From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sun Sep 25 2005 - 06:49:50 BST
Matt --
You said:
> I still don't think you quite understand what I'm up to (or else you're
> being coy). First of all, I was explicating Pirsig's position.
I understand that perfectly.
> Second, whether we call it metaphysics or not depends on
> how we are defining metaphysics (my hunch being that
> the two of us would use opposing definitions in trying to
> capture what Pirsig is up to (or _should_ be up to).
I define metaphysics as a study of reality beyond the realm of physical
experience. How would you define it? As to what Mr. Pirsig is or should
be up to, I wouldn't presume to speak on his behalf.
> Third, there is no opposition between philosophology and metaphysics,
> at least to which I do the former almost exclusively and the latter
rarely,
> that respects Pirsig's own philosophical scruples (though it may respect
> yours).
True, these are not oppositional approaches (I never said they were), and
true, you philosophologize almost exclusively. I'm puzzled, though, why you
consider your philosophologizing to be in Pirsig's interest, since he's
obviously used this term to deride the practice.
(I won't attempt to untangle your fourth argument because, frankly, it's not
worth the time for either of us.)
Getting on to your answers to my questions ...
Ham asked:
> Why should the subject-object division be an enemy
> to SOM's inventor?
Matt replied:
> Because Pirsig invented it to capture what was wrong
> with contemporary philosophy.
Do you really feel that contemporary philosophy is generally more
"dualistic" than that of the Greeks, the medievalists, and the renaissance
philosophers? Strange. I see it going in Pirsig's direction.
Ham also asked:
> If rocks are causally independent of man's experience, to what do we
> attribute their cause? If Mr. Pirsig has laid out a Creation ontology,
I'm
> not aware of it.
Matt replied:
> Indeed, Pirsig does not have a "Creation ontology,"
> which I consider to be a plus.
I know you feel this way, despite all the confusion and speculation in its
absence. What I still can't understand is why?
Matt:
> I don't think we need anything more grandiose than that,
> like the Creation story in Genesis or in Aristotle's
> Metaphysics.
No, we don't need anything grandiose, just more fundamental and precise.
While a dose of Aristotelian dialectics might improve the MoQ's
comprehensibility, I suspect Pirsig would have chosen neo-Platonism for his
metaphysical model (as I did).
Ham:
> Are the levels "inorganic", "biological", "social" and
> "intellectual" also pre-conscious?
Matt:
> So it would seem to imply, but I've suggested on
> occasion that the consequence of Pirsig's claims about
> experience being synonymous with reality is that other
> terms dancing around in the same sphere, like
> consciousness, are also thusly redescribed.
> On my reading, if we are willing to suppose that rocks
> experience other rocks, then we could also just as
> easily say that rocks are conscious of other rocks.
> Saying this is no big deal. What we need to remember,
> though, is that rocks, cells, animals, and humans have
> different kinds of consciousness. This is what I
> intimated when I said that rocks only experience other
> rocks. ...
Aren't you "dancing around" my question??
I won't embarrass you by asking what "different kind of consciousness" a
rock needs in order to have experience. Concerning the "human" variety,
however, what is the motive behind the following assertion?
Matt:
> While Pirsig appears to be ubiquitizing experience and
> consciousness, thus making them completely useless
> (which, in a sense, he is and with good reason) ...
> He thus saves our intuition that there is a difference
> between humans and rocks ...
As a philosophologist, do you believe philosophers have overemphasized
conscious awareness as a uniquely human attribute? If so, based on your
assessment (above) of Pirsig's intent, do you think philosophers have "good
reason" to present the case that experience and consciousness are
"completely useless"?
On second thought, you're probably right, Matt. If you ever did decide to
discuss metaphysics seriously, you and I would be at opposite ends of the
pole.
Thanks for your responses, anyway.
Ham
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