RE: MD Pirsig the postmodernist?

From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sun Mar 30 2003 - 20:22:08 BST

  • Next message: Elizaphanian: "MD what is a fact?"

    Matt and all MOQers:

    Matt said:
    Granted that not all mysticisms are the same. The main point I want to
    make about mysticism is that if it has a concept of "maya," a notion that
    if we move past the illusion of our senses or concepts or language or
    whatever, that we will then see Reality as it truly wants to be seen, then
    I would interpret it as having an appearance/reality distinction. For any
    particular version of mysticism (or religion or philosophy, for that
    matter), they may not fall in with this distinction, but that's a
    scholastic issue as opposed to the metaphilosophical point I just made.

    DMB says:
    You're hunting in the wrong ocean, Ahab. Your great white whale, the
    appearence/reality distinction, swims in the sea of epistemology.
    Metaphilosophically or otherwise, mysticism is not the same as epistemology.
    Recalling chapter 9 of Lila, we know that Pirsig's expanded empiricism stops
    short of making any claims about what it "really" is that holds that glass
    of water together, he just says the patterns are static enough that we can
    trust it to keep our laps dry. If that's not pragmatic, nothing is. More
    importantly, Pirsig's epistemology is not haunted by the appearence/reality
    distinction, and that's where it really counts.

    Matt said:
    Now, as for a "conflation of appearance/reality and mysticism in Pirsig," I
    don't want to say that Pirsig conflates them. I would more say that Pirsig
    characterizes the mysticisms he's talking about _because_ of the
    appearance/reality distinction I see him using. This is a scholastic
    question, but I've thought of the easiest way to catch him doing
    it. Pirsig describes Dynamic Quality as the "pre-intellectual cutting edge
    of reality" and as unmediated experience. The notion of us stripping away
    our language and concepts to get at _real_ experience dips into the
    appearance/reality distinction.

    DMB says:
    You're demonstrating a misunderstanding of mysticism here. You've
    misconstrued it as epistemology so that "unmediated experience" becomes the
    real reality or foundation. But that's not what's going on at all in these
    descriptions. Pirsig is only making a distinction about two kinds of
    experience, mediated and unmediated, static and Dynamic. Pirsig's expanded
    empiricism says both kinds of experience are valid and verifiable. The
    distinction between these two kinds of experience does not does not "dip
    into the appearance/reality distinction" because experiences ARE appearences
    and in the MOQ that IS reality. Distinct? Heck, in the MOQ appearance and
    reality are indentical. Experience is all you get.

    Matt continued: ... Pirsig says in Ch 9, "The purpose of
    mystic meditation is not to remove oneself from experience but to bring
    one's self closer to it by eliminating stale, confusing, static,
    intellectual attachments of the past." The problem with this statement
    from my standpoint is that we are always in connection with experience, we
    can never remove ourselves from it. Pirsig's statement makes no sense when
    you compare it to his statements that we are everywhere in touch with
    Quality. You can't really have it both ways.

    DMB says:
    It makes sense when you see that he's talking about the static/Dynamic
    split. Yes, we are everywhere in touch with Quality, but there are two
    different kinds. Re-reading your favorite book is different than tripping
    your face off in a teepee. He's just saying that letting go of the static
    opens up the Dynamic. We do have it both ways all the time. A hurricane, a
    vacation, a sail boat, a cretive impulse, a new song, a mystical experience.
    Most of us know this kind of experience first hand, its just that Pirsig is
    saying it ought not be dismissed as an aberation, fantasy or hallucination.
    He's saying emptiness is huge.

    Matt said:
    With the picture of Dynamic Quality as unmediated experience, we can read
    another piece of evidence as not just an over-embellishment. In Ch 8
    (beginning), Pirsig uses the glasses analogy. He says, "The culture in
    which we live hands us a set of intellectual glasses to interpret
    experience with...." This is great. However, historicists say that its
    intellectual glasses all the way down. Pirsig however says, "If someone
    sees things through a somewhat different set of glasses or, God help him,
    _takes his glasses off_, [my emphasis] the natural tendency of those who
    still have their glasses on is to regard his statements as somewhat weird,
    if not actually crazy." It might be easy to try and gloss this as Pirsig
    simply going a little too far over the top and that we shouldn't take him
    so literally. However, in light of "DQ as unmediated experience" and his
    later discussion of insanity, it seems to me clear that Pirsig does think
    we can get behind our language, our concepts, our appearances.

    DMB says:
    I've already commented on the issues of mediated and unmediated experiences,
    and on the difference between mysticism and empiricism, but let's take a
    look at the "interpretive glasses" that Pirsig is talking about. I think
    they have very little to do with the appearance/reality distinction. I don't
    even think that Pirsig is doing epistemology with these glasses. No, Ahab, I
    think he's talking about cultural relativity, a topic near and dear to the
    postmodern heart. He's acknowledging the important postmodern insight that
    our values and beliefs are determined by a particular cultural context.
    Unlike the extreme pomos, however, he does not take that to mean that values
    and beliefs are arbitrary or meaningless. In fact, the MOQ says that our
    social and intellectual constructs have a structure, serve a purpose, are
    just as real as rocks and trees, and that the failure to recognize this is a
    disaster with real consequences. I think the nihilistic kind of
    postmodernism you seem to be asserting is actually the kind of thing the MOQ
    is supposed to cure. It represents the kind of moral relativity that makes
    the Rigels so angry, but Pirsig explains why Rigel is wrong to think he was
    one of them, remember?

    Thanks for your time.

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sun Mar 30 2003 - 20:24:11 BST