From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Fri Jun 03 2005 - 17:38:29 BST
Hi Scott and all --
Scott raises an important point that has been left hanging in the MoQ
metaphysics:
> Before one can evaluate Bo's SOL, a fundamental logical error in the MOQ
> needs to be addressed. That error is to ignore two different meanings of
the
> word pair: subject and object. One meaning is to equate 'subject' with
> 'mind' and 'object' with 'matter', which I'll call subject[1]/object[1].
The
> other meaning (which I'll call subject[2]/object[2]), covers the X and Y
> respectively in sentences like "X is aware of Y" or "X thinks about "Y",
or
> "X values Y". The MOQ dissolves the opposition between subject[1] and
> object[1] by calling each different levels of static patterns of value.
This
> makes a certain amount of sense, but does nothing to dissolve the
opposition
> between subject[2] and object[2]. This latter opposition is simply ignored
> by the MOQ, which makes the MOQ inadequate as a metaphysics. I've raised
> this issue several times, but no MOQ defender has dealt with it.
Perhaps Matt is right that we should not be addressing epistemology, yet it
is the crux of our problem with the MoQ, so I don't see how we can avoid it.
I understand your distinction between things observed by a subject and the
thoughts (sensibilia or qualia) of things in the subject's consciousness.
However, inasmuch as Pirsig makes no distinction between "appearances" and
"real objects", doesn't this infer that the intellect "creates" the objects?
If so, there is no need to talk about material objects (phenomena) existing
apart from one's cognizance of them. Why complicate the issue? They are
one and the same.
At least, that has been my personal interpretation of this Quality-based
metaphysics.
Pirsig made Quality, not matter, the "primary empirical reality"; hence, the
MoQ is phenomenalistic or non-noumenal in the Kantian sense.
For those, including myself, who have not read Barfield, here is a small
excerpt of his phenomenalistic perspective:
"In our critical thinking as physicists or philosophers, we imagine
ourselves set over against an objective world consisting of particles, in
which we do not participate at all. In contrast, the phenomenal, or
familiar, world is said to be riddled with our subjectivity. In our daily,
uncritical thinking, on the other hand, we take for granted the solid,
objective reality of the familiar world, assume an objective, lawful
manifestation of its qualities such as color, sound, and solidity, and even
write natural scientific treatises about the history of its phenomena-all
while ignoring the human consciousness that (by our own, critical account)
determines these phenomena from the inside in a continually changing way."
[Worlds Apart; Saving the Appearances]
I'll be interested in Matt's thoughts here, even though he doesn't like to
discuss epistemology.
Regards,
Ham
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