From: Dan Glover (daneglover@hotmail.com)
Date: Thu Nov 24 2005 - 16:38:22 GMT
Hello everyone
>From: "Platt Holden" <pholden@sc.rr.com>
>Reply-To: moq_discuss@moq.org
>To: moq_discuss@moq.org, owner-moq_discuss@venus.co.uk
>Subject: RE: MD Two Theses in the MOQ
>Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2005 10:31:12 -0500
>
>Hi Dan,
>
>Wonderful to hear from you. The debt we have to you for producing "The
>Lila Squad" can never be repaid. I trust you've been well and that your
>entrepreneurial business is booming. :-) Thanks for taking the time to
>write.
Hi Platt
Thank you so much for the welcome (I trust that you mean LILA'S CHILD). I've
been crazy busy since early spring but with the holidays coming up things
are tailing off just a bit. Thanks again for asking. I'd like to add that
I've enjoyed reading your posts over the years as they're always
well-contructed, very informative, and a pleasure to read.
>[snip]
>
>Well, what I think I know about DQ emerged from Pirsig's pen. For example
>(emphasis added):
>
>"Dynamic Quality is the pre-intellectual cutting edge of reality, the
>SOURCE OF ALL THINGS, completely simple, always new. It was the MORAL
>FORCE that had motivated the Brujo in Zuni." (Lila, 9)
>
>"Although Dynamic Quality, the Quality of freedom, CREATES THIS WORLD in
>which we live, these patterns of static quality, the quality of order,
>preserve our world." (Lila, 9)
>
>"Biological evolution can be seen as a process by which weak Dynamic
>FORCES at a subatomic level discover stratagems for overcoming huge static
>inorganic forces at a superatomic level." (Lila, 11)
>
>"What the Dynamic FORCE had to invent in order to move up the molecular
>level and stay there was a carbon molecule . . ." (Lila, 11)
>
>"But restriction that stop the degenerates also stop the CREATIVE DYNAMIC
>FORCES of evolution." (Lila, 17)
>
>Either I've misread Pirsig or he does indeed describe DQ as a creative
>power. In fact, throughout the MOQ you'll find forces at different levels
>competing one one another as well attempting to smother the creative force
>of DQ.
I agree that LILA gives that impression and in LILA'S CHILD Robert Pirsig
has this to say in reply to a question of mine in a similar vein:
"Yes, my statement that Dynamic Quality is always affirmative was not a wise
statement, since it constitutes a limitation or partial definition of
Dynamic Quality. Whenever one talks about Dynamic Quality someone else can
take whatever is said and make a static pattern out of it and then
dialectically oppose that pattern. The best answer to the question, “What is
Dynamic Quality?” is the ancient Vedic one——“Not this, not that.”
If we attribute creative force to Dynamic Quality, aren't we putting
limitations on "it"? That's why I think it best to attribute attention to
Dynamic Quality as the creative force rather than Dynamic Quality itself.
Attention has limits. Dynamic Quality cannot be limited.
>
>Platt referring to Paul's statements:
> > >Now we learn that DQ produces more than value judgments. It produces
> > >INTELLECTUAL value judgments. The difference between plain old value
> > >judgments and intellectual value judgments isn't explained. Further,
>these
> > >intellectual value judgments produce not intellectual patterns but
> > >"explanations."
>
>Dan:
> > If we look at attention to Dynamic Quality (a definition of
>consciousness)
> > as the key to the formation of value judgements, then the formation of
>the
> > explanations (the results of value judgements) are indeed intellectual
> > patterns of value, or ideas.
>
>Yes, a two step process: formation of value judgments, then formation of
>intellectual patters. Values precede concepts. I find it most interesting,
>however, that your define consciousness as "attention to DQ." Since DQ
>played a key role in the development of biological evolution, I presume
>you believe (as I do) that consciousness existed long before humans came
>on the scene, in fact, was there from the very beginning.
Yes I tend to agree with you.
>
> > Again, it is attention to Dynamic Quality that produces value judgements
> > which produces ideas which produces what we know as matter. Reach out
>and
> > touch the desk in front of you. Your idea of desk is filtered through
>the
> > experience of desk, an experience built up over the course of a
>lifetime.
