From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Wed Apr 09 2003 - 03:27:19 BST
Matt,
I agree with this anti-reductionist approach, but (no surprise) not with the
"physicalism". Further, it is the "physicalism" that I regard as the kind of
metaphysical assumption that -- it seems to me -- Rorty should be decrying,
not supporting. You quote:
> A "physicalist" is "someone who is prepared to say that every event can be
> described in micro-structural terms, a description which mentions only
> elementary particles.
and I also found this in the essay:
"Davidson suggests that we see these two explanations as two descriptions of
the same process."
My question is: why add this additional, non-empirical claim to one's
worldview? Why isn't it sufficient to say: I work with two language games,
one for discussing beliefs and desires, and one for discussing neural
activity. Why add that they are two descriptions of the same process? Why
isn't this an appearance/reality distinction: the appearance is of two
language games, and the reality is (the claim that) there is really just one
process.
I would guess that the answer to "why make the addition" is found in: "In
terms of mind and brain, physicalists hope that physiology may someday
describe our actions in micro-structural terms." Physicalists are betting
one way, while I am betting another, and this choice of bet does affect
one's actions. But the only program that I can see resulting from taking the
physicalist bet is to urge one on to actually look for that description of
"our actions in micro-structural terms", which is to say, finding that
reduction of the one language to the other. That seems to me to contradict
the virtue of being anti-reductionalist.
- Scott
----- Original Message -----
From: "Matt the Enraged Endorphin" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Tuesday, April 08, 2003 12:16 PM
Subject: Re: MD Mysticism and the appearance/reality distinction
> Scott,
>
> I think you make a very good point given the material you are using. I've
> admitted before (I think) that I'm fairly unfamiliar with Philosophy and
> the Mirror of Nature. I haven't read the whole thing, only bits and
> pieces. What I have read are his post-PMN writings and, since Rorty is
> more than willing to admit that his first opus is now a little outdated
and
> in some cases wrongheaded (I can cite at least one place off the top of my
> head where he admits this), I don't want to convince anybody that "PMN
> Rorty" is anti-reductionist (though it is possible). However, just as we
> are given to periodize other thinkers (the pertinent one coming to mine
> being Pirsig) I would like to convince people that "post-PMN Rorty" is.
My
> main source for this view (for anyone keeping score) is his piece in
> Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, "Non-Reductive Physicalism" (all
> citations will be to ORT). This essay is one of many expositions Rorty
has
> written about the philosopher Donald Davidson, so Rorty attributes this
> position to Davidson and, in so doing, co-opts for his own.
>
> This is mainly going to one big quote from Rorty, so people who don't care
> about Rorty can tune out now if you haven't already.
>
" (114) in > A "physicalist" is "someone who is prepared to say that every
event can be
> described in micro-structural terms, a description which mentions only
> elementary particlesaddition to macro-structural terms. In
> terms of mind and brain, physicalists hope that physiology may someday
> describe our actions in micro-structural terms. For macro-structural
> terms, we already have "folk psychology," "an explanation which predicts
my
> action on the basis of my newly-acquired belief, taken together with the
> rest of my beliefs and desires." (114) The physicalist suggests "that we
> see these two explanations as two descriptions of the same process, and
the
> 'mental' and the 'physical' events as the same events under two
> descriptions. The difference between mind and body ... is thus no more
> mysterious than, e.g., the relation between a macro-structural and a
> micro-structural description of a table." (114)
>
> To say that Rorty is a "non-reductive" physicalist, is to say that "he
> combines this claim [about physicalism] with the doctrine that 'reduction'
> is a relation merely between linguistic items, not among ontological
> categories." (114-5) A reduction of the language of X's to the language
of
> Y's, does not show that "X's are _nothing but_ Y's". (115) "For most
> interesting examples of X and Y (e.g., minds and bodies, tables and
> particles) there are lots of true sentences about X's in which 'Y' cannot
> be substituted for 'X' while preserving truth. The only way to show that
> 'there are no X's' would be to show that there are no such sentences.
That
> would amount to showing that 'X' and 'Y' were merely, so to speak,
> stylistic variations of one another." (115)
>
> Rorty continues to say that it is very rare to be able to "show that a
> given language-game which has been played for some time is, in fact,
> dispensable. This is because any tool which has been used for some time
is
> likely to continue to have a use. The cases in which a tool _can_ be
> discarded will be recognized as such only after a new tool has been
devised
> and has been employed for some time." (115) In the cases where, for
> instance, we move from a Aristotelian vocabulary to a Newtonian one,
> "X-talk just fades away, not because someone has made a philosophical or
> scientific discovery that there are no X's, but because nobody any longer
> has a use for this sort of talk." It is perfectly compatible to be
> non-reductive physicalist and say "we shall probably continue to talk
about
> mental entities -- beliefs, desires, and the like -- forever. Such talk
is
> not metaphorical, does not need to be bracketed, does not need to be made
> more precise or scientific, does not need philosophical
> clarification. Further, it would be wrong to suggest that talk about
minds
> is necessary for convenience but is not to be taken as 'the truth about
the
> way the world is'. To say that we shall always be talking about beliefs
> and desires is to say that folk psychology will probably remain the best
> way of predicting what our friends and acquaintances will do next. That
is
> all that one could possibly mean by saying 'There really are mental
> entities'. Similarly, the best way to predict the behavior of tables will
> probably remain to talk about them qua tables rather than as collections
of
> particles or as fuzzy replicas of the Platonic archetypal Table. That is
> all that one could possibly mean by saying 'There really are tables'."
(115)
>
> I have to go, so I don't have time to gloss anything or answer what I
think
> will be one of your first objections (Rorty's nominalism), but I think
most
> of this stands by itself. My hope is that this answers the scholastic
> question of whether Rorty's a reductionist or not.
>
> Matt
>
>
>
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