From: Mark Steven Heyman (markheyman@infoproconsulting.com)
Date: Wed Jul 06 2005 - 20:45:13 BST
Hi Steve,
Thanks for taking the time to write a thoughtful post.
On 5 Jul 2005 at 11:48, Steve & Oxsana Marquis wrote:
MSH wrote:
Evil is banal but not invisible. With astute external observation,
and lots of reflection inward, and, most important, the unfettered
flow of information between the island universes we've made of
ourselves, our participation in evil can be minimized and maybe
eliminated altogether. I think this will have to do, until the
estranging sea we've set between us subsides and the illusion of
proud individuality disappears, once and for all.
steve:
OK, Mark, how do you talk about intentionality without moral agency
and moral agents without some idea of a person? Are you suggesting
we kill ego entirely or just put it in its place?
msh:
I think my inclination to wax poetic, as above, sometimes leads to
more confusion than clarity. Sorry.
Rather than using the word "ego," which gets me thinking along
Freudian lines, I'd like to talk in terms of the Buddhist's small-
self Big Self distinction. At this point in my own struggle along
the path, I don't think it's possible to annihilate the small self;
I do think it is possible to some extent to put the small self in
cold storage while making decisions regarding our actions. I think,
in this way, our actions can move us toward a more moral society, and
to the compassionate awakening that allows us to see that our small
selves are part of something bigger.
So, despite my poetic imagery, I don't believe that individuality is
an illusion. The thrust of my metaphor is that relentless focusing
on the "proud individuality" of our small selves results in our
estrangement from the Big Self. And this, I think, is not good,
neither for us nor for our efforts to move toward a more moral social
arrangement.
As for how I talk about intentionality, I don't. I'm sticking to
what I said in the previous post. I think it's impossible to know
anyone's intentions, other than our own. However, although we cannot
know them, we can make reasonable inferences about infer other
people's intentions based on their actions.
This is how I would try to solve Matt's problem about how we might
choose our "fox-hole" companions, that is, what kind of people we
want around us. In my example of the rescued swimmer I don't know
the rescuer's intentions, but it seems highly unlikely that anyone
acting instantly, showing no signs of deliberation, is really going
through the mental machinations of envisioning his own post-rescue
press conference. And his actions after the fact, whether or not he
sticks arounds for the camera, may be further evidence of his
intentions.
steve:
Intentions value actions (intentions are the motivation for action),
and much of what results from this interplay of static patterns once
intention is actualized as action was not foreseen by the agent.
msh:
No disagreement here. I don't doubt that intentions motivate actions.
I just don't think we can know someone else's intention.
steve:
Some of this can be alleviated by critical thinking / careful
consideration beforehand.
msh says:
No disagreement, as this sounds like my "astute external
observation, and lots of reflection inward."
steve:
IOW, value understanding and value patience as opposed to value ego
and value passion. Form some clear intellectual patterns of value
concerning what is Quality in a given situation prior to acting.
msh:
I'm assuming you meant these two sentences to be one, with a comma in
place of the first period. Anyway, no disagreement here, either.
But we still can't know what sort of value understanding is occurring
in someone else, although we might be able to infer such after the
fact of action.
steve:
Focusing on action alone is slipping again into SOM materialism,
recognizing that only the physical deed is 'real'.
msh:
I'm not denying the reality of intentions prior to the physical deed.
steve:
Regardless, unless one is omnipotent, what some patterns will value
given intentional input cannot be foreseen. What could be foreseen,
or, what a 'prudent' adult is expected to foresee, we can hold a
person accountable for. What this person (sorry, I'm sticking with
the individual as the smallest pattern of agency) cannot be held
accountable for is what did occur due to intention but an average
prudent person would not have foreseen.
msh:
I don't think I disagree here, but maybe it will help me understand
if you provide an example illustrating your last sentence, above. It
sounds like you're saying that someone who acts with good intentions
cannot be held accountable for the unforseeable bad effects of his
actions. Is it your contention that someone acting with bad
intentions should be held accountable in the same circumstances?
See, in either case we're stuck with the problem of verifying
intentions; and I think once we start trying to verify the
intentions of others we may be making it impossible to form
judgements. If someone intends to do good, and acts on his
intentions, and some unforseeable bad happens, we would rightly call
this an accident. But, if the bad that happens was not the intention
of the guy intending to do some different bad thing, then I see no
reason to hold him accountable for the unintended bad thing that
happened, any more than we would for the good-intender. This is why
I'm uncomfortable with the idea, common in many legal systems, that a
guy who swipes a six-pack in a 7/11 should be held responsible when
the owner grabs a gun and shoots himself in the foot.
I know this is getting a little convoluted, but we're seeing a
glimpse of the complication that arises when we try to divine
intentions. The can of intention worms is better left unopened, I
think.
steve:
Accountability is after the fact and deals with actions.
Responsibility (response ability) is prior to the action and deals
with intention. It assumes agency. We need to deal with both ends.
msh:
I'm not sure we do. But the question we're wrestling with here is,
if we do need to verify the intentions of others, how do we do it?
steve:
Certain actins can be an immediate threat to social stability.
However, this is always a band-aid approach.
A higher quality approach is the training of appropriate use of the
agent's responsibility (ie, character, that which motivates) and in
an MOQ sense this would have to deal with an education in Quality; to
perceive, intend, and act, with Quality in mind. This would, of
course, entail critical thinking, so of course instances of
unintended low quality consequences would drop.
Learn what Quality is and apply it to your life, education of your
young ones, and how you deal with others.
msh:
Nothing to disagree with here. This is in line with my own ideas of
our responsibility to remove from our environments all physical and
psychological impediments to our becoming fully-realized human
beings. Though it's cooled off, Sam Norton and I have a discussion
going about this very thing. (Where are you Sam? I miss your
rational conservatism.)
steve:
Check out psychological egoism which claims that no act or intention
can ever be anything but 'selfish'. That's one perspective.
msh:
This is the first I've heard of it, I think. But I jumped to the
first google link and found this:
http://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/egoism.html
On one reading, I see nothing to distinguish this from the ideas of
selfishness presented by the Randians. I found this page very
helpful, however, because it goes to some length presenting both the
ideas of psychological egoism, and their refutation. I find the
refutation to be pretty convincing, but would be happy to discuss
further, if you like, but in a different thread.
steve:
Certainly one who is motivated by social quality (the desire for
fame) to do a certain act is not selfless.
msh:
I agree, Problem is, you can't prove motivations any more than
intentions; I'm not even sure there's significant difference: What's
my motivation for this action, why am i doing it, what's my
intention. Sounds kinda close.
Thanks again for the thoughtful post.
Mark Steven Heyman (msh)
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