> > So even though it may seem as if desk is really there, apart from the
>you
> > touching desk, desk is really part of the idea of you that has taken a
> > lifetime to construct. Without the idea of you there would be no desk.
> > Therefore, just as the idea of you comes before you, the idea of desk
>comes
> > before desk.
>
>No argument there, except the idea of "attention to DQ" being the creative
>force. The concept of "attention" presupposes an existing entity capable
>of "attending." Do you think that quantum particles are capable of
>attending?
I don't know.
>And who or what created this ability to attend if not DQ?
That's a head scratcher too. But that's Dynamic Quality -- the ultimate head
scratcher.
>
> > >Questions left hanging are:
> > >
> > >Do value judgments occur on a sliding scale from good to awful?
>
> > Of course they do.
>
>Agree. No doubt about it. Also from beautiful to ugly.
>
> > >Are value judgments ideas or feelings?
> >
> > They can be both.
>
>I thought we agreed that value judgments always precede intellectual
>patterns? So wouldn't that rule out ideas?
I think it depends on the context, don't you? For example: When first I
could bring myself to read your reply to my post I thought: Is it a good
idea to put the effort into answering Platt or should I just go on back to
lurking? Going back to lurking would be a whole lot easier but I'm going to
try answering anyway. And that would seem an intellectual value judgment. On
the other hand, leaping off a hot stove on account that I sat down on it
without realizing it was hot is a biological value judgment, or so it would
seem. Only later would I make an intellectual value judgment: Next time I'm
going to check that stove to see if it's hot before I plop my skinny arse
down on it.
>
> > >Are ideas intellectual patterns?
> >
> > According to thesis (1): No. According to thesis (2): Yes.
> >
> > Perhaps this quote from chapter 2 of Buddhism: Plain & Simple by Steve
> > Hagen will help to clarify: "We've all heard the expression 'seeing is
> > believing.' But the fact is that believing is not true SEEING. In fact,
> > they're opposites. Belief is at best an educated, informed conjecture
>about
> > Reality. In contrast, SEEING -- raw, direct, unadulterated experience --
>is
> > the direct perception of Reality Itself." (Caps originally in italics)
> >
> > So, if we apply the MOQ to the above quote, it would seem that Paul's
> > thesis (1) equates to SEEING while thesis (2) equates to believing.
>
>Now I'm really confused. :-)
Oh my! I'm so sorry. That was not my intention. If you have access to a copy
of Steve Hagen's book it might help to read it as I cannot properly explain
just what it is he's getting at with my feeble words. It's a great book; I
think you'll enjoy it. Plus Robert Pirsig recommends it as well.
>
> > >Is there anything intellectual about value judgments?
> >
> > All in good time. Remember the hot stove example in LILA.
>
>Yes, the time element seems crucial --first the value, then the intellect.
>
> > >Do explanations always consist of intellectual patterns?
> >
> > Yes and no. Again, look to the hot stove example.
>
>Are you saying a value judgment amounts to the same thing as an
>explanation? If so, I disagree. I think explanations are always derived
>from intellectual patterns. But "understanding" can come from value
>judgments alone.
I'm unconvinced things are as clear cut as all that. To be sure what we're
talking about is the same, I took the liberty of looking up the following:
value judgment
n.
A judgment that assigns a value, as to an object or action; a subjective
evaluation.
explanation
n 1: a statement that makes something comprehensible by describing the
relevant structure or operation or circumstances etc.; "the explanation was
very simple"; "I expected a brief account" [syn: account] 2: thought that
makes something comprehensible 3: the act of explaining; making something
plain or intelligible; "I heard his explanation of the accident"
(www.dictionary.com)
This book explains things very well; now I understand. Is the book an
intellectual pattern of value? Yes and no. I understood that the stove was
hot when I sat down on it so I quickly moved. Is the stove an intellectual
pattern of value? Yes and no. Now, do explanations always consist of
intellectual patterns of value? Yes and no.
>
> > >Are intellectual patterns always "contextualized?"
> >
> > Yes I should
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