From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Fri Feb 28 2003 - 17:52:14 GMT
Matt S.,
> Foucault makes no judgement as to what reality is,
> only to how we have perceived reality.
Obviously he has made a judgment about what reality is. Otherwise,
reality would be exactly as we perceive it to be. In other words, in order
to make a judgment as to "how we have perceived reality," Foucault
must have established some standard as basis for his judgment. To
make a judgment is to select from two or more options.
> He doesn't
> even prescribe how we ought to perceive reality, only
> hinting at the general direction in which we are
> headed, in the wake of key figures such as Nietzsche
> and Freud.
Again, he (Foucault) makes a distinction between reality and the
perception of reality, suggesting there's a difference but not telling us
what the difference is.
> Thus, he has no 'universal good' - or if
> he does, it is formal, not substantive, applying only
> to the rigours of (historical) analysis, and not to
> any metaphysical assumptions or prescriptions.
Ok, I get it. Formal is subjective, substantive is objective. Only
substantive is real. Reminds me of Pirsig's statement:
"Subject-object science is only concerned with facts. Morals have no
objective reality. You can look through a microscope or telescope or
oscilloscope for the rest of your life and you will never find a single
moral. There aren't any there. They are all in your head. They exist only
in your imagination." (22)
I take it "formal" means "all in your head."
> This can be transposed to all of the postmodern era of
> thought in general, in the sense that man's progress
> loses it's meta-narratives, it's 'big concepts', and
> is deconstructed to show the contingency, the
> historically-sensitive context, and the indeterminacy
> of things previously thought to be absolute. I'm
> quite keen to keep this thread on the track I started
> it on - that the intellectual level makes Pirsig's
> prior postmodernist angle less credible, but I guess
> it's integral to clarify whether he is 'postmodern' in
> the first place, so we'll have to get this out of the
> way first.
I agree. Until we know the premises of postmodernism we can't very
well decide if Pirsig is a postmodernist in any way.
> > As for the MOQ, if Quality isn't a
> > universal in Pirsig's
> > theory, you and I have a different view of the
> > meaning of "universal."
>
> Quality is universal in the MoQ, but not in reality
> itself. I understand that conceptual constants are
> necessary for thought, but the transposition into the
> realm of the universal truth is what bothers me.
Again, "not in reality itself" suggests you know what "reality itself" is.
And apparently your idea of reality doesn't include concepts. Pirsig's
reality has an entire level devoted to concepts, the intellectual level. Yet,
for you, "conceptual constants necessary for thought," are "not in reality
itself."
> > Whose "thought" are you referring to? Do you see
> > something wrong
> > with arguing against the "last 40 years of thought?"
>
> I'm referring to the postmodern trends in
> deconstructivist Europe (e.g. Foucault, Derrida,
> Lyotard, Baudrillard, Satre, as well as 'golden
> oldies' like Nietzsche), as well as the so called
> 'bourgious liberalism' in the US, exemplified by Matt
> E.E.'s favourite, Rorty. Of course, each of these
> contributions can't simply be reduced to the idea,
> 'truth is contingent', but they all build upon an
> anxiety over 'universals', meta-narratives, and the
> idea that human reason holds the solution to
> everything.
Well, if thoughts aren't real, what difference does it make?
> There's nothing wrong at all per se with arguing with
> 40 years of thought. It's just that it's better to
> have an awareness of what is happening in
> contempoarary ideas than not be aware. If you can
> persuasively argue against it, then good for you!
A lot of people besides me have persuasively argued against it including
Wilber, Scruton, Kimball, Stove and of course, Pirsig.
> > Slavery could not have been immoral before mankind
> > came along
> > because slavery by definition requires the existence
> > of one man to
> > enslave another. Gravity as a name for a force
> > didn't exist before
> > mankind because names for things are products of
> > man. But if gravity
> > as a force didn't exist prior to mankind, we
> > wouldn't be here to call it
> > "gravity."
> So, if slavery is a product of man, then isn't the
> immorality that arose *after* slavery a construction
> of man? If slavery is absolutely immoral, why has it
> existed un-hindered, in many socieities and cultures,
> for all of humankind's time prior to the 20th century?
> Or the immorality an inevitable (and thus
> 'universal'?) condition of human reason? Is this
> universal, or is it something that has been
> constructed with, if not by, man, that can thus be
> analysed from the 'outside'?
Are you saying that slavery is NOT absolutely immoral? Are you saying
"constructions of man" are unreal? What is your objection to man's
constructions? Why do you separate ideas and "human reason" from
reality?
> > I think they
> > would
> > > rather it be phrased “all I can be sure of is that
> > > there is no universal truth”.
> >
> > Let's see. Is that 100 percent "sure" and thus a
> > universal truth, or 99.98
> > percent sure and thus more accurately "maybe sure."
> > If the former, you
> > can see the self-contradiction I'm sure. If the
> > latter, the door to
> > universals is left open. It's my contention that
> > logically you cannot deny
> > the existence of universals without invoking a
> > universal in your denial.
>
> I think here we have the difference between a formal
> and a substantive 'universal'. I would contend that
> the latter is a myth (presumably contrary to your
> views), but that the former can be self evident. I
> can be sure that I know nothing: this is formally an
> 'absolute' statment, but it contains no substantive
> universality. I think this may explain our
> differences on the logic of postmodernism - the
> postmodernists all do make claims about what we can
> and, more commonly, cannot know, but you will rarely
> see any of them making a substantive claim. Formal
> 'universals' perhaps can be verified, by their
> historical evidence, or self evidence in the way the
> human brain functions; substantive universals, such as
> morality, are clearly different.
Let's see. A "substantive" that claims to be a universal, like "There's a
difference between life and death," is a myth, but a formal universal like
"I can be sure I know nothing" is a self-evident contradiction. Obviously
I'm mixed up about what you mean by "substantive" and "formal." To
me, substantive suggest something empirically verifiable, while formal
suggest the bare processes of mathematics and logic.
Sorry to be so dense. Thanks for your patience.
Platt
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