Re: MD Primary Reality

From: Tim Chizmar (robertpirsigfan@yahoo.com)
Date: Mon May 02 2005 - 16:43:36 BST

  • Next message: Mark Steven Heyman: "Re: MD Quality and the Nuremberg-Tokyo Tribunals"

    Hello all,

    I am not sure if this is the proper area to ask this.... but I do have an important Pirsigian
    question. I have read, studied and currently love both of Pirsig's
    tomes. Spent my summer studying LILA actually.... But in my wanting to take his ideas
    and even those of you philosophers as possible truth,..... I see one
    problem.

    Why is "Lila's Child" marked as a fiction novel?

     Its marked as fiction clearly in the early pages.
    If this is true, (all the ramifications of Pirsig's deep observations on life and society) then
    the thoughts and ideas presented should not be ficticious but
    truthful.. real.

    PLEASE somebody explain to me why it is marked as fiction....

    I ask this in complete respect and sincerety.

    ian glendinning <psybertron@gmail.com> wrote:
    Hmm, not sure how to reply to this Ham ...

    Your assumptions about what my words were trying to say, and the
    arguments you construct, are dense with concepts, most of which I
    don't follow or agree with ... so lots of [inserts] in the text below
    ...

    On 5/2/05, hampday@earthlink.net wrote:
    > Ian --
    >
    >
    > > Ham, rising to Platt's challenge, I will not avoid your question any
    > longer ...
    > >
    > > I'd say I was more B than A, but like Scott, I don't see them as
    > > mutually exclusive.
    >
    > As I see it, you're all trying to define your personal metaphysical
    > perspective

    [Ian - I can't speak for all, but I see no reason for metaphysics]

    > in terms of the MoQ

    [Ian - which is why we're here on MoQ-Discuss]

    > which is ambiguous

    [Ian - not sure ambiguous is the word - it's neither subject nor
    object, but it's very clearly the triplet of the
    "subject-experiencing-object"]

    > on the issue of ultimate reality.

    [Ian - reality is everything that exists - the ontology is everything
    that is part of that reality.]

    > The very use of Quality as the primary reality makes the ontology
    > ambiguous.

    [Ian - Why ? See above]

    > Quality, like Goodness, Beauty and Truth, is a valuistic
    > judgment

    [Ian - Yes, by definition almost.]

    > of something experienced;

    [Ian - "of something experienced" - yes, that's the triplet.]

    > any attempt to rationalize it as non-SOM
    > is based on the premise that Quality exists independently of conscious
    > sensibility.

    [Ian - that would depend on your definition of consciousness - for me
    it's independent of or prior to "intellectual interpretation" of that
    experience. If you have literally no consciousness, you couldn't
    experience anything, pre-cognitive or otherwise.]

    > It is that premise by which Mr. Pirsig has purportedly
    > eliminated Cartesian dualism.

    [Ian - I wish he had - sadly it's still all around us. He is one of
    many people who've pointed out that this old-fashioned dualism is an
    illusion from the SOMist world view, although it's so old it was based
    on a very ancient view of what the objective reality might have been.]

    > One may accept the concept of a universal
    > Quality on "faith", but it doesn't pass muster as a credible thesis.

    [Ian - not sure what you mean "You don't believe in Pirsig's MoQ ?"
    perhaps. I believe it, but not because of any "faith" and not because
    it claims to be a metaphysics (see above), but simply because it is
    (so far) the most complete, consistent and pragmatic explanation of
    the whole of reality as I see it.]

    > > The problem with B for me is the word "exists" in the first sentence -
    > > ontologically I don't believe B, epistemologically I do. For me
    > > consciousness is part of the real "physical" world, but I do firmly
    > > believe all we can ever know about the real world and its ontology is
    > > that which is perceived through consciousness.
    >
    > Here I would ask: what part of the "physical" world is not contained in
    > consciousness?

    [Ian - none of the physical world is "contained" in consciousness. The
    whole experience of of the phsyical world so far (and all its
    metaphors and intellectual explantions and interpretations) are
    "contained" in consciousness.]

    > I don't mean to imply that the physical world is all there is;

    [Ian - but that is exactly what I am claiming. The whole of the real
    world is part of physics, including consciousness. The physical world
    is all there is - by definition, if you have no need of metaphysics -
    at least I'm consistent :-)]

    > but since it is all we can know (empirically) about reality, physical
    > reality is identical with experiential reality.

