From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Fri Jul 22 2005 - 09:11:05 BST
Hi Paul,
I think we're in the same ballpark.
> Paul: Okay, I see. Well I think in LILA it says that intellectual
> patterns
> can't respond to Dynamic Quality without the parallel social, biological
> and
> inorganic patterns ("the living being") which support them. Is this what
> you mean?
Not quite. To use the hardware/software analogy, what I am saying is that
there are different patterns of software, as well as a wholesale dependence
of all software upon the hardware, and that the interesting patterns of
software (ie those which are capable of responding to Quality) are not
properly characterised as GPT.
To enlarge on that, I'll refer to the Damasio material which I cite so
frequently. The mind contains representations of the body, and in making
decisions, the mind will project possibilities and discern an emotional
reaction to them, ie the representation of the viscera (the intellectual
patterns) within the mind will change. It is that emotional reaction which
is the seat of decision making, and therefore the response to Quality.
In other words, in determining whether a particular equation is solved or
not, the collection of intellectual patterns which we call mind will defer
to a particular set of intellectual patterns associated with emotional
response. It is those intellectual patterns associated with emotional
response, viz the representations within the mind of visceral reactions,
which I don't think are adequately characterised by GPT. (I think they are
more adequately characterised by the language of emotional intelligence, aka
virtue language. I also think that the agglomeration of intellectual
patterns bears a remarkable resemblance to traditional teaching about the
soul, but that's a whole other story.)
>>I'd rather say that a mind is an intellectual pattern of value, and keep
>>'human' for the whole agglomeration of inorganic, biological etc. In which
>>case it makes sense to speak of a human having intellectual patterns, but
>>of
>>the human mind being intellectual patterns. Happy with that?
>
> Paul: As long as it is understood that there is no mind separate from the
> intellectual patterns i.e. a mind that would be there without any
> patterns.
Complete agreement. It's the type of intellectual pattern we're considering,
how it functions, what it's mechanics are etc.
> Paul: No, I'm saying mind is webs of intellectual patterns and GPTs are
> central to the organisation or structure of the webs.
Right. This is the bit I disagree with the most. I think GPTs are useful
tools chosen (dynamically selected) on the basis precisely of their utility.
I don't think that they self-select. A worked example might help (see
below).
> Paul: Agreed, but given that the intellectual patterns are self-reweaving
> I'm not sure why you say that mind is "able to manipulate GPTs."
> Paul: Okay. I wasn't clear on this. I think that the whole web is what
> responds. This is because the atomistic idea of individual concepts being
> paired off against reality is part of a representationalist position which
> I
> would like to leave behind.
Great.
> Each pattern in a web is what it is - is
> valuable - by virtue of its relationship with the rest of the web. Some
> patterns have more justificatory relationships - are depended on by more
> patterns for their truth - than are others. These are the GPTs. I think
> it
> was the organisation of beliefs around these GPTs that marked the
> beginning
> of a new level of static quality. Beliefs became justified by their place
> in a web rather than by the social level authority of their proponents.
> Do
> you see where I'm coming from?
Yes, it's becoming clearer. Let's take a worked example, the shift from
Ptolemaic to Copernican understandings of planetary movements. How would you
characterise that shift in terms of GPT? Clearly the overall interpretation
shifted - the GPT changed unrecognisably - but how about the detail (ie what
could be observed with the naked eye)? Are you saying that there are no
uninterpreted facts, the GPT completely governs all observation and
experience, and therefore there is a radical incommensurability between the
two understandings? (That would be the Kuhnian position, and I think it
logically follows from what you've said so far) Or is it that there is some
continuity, that conversation is possible between the one and the other in
terms of a debate about observable data etc, and that therefore the GPT is
not determinative for the whole understanding. That is, there are elements
of the understandings (what is seen with the naked eye) which are more or
less independent of the GPT for their validity and use. The latter is my
perspective.
I suspect it is also the MoQ perspective, in that giving the GPT the wholly
determinative role would rule out the possibility of DQ, in the form of
non-integrated experience, ie anomalies. What place do anomalies have within
the mind if the GPT is what governs mental structure?
> Paul: I'm afraid your analogies aren't helping me see the problem.
> However, as I've said, it's the whole web which is responding to Quality
> and
> reweaving patterns. Maybe that answers you?
