From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Mon Aug 22 2005 - 10:11:16 BST
Hi Ant,
>
> Yes, I've noticed you and Dave have been going round in circles a bit
> recently.
About three years in fact.
>
> I think you need to first take on board when discussing philosophy,
> Northrop's caution against presuming that identical terms in different
> philosophical systems necessarily have the same meaning. For instance,
> the term 'mind' for Descartes and Locke refers to an internal mental
> substance (as distinct from an external material substance) while 'mind'
> for a Buddhist philosopher, of the Cittamatra tradition, refers to all
> apprehended factors (whether physical or mental) given in immediate
> awareness.
>
> Likewise, with the term "experience". Dave has quoted Pirsig's
> understanding of "experience" in his last couple of posts to you. What I
> would therefore suggest is that you read them in context maybe in LILA, or
> LILA's CHILD or even my own thesis and then get back into the debate with
> this understanding.
>
> That's my advice anyway.
Well thanks for that, but believe it or not I'm quite familiar with what
Pirsig actually says. I've even read your thesis. What I'm after (and what
DMB has provided, although I haven't gone through it in detail yet) is an
explanation of what Pirsig means by what he says.
Thing is, it's all well and good to say that different philosophical systems
use words in different ways (Doh!) The trouble is that Pirsig explicitly
draws on James and pragmatism. James uses experience in a particular way - a
way that is profoundly flawed IMHO. What I want to know is how Pirsig's
understanding differs from James', and how, therefore, he manages to avoid
SOM, or whether, to use Wittgenstein's description, Pirsig's use of the word
'experience' is simply a form of language going on holiday, which needs to
be brought back to its daily use in order to be understood.
So what I am after is a substantive description of a) Pirsig's understanding
of 'experience' and b) where that understanding differs from that of James
(or 'empiricism'). Paul assures me that it's possible, that's why I'm
willing to be persuaded.
Sam
"Wittgenstein's exasperation with James is a response not so much to his
practicing science, or claiming to be practicing science when he is doing
something else, but, more fundamentally, to James' empiricism, his belief
that _experience_ is a sufficient fundamental category." (Russell Goodman,
"Wittgenstein and William James")
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