Re: MD Bo's Incompleteness Theorem

From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Wed Jun 22 2005 - 16:40:00 BST

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    Hi Ham,

    > Platt said:
    > > Just so, any reality based on the subject/object split (SOM) is going to
    > > be inconsistent or incomplete. Why? Because it makes no provision for
    > > values.
    >
    > That would be a reasonable complaint if it were a valid assertion. But the
    > truth is that values are experienced ONLY in an SOM reality. Finite
    > creatures cannot experience the absolute, undifferentiated reality.

    I beg to differ. Finite creatures like you and me experience absolute,
    undifferentiated reality all the time. It's the value-filled now moment,
    totally embracing us with its ever present presence.

    > But
    > from the perspective of that essential reality, value would have no more
    > meaning than desire. A thing is valuable to us because we do not possess
    > it. Absolute reality (Essence) possesses all; it is the perfect
    > "embodiment" of value, not its experience.
    >
    > Here is what Aristotle said about desire. "... the man who desires
    > something desires what is not available to him, and what he doesnąt already
    > have in his possession; and what he neither has nor himself is-that which
    > he lacks-this is what he wants and desires." I think this definition is
    > equally true for value, and it is notable for being expressed in the
    > context of man's experience.

    Not only do we desire to acquire what we don't have, but also to keep what
    we have. Also, we don't always desire to possess what we value. I value
    Rachmaniov's 3rd piano concerto, but to possess it is out of the question.
     
    > When we speak of a subject/object "split", the object's value is always
    > implied in the subject's awareness. You could say that value is a
    > "contingency" of experience, or that differentiated reality is a "trinity"
    > rather than a duality. What you can't say is that value is ruled out by a
    > subject/object reality. If Pirsig's MoQ "makes no provision for values" in
    > SOM, then it is either wrong or incomplete.

    To repeat: value is a separate category that stands above and prior to
    subjects/objects or any other intellectual differentiations that create
    dualities, trinities or splinters of any kind. Value--direct experience--
    comes first. All else is derivative.

    Best,
    Platt
     

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