Re: MD The intelligence fallacy (was Rhetoric)

From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Tue Sep 20 2005 - 20:11:23 BST

  • Next message: Platt Holden: "Re: MD Individuals and Collectives"

    Hi Platt (Bo, Reinier mentioned) --

    > You draw a line for awareness at organisms that have no localized
    > sensibility, yet deny that the line can be drawn for specific species.
    > Further, you say an organism to be aware must experience a self identity.
    >
    > So does my cat have self-awareness? How about a frog? Does a jellyfish >
    have a localized sensibility? By not being specific, Ham, you leave me
    > grasping for understanding.

    Your demand for specificity will be a stumbling block to your understanding.
    It's the kind of parsing that goes on when the Right to Lifers ask: When
    does life begin? What they're really asking is: When does the fetus become
    an "individual"? If you can you tell me exactly when the post-partum infant
    has "intellect", I'll tell you when it becomes an individual. So far,
    Science has defined self-awareness with any degree of precision. Like all
    evolutionary processes in a relativistic world, self-awareness occurs
    developmentally (over time). One may reasonably conclude that a living
    organism requires a functioning central nervous system for self-identity;
    however, since self-awareness is subjective experience, trying to pinpoint
    it objectively by the particular species is foolhardy. Anyway, why should
    not knowing if a sea urchin or jellyfish has self-awareness impede your
    understanding of a metaphysical concept? It's a specious question that has
    little relevance in my anthropocentric ontology.

    > OK. But that raises the questions of when, how and why non-physical
    > awareness comes into existence. At what stage of evolution does
    > awareness suddenly emerge? Who or what caused it to pop up at that
    > particular time in that particular way?

    That's the 'two million dollar' question I hope to be able to answer.

    What I'm currently looking for is a metaphysical principle that's still
    missing in this ontology -- primary difference. This is the key to all
    relations. I think the answer may be found in Cusa's theory. Bo has just
    sent a note referring to Cusa as "some Medieval bishop [with] God [as] his
    primal source". That's a vast underestimation of this man's genius. (I
    intend to send him a brief biography of Nicholas of Cusa that I think will
    impress both of you.) For now, let me quote this analysis of Cusa's theory
    of the coincidence of opposites:

    "Nicholas of Cusa was the first philosopher to separate himself from
    Scholasticism. He began with a logic based on the coincidence of
    opposites -- at variance with Aristotelian-Scholastic logic, which is based
    on the principle of contradiction. In metaphysics he was Platonic, and the
    notion of the transcendence of God was thus seriously compromised.

    "Observing how, in a circumference carried to infinity, the straight and the
    curved line coincide, he affirms that in the infinity of God all oppositions
    are identified, all distinctions overcome, and all contrariety fades into
    nothingness, since the correlative is not to be found. God is the
    "implicatio" of all opposites. But what in God is "implicatio" and
    "complicatio," becomes "explicatio" in the universe, which results from
    multiplicity, distinction, and opposition. This concept does not differ
    substantially from the Neo-Platonic idea. The "explicatio" is equivalent to
    Platonic emanations, by virtue of which God, absolute unity, becomes
    multiple through subsequent emanations. The concept of Nicholas of Cusa
    becomes more dangerous because of the consequences he derives from
    "explicatio." The world is an infinite potential, and because of this it
    participates in an attribute of divinity. This theory was to be reaffirmed
    by Giordano Bruno."

    It is clear to me that the Cusan not-other implies "difference", and that
    Cusa himself understood that the absolute 'first principle' (God or Essence)
    cannot in any way be differentiated. So the question we're all asking is:
    How does difference result from absolute unity? I have argued (with
    Reinier) that Essence must include "potentiality" or "intentionality" in
    order to create, that the "primary" step in creation is the appearance of
    Difference, and that without this potential, the metaphysical attributes
    "immutable" and "absolute" have no more essence than does pure nothingness.
    I've worked out a "valuistic teleology" for Essence, but am still in search
    of a metaphysical "primary difference". When I find it, you'll be the first
    to know.

    > Please explain what you mean by "not real in the metaphysical
    > sense." I thought metaphysics was about reality, not about
    > what is not real.

    Metaphysics is the study of what lies beyond the physical world(existence).
    Just as Quality is metaphysical reality for Mr. Pirsig, Essence is
    metaphysical reality for me. I do not see Quality (by Pirsig's definition)
    capable of being the primary source or cause. This doesn't seem to bother
    the MoQers who are mainly interested in replacing both religion and
    materialism with a "more aesthetic" doctrine to explain evolution, cultural
    values, and to some extent morality. The MoQ thesis is not a metaphysics in
    the classical sense; it's a belief system that bears a closer resemblance to
    Eastern mysticism than to logical positivism or philosophical idealism.

    > My interest is in understanding you. When you say things like "I think
    > Essence has a 'need' to sense its 'absoluteness' from the perspective of
    > the infinitessimal. In other words, I don't think existence occurs so much
    > by 'natural law' as by what theologists would call 'divine will.' " I'm
    > bewildered.
    >
    > I guess I'm just not up to your high level of philosophical knowledge and
    > sophistication to be able to participate in your metaphysical threads...

    That's plain crap, Platt. It has nothing to do with my level of
    philosophical knowledge. The fact is, you are just not as interested in
    (and therefore not as open to) metaphysical concepts as I am. Your passions
    are focused on the arts and politics -- topics which I find relatively less
    important (i.e., of less value), hence have less to contribute as a
    participant.

    > I wouldn't blame you for not wasting your time answering my questions, >
    but rather spending that time conversing with others who are at your
    > level of expertise. No hard feelings either way.

    I don't know how you possibly could come to the conclusion that I don't wish
    to discuss philosophy with you. Indeed, I very much want and appreciate
    your participation, and have asked for it on more than one occasion. As to
    my supposed "level of expertise" on the subject, I can already hear Paul,
    Ant, MSH, Matt, David, Scott, and the rest of the gang rolling over in
    laughter at the phrase. So, please don't try to make me a whipping boy for
    hurting your feelings. It's a groundless accusation that is not worthy of
    your intelligence.

    Cheers,
    Ham

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