Re: MD Hume, Paley and Intelligent Design

From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Wed Apr 27 2005 - 10:49:12 BST

  • Next message: Arlo J. Bensinger: "Re: MD Access to Quality"

    Arlo, Platt, Sam and msh:

    Arlo had asked:

    > Who's engaging in "philosophy" and who's "pontificating"?

    Ham had answered:

    > That's really an unfair comparison, Arlo. Mark is engaged in proving that
    > all ID arguments are invalid. I'm postulating a valuistic philosophy that
    > is founded on the concept of an intelligent designer.
    >
    > Given my assertion that "man cannot prove the existence of a creator by
    > reason", what 'reason' would I have to attack anti-ID arguments?

    Arlo reconsiders:

    > Maybe I'm out in left-field then, but I thought Mark was arguing that ID
    arguments > rest on faith rather than rational or empirical arguments, while
    you were arguing that > ID can be reasoned through rational argument, if not
    empirical means. From what
    > you say above, I do see I was wrong.
    >
    > However, if your philosophy rests on a faith-based (non-reasoned) belief
    in a
    > "designer", why attempt to put it into a "rational" format? Right or
    wrong, Pirsig
    > believed Quality was NOT a faith-based (non-reasoned) concept, but one
    that
    > could be experienced empirically, and that is (one reason perhaps) why he
    took the > time to place it in a rational format (instead of keeping it a
    mystic reality like he was > temped to do in ZMM).
    >
    > If you start from a non-rational, mystic "faith" in an unexperiencable
    "designer",
    > what goal is served by placing it in a structured, rational format?
    > But also, if you don't feel that your "designer" can be proven by reason,
    but must > be accepted by faith, what exactly was your disagreement with
    Mark? I thought
    > that's what he was saying all along??

    I have a theory about why I'm encountering so much confusion and resistance,
    not only in the MD but from others I've been discussing my philosophy with.
    It involves our common understanding of the terms "faith" and "belief"
    relative to "logic" and "reason", and the notion that the latter are
    anchored to empirical experience and mathematics, while the former are
    intuitive and free of such restrictions.

    I was intrigued by this confession by Sam in another thread:
    > I'm happy to have 'scientific' beliefs defined as those with
    > rational/empirical support, and 'faith' being defined as those beliefs
    > without such support (for the time being at least ;-) I just think that
    all
    > the most important things in life fall outside of the boundary.

    Without naming names, I think most of us put a higher priority on our
    personal beliefs, whether they're validated by science-based reason or not.
    But since what we believe is experiential, it's also by definition
    "empirical". So, to the extent that beliefs are codified feelings that we
    all experience, they are just as "reasonable" as the laws of thermodynamics
    or the Pythagorean theorem. That makes them vulnerable to the criticism of
    the logicians and logical positivists who, in most cases, will pronounce
    them "invalid". I think this deeply troubled Pirsig, who tended to paint
    over his theories with an empirical tone to avoid such criticism.

    But there's a more fundamental basis for this disparity, and it's the
    primacy of experience that is unique to belief systems like the MoQ and
    Essentialism. To put it simply: The real issue is that those who hold to
    the view of scientific materialism believe that matter is the primary
    reality. They can't conceive that thought and proprietary awareness could be
    primary to material existence. Mind is a product of matter, they insist; it
    would defy logic to have it any other way.

    Well, it doesn't defy logic that mind is the subject of experience, and you
    folks have assured me that experience IS empirical reality. Pirsig has
    stressed the primacy of Quality which, despite his metaphysical ambiguity,
    is certainly more experiential than material. Obviously, then, Essentialism
    and the MoQ are not in the materialist camp, and both have the potential to
    transcend material existence. Why is this concept so unacceptable to many,
    if not most, of the MD participants? Why, indeed, is MoQ's author himself
    reluctant to embrace it?

    It can only be because they can't find it within themselves to cut the cord
    of scientific materialism and reap the psychic benefits of a valuistic
    belief system.

    That's my theory. Do give it enough thought to discover where YOU side on
    this issue before posting an opinion.

    Thank you,
    Ham

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