From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Fri Nov 18 2005 - 18:39:49 GMT
<This is a much revised resend, so if the original shows up, it just has the
snippy part>
Case,
Your post is filled with a bunch of references and questions which I don't
see the point of. On Jaynes and Barfield, "Saving the Appearances" was
published in 1958, Jaynes' book in the 70's. They are talking about the same
thing, only Jaynes, as a materialist, naturally tries to squeeze it into a
brain thing.
Let me repeat where I am coming from. I reject the materialist's view that
consciousness came to be in a world without it for two reasons:
1. QM shows that what underlies our perception of spatio-temporal things and
events cannot be understood as spatio-temporal things and events. It
therefore seems reasonable to assume that spatio-temporality of the things
and events perceived (what makes them, in fact, things) is produced in the
act of perception from this underlying structure. It thus makes no sense to
try to explain perception in terms of spatio-temporal things and events.
2. If the universe consists of chemical reactions, with each reaction
separated in space and/or time from the others, how can there be awareness
of anything larger than a chemical reaction?
Now if you want to convince me that I am wrong to look for an alternate
metaphysics that does not fall prey to these objections, you're going to
have to show me what is wrong with them. You haven't done that, and instead
fill your posts with what -- in this context -- are irrelevancies. That is,
you do everything but address these objections. You also haven't shown me
what's wrong with my "value implies semiosis" argument, just labelled it as
a house of cards.
Now there's nothing saying you have to go along with what I am saying. You
can, as all materialists do, just ignore these objections. If you do,
though, you have no basis for saying it is just "speculation" (much less
calling it "weird"), with the implication that all those materialist
philosophers (like Dennett, who nowhere in "Consciousness Explained"
addresses these objections) aren't equally speculative and weird.
<That was all of the original, what follows is a little more responsive>
[Case]
<skip a lot of stuff on ancient (pre-500 BCE) culture, in relation to
Jaynes' theory, I presume. Publication dates noted above, so the question is
whether Jaynes knew of but ignored Barfield, or just didn't know of
Barfield's work. Probably the latter, but even if known would probably have
ignored, since Barfield would not have registered in Jaynes' materialist
outlook.>
Case said:
I recently saw an episode of Nova where a lost work: "The Method" of
Archimedes had been found. It indicated that before 300 B.C. Archimedes had
discovered the method used by Newton and Leibniz to develop the calculus.
There was a paradigm shift laying in the scrap paper bin of some gothic
monastery for more than 1000 years before Newton and 400 hundred odd to grow
on.
Scott:
Yes, and someone in Alexandria made a steam engine. Barfield would probably
say that consciousness hadn't evolved well enough for society as a whole to
think of these sorts of things as useful -- one hadn't yet come to the point
of seeing nature as just "out there" to allow it to be studied objectively.
Case said:
But seriously have you never played Age of Empires?
Scott:
No, don't know what it is.
-----------------------------------------------
[Case]
So they co-exist?
Scott said:
If by "they" you mean consciousness and semiotics, I am saying that they are
two ways of considering the same (non-)thing. Quality is another way.
[Case]
And there are a thousand other ways of considering it. It is the Koan of the
Blind Men and the Elephant.
Scott:
No, I don't quite agree, since I don't think there is anything mysterious
about the different ways. One says "consciousness" when one wants to bring
to mind connotations of words like 'awareness', 'experience', 'perceive',
while one uses 'semiotics' when one wants to bring to mind connotations of
words like 'communication' and 'expression', and one uses 'quality' to bring
out connotations like 'value', 'good', 'feeling'. Then are a couple of words
than span two or more: 'meaning' and 'judgment'.
----------------------------------------------------
Scott said:
I don't follow. What does this have to do with attempting to explain
perception with the products of perception?
[Case]
Since we do this I am not sure I need to explain why we can't.
Scott said:
We do this? How so? There is no explanation of perception from the products
of perception that I am aware of. And, of course, I am saying there can't be
one.
[Case]
I may not full understand this question but I would want to make reference
to the things perceived. Since I don't assume the objects of perception
necessarily feel the need for an explanation; I am happy to oblige them. But
I also rely on them and discussed them with others so that my perception
does not make me the object of deception.
Scott:
Which is to say, you are sticking to a belief in the material existence of
the objects of perception. My objections above are why I don't assume this
belief, which is to say that they are the reason why I think you *are*
deceived.
----------------------------------------------
Scott said:
So we agree that there is non-spatio-temporal reality "behind" the
spatio-temporal that we sense? So I am asking: why attempt to explain
sensing in terms of the products of sensing? Or memory (that is, why attempt
to explain it as spatio-temporal neural activity)?
[Case]
I know neither, how many dimensions there are nor where they stand in
relationship to one another. I am not sure if they are discrete or
continuous. But when Ham tells me to adopt the position of a Supernatural
Being that can see the beginning and end of things it is not as though I
can't do that. It is the teleology implied that disturbs me not the
doability. You seem to be suggesting that consciousness is able to supply
direction and purpose or a minimum a motive force.
Scott:
You don't know (nor do I) how many mathematical dimensions physicists will
need in their theories. But it sure looks like it will be a different number
than the five of perception (3 space, 1 time, 1 mass). For example, the
description of electrons requires complex (2-dimensional) numbers; one
"revolution" of a spinning electron goes through 720 degrees, and so on,
none of which "shows up" in perception.
On teleology, yes, the MOQ, Ham, and I accept it, and you don't. More
'tis/'taint, with my 'tis being a consequence of my rejection of the
materialist 'taint, and that rejection of materialism being a consequence of
the objections stated above. So it says nothing to me that you reject
teleology unless and until you can answer my objections.