    [Ian - knowing and experiencing are not the same - and as we've said
    "empiricism" is a complete red-herring, once you accepted the absence
    of any objectivity - at least it is not something with any special
    place in the world.]

    > You say "consciousness is
    > part of the physical world". I say, that's true only if the consciousness
    > you speak of is proprietary to you, me, or someone else.

    {Ian - What ? How ? Why ? Huh ? - don't follow your reasoning, logical
    or otherwise. Total non-sequitor for me. I have said explicitly that,
    whilst our individual consciousness seems to be built on our
    "material" substrate (brain), I don't think consciousness per se is
    tied exclusively to brains.]

    > You also say:
    >
    > > I don't believe consciousness is restricted to our human
    > > minds, or even minds in general, and in keeping with MoQ and Zen, I
    > > believe there are ways for consciousness to alter its own "levels",
    > > although clearly to perceive, know, think, imagine, hallucinate
    > > anything, we need non-zero consciousness.
    >
    > I don't know the meaning of "non-zero consciousness"

    [Ian - just what the individual words mean - no techie jargon - I was
    simply saying the broadest, most inclusive definition of consciousness
    you could think of. Anything more conscious than having literally no
    consciousness. In an individual, every kind of consciousness above
    brain-dead - unconscious, sub-conscious, spaced-out, meditating, REM
    Sleep, every other kind of sleep, dreaming, aware, etc ...]

    > , but the notion of
    > "minds in general" or free-floating, non-proprietary consciousness with no
    > referent subject is insupportable by logic or metaphysics.

    [Ian - Hallelujah - I thank you very much - my main thesis on a plate
    - so just why do you place total store in logic and metaphysics - when
    there's a whole world out there waiting to be experienced. interpreted
    and explained. So what I say ? Logic and metaphysics are dead, long
    live reason - new reason that is.]

    >
    > What I'm getting at is, simply, that these two perspectives of reality
    > indeed are mutually exclusive.

    [Ian - only Ham, if you make them exclusive - you chose words to make
    them exclusive, I objected to the probem word(s) - isn't that what
    Pirsig suggested we put a stop to ?]

    > Statement A, that "matter, nature, the observable
    > world is taken 'without reservations' as real in its own right, neither
    > deriving its reality from any supernatural or transcendental source, nor
    > dependent for its existence on the mind of man" is a clear argument for the
    > primacy of matter.

    [Ian - it might be such an argument if the three preceeding clauses
    were true - but they're not, and as I said I preferred B anyway.]

    Conversely, Statement B, that "consciousness and its
    > contents are all that exists. ...The world of our daily experience ... is a
    > species-specific
    > user interface to a realm ... whose essential character is conscious",
    > argues unambiguously for the primacy of conscious awareness.

    [Ian - obviously if you ignore the criticsims of your two alternative
    statements you Ham, can still infer the same conclusions, but as I
    said "exists" is wrong in the first sentence.]
    >
    > The fact that awareness is proprietary to the individual,

    [Ian - Possibly, but why ?]

    > whereas experience
    > always alludes to a non-proprietary object,

    [Ian - Why ? Surely you are just stating the ancient dualism -
    building a windmill or straw-dog to tilt at with your theory.]

    > confirms the duality of existence.

    [Ian - Why ? Yep, as I said "building the duality". It confirms your
    argument builds it, not that it really exists.]

    > The only way to overcome this dichotomy is to acknowledge a
    > primary source that transcends existence.

    [Ian - Why a "source", why not just existence of reality ?]
    >
    > > Like Hoffman I see that "there is as YET no physical theory of
    > > consciousness" but as Hoffman says it's only a matter of time (and
    > > yes, like everything else the answer will be yet another metaphor -
    > > "42" perhaps - with an explanation that no-one believes or understands
    > > for 30 to 100 years - situation normal.)
    >
    > Hoffman seems to have closed the door to a scientific theory of
    > consciousness -- at least in this quotation.

    [Ian - in the quotation you chose he very clearly says "YET" as I
    highlighted back to you - yet is a matter of time in my dictionary and
    common usage.]

    > And I tend to agree. For the
    > scientist reality is the otherness 'out there'.

    [Ian - Says who ? Show me one scientist - since say, Schroedinger - I
    say reality is everything - by bleedin' definition.]

    > But the answers are not to
    > be found 'out there', because reality is the primary Essence which
    > transcends both self and other.

    [Ian - Sorry Ham, you need to go back 8 or 10 leaps of faith and
    rhetoric in your argument and explain each small step to get even
    close to that conclusion.]
    >
    > Essentially yours,
    > Ham

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