From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Thu Oct 27 2005 - 05:23:45 BST
Bo,
In your response to my post you ignored my Barfieldian comments, which
basically means that you are not allowing me to make my case. Unfortunately,
I cannot include the full argumentation that Barfield provides (it took him
a book, albeit a short one, to do it, and so it would take me). All I can do
is relate his conclusions, and point out that if one accepts them, then
significant parts of SOL (and the MOQ) become untenable.
As I understand it, you are saying that though SOM did not appear as clearly
"subject-object metaphysics" until Descartes, the dualities of Greek
metaphysics were, so to speak, incipient SOM, that they set up the dualities
that turned into SOM. And you claim that the MOQ finally breaks this
pattern.
First, a remark on this supposed break. I don't see how the MOQ has broken
this pattern, if SOM is characterized the way you have (that is, based on
the Greek dualities). I see no difference between Aristotle's form/substance
division and Pirsig's dynamic/static division except that Aristotle placed
creativity on the form side, and Pirsig on the dynamic (formless) side. A
significant difference, I admit, but still a footnote to Plato. So why isn't
the MOQ also in the Western, SOM, tradition?
But that is not the main point I want to make.
Basically, Barfield would reject your contention that ancient and medieval
philosophy was incipient SOM. The philosophy that developed into SOM was
nominalism (which began to be taken seriously in the 14th century). Prior to
that, though there was a categorization into soul and body (along with many
other categorizations), that was no more fundamental than the MOQ's
categorization into levels of SQ. Knowledge was not a mind separated from
nature and observing nature and coming up with intellectual patterns about
nature, rather it was participation between mind and nature. From a SOM
(modern) point of view, all this is more SOM-like theorizing. That is, it is
assumed that pre-modern observation was the same as it is today, and that
participation was just another intellectual pattern about mind and nature.
Barfield argues that that was not the case, rather that the participation
the ancients and medievals talked about was what they experienced, a dying
stage of the original participation of pre-intellectual humanity.
Nominalism arose because this participation died out. It could not have
arisen until that happened. With nominalism, and only then, was intellect
experienced as strictly a human mental faculty. Then, and only then, could
SOM arise. Then, and only then, would a philosophy that "intellect makes
everything" (e.g., Plotinus) be seen as "idealism" (a SOM variation). In
other words, your characterization of pre-modern philosophy is based on SOM.
Nominalism created the fundamental intellect/world distinction that became
SOM, and I note that both the MOQ and SOL preserves that distinction, by
believing that intellect came into existence from a world without it. The
MOQ is recoverable, in my opinion, by noting that value implies intellect
(separate argumentation is needed for this). This will change the
characterization of the fourth static level, (and of course the
characterization of DQ as "pre-intellectual"). And to finally overcome the
Aristotelian form/formless distinction that the MOQ adapts will require the
logic of contradictory identity, but that is also another argument.
(BTW, with this last comment I hope it is clear that I am not saying that
all we need to do is go back to pre-modern metaphysics. It doesn't work in
our post-modern situation. But those difficulties are not because it is
incipient SOM).
- Scott
----- Original Message -----
From: < >
To: < >
Sent: Wednesday, October 26, 2005 2:07 AM
Subject: Re: MD The SOL fallacy was the intelligence fallacy (was
Hi Scott
23 Oct.you wrote:
> I see no evidence in, say, Plotinus, that he thought in terms of "a
> mind that thinks".
Plotinus is a neo-platonist, in ZMM the reasoning is that the
subject/object world view emerged with the ancient Greek
thinkers. This went through several stages, but wasn't close to the
"mind/matter" variety, rather a search for eternal principles
beyond the mythological reality. Anaxagoras was ... (ZMM p 366)
"...the first to identify the One as NOUS, meaning "mind".
and Parmenides:
"...made it clear for the first time that the immoral
principle, the one, truth,god is separate from appearance
and from opinion, and the importance of this separation
and its effect upon subsequent history cannot be
overstated..."
As said those thinkers did not speak of a subject or mind, the
idea is that these principles be they "water" (Thales), Air
(Anaximenes) "numbers" (Pythagoras) "fire" (Heraclitus) ....etc.
were regarded as something beyond both humans and gods.
I can't go through it all, but with Socrates it had become
Truth/Opinion, with Plato Ideas/Appearances, with Aristotle
Substance/Appearances, only much later did the mind that
observes naturlal constants occur (Descartes) and the many spin-
offs.
> For Plotinus, the first emanation from the One was
> Intellect (nous),
Of course Plotinus saw the first emanation from the One (God) as
"nous" his was Medieval times. This is my very point: If we allow
SOM or intellect's view of itself we get mind, but what we want is
the MOQ's view of intellect which is the mind/matter distinction.
Will you ever get this?
> not Something That Thinks. Nor did Hegel or
> Coleridge, so I hardly think of the MOQ as the "first ever". In
> fact, I don't think that was much of a confinement at all.
Hegel and Coleridge!? All Western philosophy after Plato has
been footnotes to him, how can they apply in a MOQ discussion?
> I don't
> assume a "mind that thinks" either, and I wonder where you get the
> idea that I do.
Maybe "mind AND thinking" confuses, but you postulate intellect
as where all emanates from. For example this to Ian
Glendinning (Oct.17):
"..... what intellect means to me, namely, the creating and
manipulating of, and reflection on, symbolic SQ".
You use some perfunctory "Q" terms, but it sounds like intellect
creates and manipulates and reflects on "symbolic static quality"
which means that all static levels are thoughts.
> I just assume "thinking",
Right: All is thoughts.
> and that it will always shake out in a
> dynamic/static manner (though one can use other word pairs as well,
> including S/O[2], though not S/O[1]).
Trust Scott to add something cryptic, but I implore you to
contemplate my point that intellect regards itself as from where
everything emanates, while it from a MOQ view is THE VALUE
of the distinction between the said intellect and what emanates
from it.
Bo
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