From: David M (davidint@blueyonder.co.uk)
Date: Thu Oct 13 2005 - 22:56:21 BST
Hi guys
is there a distinction between
value-experience that is undeniablein quality: colour/pain/pleasure, etc
and that which we cut by choice to handle sq-patterns?
DM
----- Original Message -----
From: "ian glendinning" <psybertron@gmail.com>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 5:55 PM
Subject: Re: MD Rhetoric
> Matt, DMB,
> I can't comment on the Hayes source, but I have a suggestion ..
>
> When you say Matt (of DMB) "It boggles my mind to think that one can
> have value at the heart of it all without valuing."
>
> Is this not just terminology again. DMB is using valuing / judging as
> post-immediate-experience intellectual processes, but he is using
> value as the more immediate experience before any active valuing.
>
> Actively (dynamically) experienced value, not actively valued value.
>
> Just a suggestion.
> Ian
>
> On 10/10/05, Matt Kundert <pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> DMB,
>>
>> DMB said:
>> This is why I think Pirsig and Hayes ARE saying the same thing. They're
>> both
>> talking about an experience in which judgement is absent. I would even go
>> so
>> fat as to say that taking the "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum", the
>> "pure sensation" or "immeditate experience" as a reference to some kind
>> of
>> "valuing" or "judging" is to inappropriately let SOM's subjective self
>> creep
>> back into the conversation.
>>
>> Matt:
>> I'm actually very surprised by this. I think the reading of the hot
>> stove
>> example you just gave is totally wrong. I actually wonder what Paul and
>> Anthony think of your most recent writings about Hayes and Pirsig. Up
>> until
>> a week ago, I thought everyone, even me, agreed on Pirsig's central
>> insight.
>> And not only that, you appear to think what you're saying is normal and
>> not a radical departure from typical readings of Pirsig. I just can't
>> believe any one impressed by Pirsig would say the above. The only thing
>> I
>> can really say is, Why did Pirsig call the ultimate reality Quality
>> (which
>> he uses interchangeably with Value) if what you say is true? It boggles
>> my
>> mind to think that one can have value at the heart of it all without
>> valuing. Touching the stove is not a neutral impression, as you would
>> have
>> it, its a negative experience, a low-Quality situation, as Pirsig says in
>> the very passage in question.
>>
>> DMB said:
>> If the four of us were in a room together, then you would be in the
>> minority
>> [about the utility of "pure sensation"], but when it comes to the world
>> of
>> philosophy, I think Hayes, Pirsig and I are part of a tiny minority.
>>
>> Matt:
>> I don't know about that. Pure sensations, in one form or another, were
>> very
>> fashionable after Locke, particularly at the beginning of this century.
>> I
>> don't know if they're "in" now, but I don't think they're as rare as you
>> seem to think.
>>
>> After my little dialogue between X and Y, I said:
>> if the conversation goes anything like that, then the user of the
>> distinction is, to quote X, "in trouble." The reason Y's in trouble is
>> because "adequacy" only comes into play if you are trying to _represent_
>> something already there (i.e. experience or reality). That's
>> representationalism to a T. And if you have representationalism, as you
>> tacitly agreed to earlier, then you have the appearance/reality
>> distinction.
>> If Y doesn't say adequate, and can't really think of a replacement
>> purpose
>> for keeping it around, then that's a good reason for thinking that the
>> distinction has outlived its usefulness.
>>
>> DMB said:
>> What's the purpose of making a distinction between divided and undivided
>> reality? ... There's more than one reason, more than one purpose, but I
>> suppose the main reasons for making this distinction is "to explain
>> Indian
>> mysticism". ( page 109) "with the identification of static and Dynamic as
>> the fundamental division of the world, Phaedrus felt that some kind of
>> goal
>> had been reached. This first division of the MOQ now coverd the spectrum
>> of
>> experience from primitive mysticism to quantum mechanics." (page 120)
>> ...
>> But I think its pretty clear that static/Dynamic split grew out of the
>> desire to create a system that does not exclude mysticism the way SOM
>> does,
>> or even the way a classic/romantic split would. Its only a little bit of
>> an
>> exaggeration to say that the whole point and purpose of the MOQ is to
>> create
>> a system which does not dismiss enlightenment as some kind of brain fart
>> or
>> crazy platypus. I seem to recall that he said something about values and
>> morals too, but its pretty clear mysticism is central to the whole
>> project.
>>
>> Matt:
>> Thing is, I'm not dismissing mystic enlightenment at all "as some kind of
>> brain fart or crazy platypus." I am saying that _one_ way to describe it
>> is
>> as a neuron firing (if you're saying it _can't_ be so described, then you
>> are committing the mistake of "insisting on a particular description"
>> that
>> you denied you were doing earlier). Another way is as "pure sensation."
>> And there are many other ways. What I'm saying is that "pure sensation"
>> is
>> not a good description for epistemological purposes. You appear to be
>> saying that we _need_ to keep it no matter what, otherwise we'll be
>> excluding "mysticism the way SOM does." You say, "The distinction
>> [between
>> divided and undivided reality] is made to include a category of
>> experiences
>> that were previously excluded, to bring in a whole range of human
>> experiences and put them on the philosophical table for consideration."
>> You
>> are saying that these experiences were there, but Western philosophy was
>> just rejecting them, ignoring them. But how can you say that without the
>> word "adequacy"? You think Pirsig is better because he more _adequately_
>> describes our experience, he describes the _whole_ range rather than just
>> part, he doesn't ignore certain sections of it. You don't want to say
>> that,
>> as when you say, "I don't think I'm talking about 'adequacy' because I'm
>> not
>> trying to 'represent' something already there," but you _are_ trying to
>> represent something "already there"---the range of human experiences that
>> the West leaves off the philosophical table. So as far as I can see you
>> haven't yet given me a replacement purpose for "adequate" that keeps you
>> well away from epistemology and the appearance/reality distinction, the
>> need
>> to answer the skeptic.
>>
>> Matt
>>
>> _________________________________________________________________
>> Don't just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search!
>> http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
>>
>>
>>
>> MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
>> Mail Archives:
>> Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
>> Nov '02 Onward -
>> http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
>> MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
>>
>> To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
>> http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
>>
>>
>
>
>
> MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
> Mail Archives:
> Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
> Nov '02 Onward -
> http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
> MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
>
> To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
> http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
>
>
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Oct 14 2005 - 01:26:44 BST