----------------------------------------------------------
Scott said:
What we don't see manifesting itself in brain activity is consciousness of
brain activity (or anything else). If you're going to restrict yourself to
scientific evidence, you've got no way to back up the view that the brain
produces consciousness. No such evidence can distinguish between the
producing and regulating positions.
[Case]
If this were a purely scientific discussion we probably wouldn't be talking
about consciousness at all. The term itself either resists definition or
carries too much baggage to be meaningful.
Scott:
So why are you here? This is philosophy, where consciousness and its baggage
are extremely meaningful.
Case continued:
Whatever human consciousness is the only place we see it manifest is inside
human skulls. The question of whether consciousness is produced there, or is
regulated there, will have to be answered there. The evidence is
overwhelming that physical and chemical alterations of brain tissue cause
changes in consciousness and can be used to regulate consciousness. If your
version offers some observable benefit over the conventional view what is
it?
Scott:
Barfield and Jaynes claim that once it did not manifest inside the human
skull (though Jaynes must state it as: did not *appear* to manifest itself
there). But again, you are simply repeating your opinion that consciousness
takes place in space and time, while my opinion is that consciousness
creates space and time. So this is more 'tis/'taint. The "observable
benefit" is that it results in a worldview that does not ignore
consciousness and its baggage (and that gives a straightforward
interpretation of QM).
---------------------------------------------
Scott said:
I was distinguishing between perceptual dimensions (3 of space, 1 of time,
and 1 of mass) which QM has shown are insufficient for accounting for
subatomic wave/particles. Physicists' dimensions are mathematical ones,
where the number and type no longer need to be the 5 of perception, now that
physics has overcome the Munchhausen fallacy. The strange thing is that
people who want to explain perception in terms of spatio-temporal neural
activity still haven't.
[Case]
I won't repeat myself again except to say that Mandelbrot shows that
dimension are not necessarily discrete. He put the fractions in fractal.
Try Flatland, or Wrinkle in Time or the cheesy SciFi Channel Hypercube, but
Dr. Who was the best.
Have you read either of the Wilsons? Either E.O. or Robert Anton.
Scott:
Fractional dimensions are mathematical objects. We don't perceive fractional
dimensions. I've read R.A. (and Flatland, and about hypercubes), have only
read about E.O. Don't know how any of this is relevant to my objections.
---------------------------------------------------
Scott said:
Yes and no. The difference between me and the materialist is on the question
of whether normal waking human consciousness is produced by brain activity
or whether it is regulated by brain activity. I go with the latter, that the
brain's role in human consciousness is to keep the senses aligned with each
other and with thinking in order to operate in a spatiotemporal manner.
[Case]
I would say that the brain is kind a tabla rasa except that unlike slate
it's texture is not always smooth or even flat. In places you have to use a
special marker. If the light is not just right in some places you can't read
what's written and some places are self luminescent. Almost always, it
changes form when you stimulate it.
But it starts out clean.
We have been gifted with sense organs that have evolved in harmony with our
brains. They and the nervous system are input and output. I think they cause
perturbations in the fields generated by the biochemical activity in the
brain. Yamana Yamana Yamana.
Scott:
What is aware of a perturbation? How has a change in perurbation come to be
noticed? By another perturbation? What continues through a change in
perturbation?
---------------------
[Case]
Unless there is something that three or more gathered in his name can agree
upon that would help guide us to a firm decision in this matter I go back to
tossing coins.
Scott said:
Everything that you are saying is just as speculative as what I am saying.
We are battling metaphysics here, which is to say, interpretations of the
scientific evidence, not the evidence itself.
[Case]
But I am speculating about what it would take for us to agree. I am willing
to base a great many decisions on intersubjective analysis and agreement on
the objects of perseption. By what standard are you measuring your
speculation? Even metaphysics has to touch down somewhere.
Scott:
I am giving my reasons for speculating as I do. As I see it, you and all
those who share your analysis are ignoring certain observations one can make
about consciousness.
----------------------------
Scott said:
So how do you justify claiming that the amoeba's behavior can be entirely
explained as a series of chemical reactions, that there is no habit
involved, that there is not even the possibility of habit forming in an
amoeba? Looks like speculation to me.
[Case]
It is theoretical which is in some sense speculative. It is also testable
and evolves dynamically with each test.
Scott:
What are these tests?
-------------------------------------
Scott said:
The existence of virtual life forms or strange attractors or anything of
that nature make no difference to my arguments, since they are all more
forms, and say nothing about how there can be awareness of forms.
[Case]
It seems highly relavant to your arguments. I keep suggesting that you tell
me how to test them. Wolfram's work may offers a way to do so. You could set
up virtual worlds operating in the most dynamic state you could put
together; then stare at it ala Sheldrake. Or you could have subjects
suspected of having high levels of consciousness see if they could guess the
outcome of a series of iterations. Or you could look for dynamic rule sets
using semiotics as a guide.
Or you could say screw Wolfram and look into the anthropology of online
games and see how consciousnesses interacts in a totally artificial synatx.
Scott:
One also has to contend with the sociology of science, though. There was an
experiment done which had two experienced meditators meditate together, then
one would move to another room, Faraday shielded from the first, both being
measured with EEG. A stimulus would be given to one, and both showed a
similar response. So has non-locality been proven in the macroscopic realm?
No, because the write-up of the experiment was not (as far as I know)
published in a refereed journal, because even if it was, no one who opposed
the idea would take the time to attempt to replicate it, and so on. After
reading of this and the whole history of ESP experiments, Sheldrake's
experiments and such, I've decided that seeking scientific validation is
unlikely to get anywhere. We are each going to interpret experience
(including scientific results) according to our respective faiths, and all
we can do is philosophize about them.
- Scott
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