I don't think the whole web responds to Quality. I think there is a spider
in the middle of the web. (But a spider composed of the same substance as
the web)
> Paul: Algorithms? No, they are just the intellectual patterns which
> justify lots of other patterns, like centres of justificatory gravity to
> mash up another Rortyan term. If the whole web of patterns is responding,
> they are the patterns which are least likely to be modified, the patterns
> that are of the highest static quality.
It's the language of 'justify' that I balk at. It makes me think that apples
weren't allowed to fall to the ground before Newton discovered gravity. I
think the GPTs are simply more or less useful filing systems, and that they
are perennially modifiable. Whereas what actually drives the response to
Quality at the intellectual level is tied up with questions of character.
One thought occurs to me, which is that perhaps the questions of character
that I find interesting are analogous to GPTs. That is, the urge to achieve
greater moral integrity is the same as/closely related to the urge to gain a
more and more general description and understanding of the world.
> Paul: Not at all. I am just saying that one is born into a culture which
> already has these huge webs of intellectual patterns which are
> "transmitted"
> to people through education, media, families etc. Infants don't work it
> all
> out from scratch.
Fine.
> No, I'm not saying there are transcendent GPTs waiting to be fathomed out
> or
> recollected. Is that really how this is coming across?
I think your position is profoundly Platonic. (so is the MoQ, of course)
> Paul: No. I think those beliefs were (and still are) part of the stories
> and rituals that were/are organised around static social structures of
> cohesion, authority, status etc. When beliefs were/are organised into
> static structures of their own I think we have an intellectual level.
>
> This is a work in progress so if all of this sounds like gibberish,
> perhaps
> I should work it through on my own and present a more refined idea to you.
I don't think it's gibberish at all. I think you are making explicit what
was only implicit in RMPs own writings. The trouble is I disagree with it -
and in fact, this was what drove my eudaimonic paper, which is about these
very questions. You said to David: "static quality is the organising
principle of all levels but the static values that hold one level together
are completely different from the values that hold other levels together. I
am proposing that truth is the
static quality that holds the intellectual level together, and in
particular, what I have called generalised propositional truths - the
platitudes and "institutions" of intellect - are central to each "web of
belief," the sum total of which comprises the intellectual level. I'm trying
to offer a distinction between the social level and the intellectual level
and it occurred to me that there has to be a particular organising element
as there is at each level."
I agree with the perceived need, but I think the answers are different. I
use these terms: 'presiding values' for what organises patterns in each
level; 'choosing unit' for the patterns which respond to the values; and
'machine language interface' for the threshold pattern which crosses over
from one level to another.
In terms of the difference between social level and intellectual, I would
say that the presiding values of the social level are those of the tribe. In
other words, any pattern of activity which is determined by the preferences
of the tribe qualifies as a social level act, even if it appears to be
'chosen' - an example might be the children used to clear minefields, by
walking through them, in the Iran-Iraq war. Another example might be the
dress worn by Liz Hurley at the premiere of Four Weddings - a decision
moulded by the social preferences of the group, and which offered up the
rewards of the group as a result (celebrity and wealth). Whereas any pattern
of activity which is not determined by the preferences of the tribe (and
which is not otherwise determined by biological preferences - sex, dominance
etc - or inorganic preferences - falling over) but flows instead from an
autonomous decision, qualifies as fourth level, as I understand it.
Let's consider the brujo. In just the same way that the carbon atom exploits
a tiny crack of freedom in order to establish the inorganic level, so too
the brujo was able to exploit the tension between his traditional society
and the incoming westerners in order to act in response to Quality. It was
clearly not activity governed by the social level (which repudiated him)
even though it was an activity aimed at helping them (he went back and took
up a position of authority there).
Perhaps the point is that where you see 'truth' as the presiding value of
the fourth level (and therefore the patterns of the intellectual level are
organised around that truth) I see truth as one form of integrity. In other
words, truth is a function of honesty; it is ontological not
epistemological. Truth is not (as you rightly say) about correct reference
from pattern to external reality; it is rather, I would suggest, the product
of autonomous integrity. Thus it is the individual mind of integrity which
represents the organising element at the fourth level. And it is
establishing and gaining that integrity which is both enlightenment and the
salvation of the soul. What does it profit a man if he gain the whole social
level (power, money, fame) but lose touch with the fourth?
Thanks for the conversation.
Sam
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