just don't see that advancement.

    Matt:
    Well, I wouldn’t necessarily say that the history of philosophy is
    continuous or positive, even though I would think you had better say so if
    you think we have perennial questions we are all working on answers for.
    But really, I suppose, neither of us has to. We can both agree that the
    history of philosophy is discontinuous (though I don’t see why you would
    since you’ve just denied the discontinuities). What I am arguing is that,
    despite historical discontinuity between Plato and Descartes, we can also
    tell ourselves a story of continuous development, we can write narratives
    that show how we dialectically got from Plato to Descartes to Kant to
    Russell.

    However, what we’ve learned over the last 2500 years is that what we call
    progression over our fallen predecessors isn’t so much solutions to their
    problems, but nonchalance over their problems. How Descartes didn’t so much
    solve the problem of the relation between the Forms and the Material World
    as he did create a different problem in the form of the Mind/Body problem.
    We can show continuities between them, but if you tell a Platonic scholar or
    a Cartesian scholar that Plato and Descartes were working on and giving
    solutions to the same problems, they would have you hung. If you told the
    Plato scholar that Plato had a mind/body problem or an a priori knowledge
    problem or any kind of modal logic problem, but he just didn’t choose to
    work on those topics, our little scholar would have a conniption fit. He
    would also patiently tell you that it wouldn’t have been possible for Plato
    to be working on the same things as Descartes or Russell without doing
    serious damage to the historical record because the Greeks didn’t have the
    conceptual resources to construct those problems.

    But the only way to become acquainted with this type of view, the type of
    view that takes history seriously and seeks not to damage it (or at least to
    be conscious of how you’re damaging it) is to become acquainted with
    Vlastos, Nehamas, Gilson, Randall, McKeon, etc., etc. But these scholars
    are, unfortunately, disbarred from philosophy, and so, subsequently, one’s
    reading list. They are simply philosophologists who have nothing to add to
    philosophy, or are at least secondary to their problem solving colleagues.
    This I think sad, especially for contemporary philosophy, which is only
    slowly regaining a sense of historical consciousness from the help of
    philosophers like Rorty, MacIntyre, Hacking, Toulmin, Derrida, Foucault,
    Habermas, etc., etc. (Actually, historical consciousness was never really
    lost on the Continent because of Hegel’s influence, but the particular
    vicissitudes of Anglophone philosophy departments made the teaching of Hegel
    frowned upon until very recently.)

    Personally, I’m never more excited then when I’m reading a good historical
    narrative of philosophy, like Susan Neiman’s Evil in Modern Thought, or
    Bernard Yack’s The Longing for Total Revolution, or Richard Popkin’s The
    High Road to Pyrrhonism. I’m never so bored then when I’m reading the
    sophisticated solutions to obscure problems by Russell, or Ayer, or Carnap,
    or Searle, even philosophers I agree with like Davidson, Dennett, Putnam,
    Quine, and Sellars. They don’t snap, there’s no verve or panache. I guess
    at heart, I like a good story. But in any event, I’m not sure you could
    make much of a case for your preference over historically-drained, general
    theorization except as a personal preference (which you share with many).
    Some people, like you, prefer theorems, some people, like me, enjoy stories.
      I don’t think there’s a general point to be made from these differing
    preferences except: if you’re going to make historical claims, you’d better
    like stories.

    Matt

    _________________________________________________________________
    Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE!
    http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Apr 09 2005 - 03:08:44 BST