From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Wed May 18 2005 - 14:08:09 BST
Hi Ham,
Another go round which I always enjoy.
> I know I've been down the road with you on this before, and the problem has
> always been the missing transcendent reality. Unless you define Quality as
> that reality [e.g., God], you need a sensible agent that is capable of
> recognizing and appreciating Quality. In other words, Quality is either
> the Creator or the experience of the creature. Quality without a sensor
> makes no sense, logically or metaphysically.
As soon as you introduce the idea that Quality requires a "sensible agent"
I know you're assuming a subject-object worldview which apparently you
find impossible to shake. Obviously if you make that assumption what you
claim about "Quality without a sensor makes no sense" follows logically.
But suppose, just suppose, you began with the assumption that Quality is
existence, and that existence itself is a force for good. Then the initial
division becomes not subject/object but forces that initiate changes
(Dynamic) and forces that preserve changes. Why adopt the assumption that
existence itself is a force for good? Because existence in which value
(quality) is subtracted would be empirically unrecognizable.
> You see, Pirsig himself leads up to his Quality epistemology by talking
> about "things being distinguished." Doesn't this suggest to you that,
> prior to value being sensed, there must be a mind (intellect) that can
> distinguish objects and events in order to appreciate their value?
> Otherwise, why would he add the Metaphysics of Quality as a "second"
> principle to the first one -- distinguishing things from each other? If
> you think this through, I don't see how you can come to any other
> conclusion.
Pirsig's principle that "a thing that has no value doesn't exist" is
simply a reiteration of the basic assumption that existence is value, that
they are co-dependent, that you can't have one without the other.
> > > Thus, while your subterranean
> > > molecule has no value for you or me, its presence is certainly
> > > foundational to the structure of the universe.
> Platt:
> > A fairly high-quality intellectual pattern I'd say.
Ham:
> It can not be an "intellectual pattern" if there's no intellect to discern it.
Your intellect created the intellectual pattern about the subterranean
molecule. My intellect agrees with yours, i.e. I think it's a good
(accurate) pattern (description) too.
> While it is conceivable that something approximating intellect may be
> attributed to the Creator, I can't accept the notion of inanimate objects
> possessing intellect. To me, that's simply the copout of an author who
> couldn't bring himself to acknowledge a primary source.
Pirsig never claims inorganic objects possess intellect. Only humans
possess intellect. Inanimate objects like atoms, however, are aware they
exist, but not in the same sense that we are aware. Their existence is
quite different from ours, just as existence is different for a worm and
for the early bird. All are value-laden however.
> Platt:
> > As said, experience and Quality are inseparable. You "absurdly" assert
> > that the subject-object division is the only possible division of
> > experience that makes sense.
Ham:
> It's the only division of experience for which we have empirical evidence.
> You're not going to persuade me that there's empirical evidence for a
> muti-level Quality heirarchy, Platt.
But I hope I can persuade you that there's empirical evidence for values
if for no other reason than you place a low value on a multi-level Quality
hierarchy. You make countless similar value judgments every day. In fact,
empirically there's no escape.
> Ham:
> > >This means that such accepted
> > > existents as the other side of the moon, a tree falling in the forest
> > > with no one to see it, all subatomic particles, any color outside of the
> > > visible spectrum, things in total darkness, and the creative process itself, do
> > > not really exist.
> Platt:
> > No. They definitely exist, as intellectual patterns of value.
> This supposes that everything I drum up in my mind exists. If I dream that
> the world has a fatal collision with an extra-terrestrial object, does that
> exist, too?
Absolutely. Ideas, thoughts, dreams, all exist. They are experience.
Otherwise, you couldn't describe them. But just because they exist doesn't
necessarily mean they are high on the value scale of believability or
truth.
Best,
Platt
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