From: ian glendinning (psybertron@gmail.com)
Date: Thu Jul 28 2005 - 06:37:50 BST
A bit late to join in this one perhaps, but I agree with Bo and Scott
generally and in particular re the mathematical equation idea.
Some interpretation of what E=MC^2 signifies would be an intellectual
pattern, but itself it is just a statement (interpretation) of a much
lower level physical pattern.
Scott - I like the idea of "concept" as a useful intellectual
(relatively statically latched) pattern ... very close to Platonic
forms and earlier essences ... but still useful after all these years,
provided you don't allow yourself to be misled by it into eternity - a
(relatively) static intellectual pattern for a (relatively) static
concept.
The one point I've wanted to add, every time I see intellectual
patterns being talked about is the one word - META.
We always talk USING intellectual patterns (memes) but only rarely are
we talking ABOUT intellectual patterns (except when we are, in the
case of a concept of a concept). It's surely an unspoken self-evident
fact that the MoQ IS an intellectual pattern, and the inorganic,
bilogical and social (and intellectual) levels are themselves
intellectual patterns. We constrantly need to discount the
intellectual patterns of the discussions we are having from their
subject matter.
I think Godel (or Hofstadter at any rate) would have something to say
about that too.
Ian
On 7/28/05, Scott Roberts <jse885@cox.net> wrote:
> Sam, Bo, et al,
>
> > Scott said:
> <snip some agreed bits>
> > However, the really big question, as I see it, is whether one can examine
> > examples from mathematics or physics, and use them for understanding
> > intellect in general, in particular in philosophy and politics. The reason
> > the better mathematical structures can be chosen is that the assumptions
> > are
> > clear and all terms are precise. That is not the case outside of
> > mathematics
> > or mathematically based science.
>
> Sam said:
> I was deliberately choosing mathematical examples simply because if I could
> make the point even there, in the hallowed realms of purely abstract
> thought, it would be a doddle making the point in more philosophical or
> political fields. As I understand it intellect isn't independent of human
> character, even where mathematics is concerned. That's my perspective.
>
> Scott:
> Well, I don't think you have made that point about mathematics. The thing
> about mathematics is that, in contrast to other disciplines, including
> science, it does not undergo revolutions. It just gets added to and
> deepened. By "deepened" I mean that the foundations (axioms and rules of
> inference) are examined and made clearer. For example, people used calculus
> for almost 200 years before an axiomatic basis for it was worked out in the
> 19th century. An axiomatic basis for arithmetic wasn't worked out until late
> in the 19th century. But that does not mean that the use of calculus or
> arithmetic was in any way wrong prior to that, in the sense that Newtonian
> physics was discovered to be wrong (albeit a good approximation) by Einstein
> and QM. This, of course, does not mean that all mathematicians get
> everything right all the time. Frege thought that he had a good basis for
> mathematical logic in set theory until Russell pointed out that Frege's
> basis allowed for a paradox. But this just meant that Frege's effort at
> deepening was off-track, not that mathematical logic had to be tossed. There
> are also (or were) some philosophers of mathematics (called intuitionists)
> who hold that some mathematical usages dealing with infinity are suspect.
> But they have largely been ignored as mathematicians continued to use those
> supposedly suspect methods.
>
> A couple of other examples: Non-Euclidean geometry did not invalidate
> Euclidean, it just added other equally valid geometries. The revolution
> involved was not in mathematics, rather it was in natural philosophy -- the
> belief that Euclidean geometry accurately described space and time could now
> be questioned. Goedel's proof likewise did not invalidate anything. All it
> proved was that those who looked for a complete axiomatic system for all of
> mathematics were not going to find one.
>
> So as I see it, mathematics is the one intellectual discipline for which one
> can make the case that it is independent of human character -- though of
> course, this claim of independence, being philosophical, is itself not
> necessarily independent. Hence the question of intellect's independence from
> human character remains open in principle. While it is clearly not
> independent in most day-to-day uses (for example in this forum), it could be
> that it is still struggling to become so, which I think to be the case.
>
> I'll throw in a criticism of the Eudaimonic level, while I'm at it.
> Actually, I am largely in agreement that the fourth level can be
> characterized as the rise of the autonomic individual. But I disagree that
> autonomy comes from emotional maturity rather than intellect. I disagree
> because I see intellect as the cause of emotional maturity, in that
> intellect is what makes it possible for the developing individual to reflect
> on his or her emotions, in a word, to become detached from them. (But there
> is a feedback loop involved: intellect increases emotional maturity, which
> in turn lets intellect thrive all the more.) Hence I see autonomous
> individuality and intellect as mutually dependent. I also agree up to a
> point with the SOL, that the power to objectify is the hallmark of intellect
> (what Barfield calls alpha-thinking). But the power to objectify can itself
> be objectified (beta-thinking), and this leads intellect to realize that
> objects are not merely mirrored by intellect (SOM), but created (as objects)
> by intellect -- and so objects and objectification are capable of being
> deconstructed by intellect. So intellect does not equal S/O.
>
> I'll also throw in my candidate for intellect's static latch, namely the
> concept. There is no object without a concept, and the intellect develops by
> inventing new words, or, more commonly, adding new meanings, or shading old
> meanings, of existing words. This applies whether or not the new meaning is
> accepted by everyone or only by a small group or just by an individual.
> Finally, in answer to the question in the subject heading of this thread
> ("how do intellectual patterns respond to Quality"), they don't. Intellect
> makes patterns (new concepts and systems of concepts), and so intellect is
> DQ.
>
> - Scott
>
>
>
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