From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Sun Apr 17 2005 - 13:06:37 BST
Hi Ham,
> Right. But I can't "know a fact" without intellectualizing it. So
> empirical experience must also involve Intellect. Also, some of the facts
> we know, if not most of them, relate to inorganic objects and social
> events.
> Therefore, it seems to me that -- unless the experience referred to is
> nothing more than an itch or a toothache -- sensible (sentient?)
> experience
> involves all four of Mr. Pirsig's pattern levels.
This is something which MF touched on in Feb/March, without reaching a final
conclusion. You might like to have a look at the archives.
Two things might be worth sharing here. First, I wrote on 20 February:
"From the Copleston annotations: "When, therefore, the Absolute is described
as sentient experience, this term is really being used analogically." This I
take to mean that in the Idealist tradition that Copleston is describing, we
have access to the Absolute through "sentient experience" - and that there
is a *difference* between the sentient experience through which we access
the Absolute, and the sentient experience by which we access, eg, hot
stoves. Pirsig then comments: " The MOQ uses it literally. " In other words,
I take Pirsig to be _denying_ the difference which was assumed in the
Idealist tradition, and to be asserting that in the MoQ we have access to
the Absolute (ie DQ) through our sentient experience, and that this sentient
experience is not different in kind or type from the sentient experience by
which we access, eg, a hot stove. Copleston goes on to quote: " 'Feeling, as
we have seen, supplies us with a positive idea of nonrelational unity. " I'm
assuming here that 'feeling' corresponds to "sentient experience" as
previously discussed, so "sentient experience" is the source of this idea,
ie our awareness of DQ. Pirsig then comments: " In the MOQ feeling
corresponds to biological quality. " So, so far as I can discern the logic
here, Pirsig is saying that we have access to the Absolute (DQ) through
"sentient experience" (= 'feeling') which is to be understood literally (NOT
analogically) as corresponding to biological quality. So we have access to
DQ through biological quality. Which is where I get stuck - and why I
suggested in my original question that it would be of interest to try and
work out what Pirsig means. Because, having denied the analogical use of
"sentient experience" it seems that Pirsig is committed to saying that we
access DQ through the biological level ... My problem is that I cannot see
how Pirsig avoids that conclusion."
That specific issue ended up getting dropped, partly for lack of time, but
also partly because it was generally agreed that Pirsig can't mean "The MoQ
uses it literally", for reasons that we went into. I later wrote to Wim (14
March):
"I think there is all the difference in the world between 'discernment' and
'experience', not least that the former necessarily refers to a
relationship. I agree that Pirsig is wanting to strip away the 'objective'
assumptions of this language, but what I am questioning is whether it is
legitimate to do so, ie, whether in broadening the use of the term in the
way he wants, he hasn't in fact denuded it of all specific content. Matt has
said more about this before, but let me give you an example. I say "I am a
great footballer". My friends say "but you never play!". And I say "But I
play it out in my mind, and in my imagination there is no greater striker of
a dead ball than me". And they say "but that's not football" - and I say "it
is in my philosophy". Something essential to the nature of football has been
lost in its transition from the open grassy field to the realms of my
imagination. And whilst that transition might work from all sorts of other
perspectives, it would be misleading to simply accept my mental imaginings
as 'football' without further ado. In the same way, it seems to me that
Pirsig is using the language of empiricism whilst trying to jettison
something essential to its normal use, ie a reliance on sensed experience
(understood as equivalent to the biological level in the MoQ). The normal
language of empiricism uses the language of experience in a way that maps
neatly onto the biological level (ie evidence that comes in via the senses).
Whereas the MoQ must use it in an analogous sense, not a literal sense - and
it is the literal sense which has given empiricism its historical sense.
Which leads us back to the question: what is 'sensation' in the MoQ, how do
we 'sense' value (or, in the terms of this thread, how to we access
Quality). I am starting to suspect that it is a metaphor that has lost its
home, and that, just as my claiming that my imaginative endeavours qualify
as football, this is language idling, gone on holiday."
I think there is a problem here, which the MF discussion didn't resolve.
Doubtless we'll have to come back to it. But I thought you might find value
in the discussion on MF (you can access the archives via the moq.org
website).
Sam
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