From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Thu Apr 10 2003 - 21:13:44 BST
[Part 2B of www.elizaphanian.v-2-1.net/Eudaimonic-moq.htm]
EUDAIMONIA OR INTELLECT?
This was an issue that was worked through by the tragedians before it was
examined by Socrates, and it was first comprehended and codified (static
latched) by Aristotle, most particularly in his Ethics, his account of the
virtues, judgement and human flourishing or happiness, which, in Greek, is
eudaimonia. Martha Nussbaum describes eudaimonia in the following way:
"Some texts we shall discuss are rendered obscure on this point by the
common translation of Greek 'eudaimonia' by English 'happiness'. Especially
given our Kantian and Utilitarian heritage in moral philosophy, in both
parts of which 'happiness' is taken to be the name of a feeling of
contentment or pleasure, and a view that makes happiness the supreme good is
asumed to be, by definition, a view that gives supreme value to
psychological states rather than to activities, this translation is badly
misleading. To the Greeks, eudaimonia means something like 'living a good
life for a human being'; or as a recent writer, John Cooper, has suggested,
'human flourishing'. Aristotle tells us that it is equivalent, in ordinary
discourse, to 'living well and doing well'. Most Greeks would understand
eudaimonia to be something essentially active, of which praiseworthy
activities are not just productive means, but actual constituent parts. It
is possible for a Greek thinker to argue that eudaimonia is equivalent to a
state of pleasure; to this extent activity is not a conceptual part of the
notion. But even here we should be aware that many Greek thinkers conceive
of pleasure as something active rather than stative; an equation of
eudaimonia with pleasure might, then, not mean what we would expect it to
mean in a Utilitarian writer. The view that eudaimonia is equivalent to a
state of pleasure is an unconventional and prima facie counterintuitive
position in the Greek tradition. A very common position would be
Aristotle's, that eudaimonia consists in activity according to
excellence(s)."
To put this in straightforward MoQ terms, we might say that eudaimonia is
activity governed by Quality.
Does 'intellect' capture what we think of when we think of human
excellences? Platt Holden has commented: 'Where intellect dominates, the
byword for individuals is "Is it logical?" and/or "Is it scientific?" ' I
agree with this; I agree that this is the nature of intellectual domination;
that this is what is commonly understood by 'intellectual' and, moreover,
that this is what Pirsig has in mind in describing the fourth level of the
MoQ as intellectual. So the values of the fourth level, on this conception,
are precisely intellectual values - whether something is logical and/or
scientific. It is this conception of the fourth level that I believe to be
misconceived.
There are a great many human excellences which cannot be adequately
conceptualised using the framework of 'social - intellectual - DQ'. Using
Pirsig's method, if you take all those elements away, is there anything
left? I think that there is - not in each and every case, but in many cases
that people are familiar with. For example, in human relationships like
marriage, I think there is something present which isn't adequately captured
by that analysis. When someone is bereaved, the prospect of 'replacing' a
person makes no sense - yet it would be possible to replace (or even
improve!) the biological, social and intellectual qualities of the person
lost. Secondly, consider a discipline like psychotherapy. Is this simply to
make people socially well-adjusted and/or intellectually capable? Or are
there aims, eg Jung's theory of individuation, which resolve around richer
conceptions of what human beings are capable of? Thirdly, consider music. Is
music purely about intellectual value, or is there something missing if
music is assessed purely in quasi-mathematical terms? (Wittgenstein: "it has
been impossible for me to say one word in my book about what music has meant
to me in my life. How then can I hope to be understood?") Fourthly, poetry.
Is poetry fully understood in logical terms? Or as a social function? Surely
not. And I could go on: excellence in sporting endeavour; opera or ballet;
art and architecture; hosting an outstanding dinner party with close
friends; watching a beloved child win a prize at school. Are all these
excellences resolvable into biological/social/ intellectual categories? In
particular, are the elements that we consider most valuable about them, once
we take away the elements that are valued by the biological and social
levels, fully understood or intelligible as 'intellectual' values (remember:
logically or scientifically acceptable)?
My argument is that the dominant values of the fourth level (those against
which the Quality of actions are judged; those which determine what can be
'static latched' and what are discarded) are not reducible to 'intellect',
and that the attempt to do so - although of ancient standing - is harmful.
So let us talk about the fourth level as the 'eudaimonic' level. The
excellences which were enumerated above were considered by different
thinkers, and were each considered to be a part of the good life. Until
Socrates came along. The problem is that attachment to these various
excellences - like loving a specific person; spending time developing a
musical skill; delight in bodily achievement - were subject to change and
decay over time, and consequently, those who spent time devoted to such
activities exposed themselves to the pain of loss. And the pain of loss
suggested that these excellences weren't quite such a constituent part of
the good life after all. Socrates (as presented by Plato, especially in the
Republic) argued that this pain and loss could not be a part of the good
life (could not be part of eudaimonia) and that the pursuit of the good life
needed to travel in a different direction - the life of the intellect. It
was through the development of the intellect, and contemplation of
intellectual values, pre-eminently mathematics, that the good life was
achieved. All that was associated with emotional qualities (especially love)
was to be repudiated in order to achieve a state of unsullied contemplation
of the eternal Forms. To my way of thinking, it is the delusion - derived
from Plato and exemplified in any 'totalising' metaphysical and political
claims - that pure reason is the best part of humanity which lies behind our
cultural understanding of 'intellectual' (and which also underlies various
political programs to 'improve' humankind).
ARISTOTLE AND THE VIRTUES
Aristotle was the first to point out what a nonsense this was, and he
developed a systematic solution which had at its heart the notion of the
virtues (arete) - those excellences which the human being could develop
which would enable them to live a full human life. In particular, the
necessity of risk - that some elements of the good life can only be achieved
if you are prepared to take the risk of failure and loss. In the
Aristotelean synthesis, the virtues have the central role, and the key
virtue is phronesis, or judgement. It is judgement which opens up the
possibility for DQ development, 'judgement has an indispensable role in the
life of the virtuous man which it does not and could not have in, for
example, the life of the merely law-abiding or rule-abiding man'
(MacIntyre). It is this ability to discriminate as an individual, and not
just as a social unit, which I see as the essence of the fourth level. Our
reasoning capacity is dependent upon our emotions, and, clearly, emotional
development is dependent upon the development of the virtues (eg
forebearance, capacity for hard work, delayed gratification etc). So,
logically, a functioning intellect is dependent on emotional maturity, not
the other way around, and it is through the growth of our emotional maturity
that we get access to DQ, not through (mainstream) intellectual development.
For Aristotle is was clear that the ability to develop the virtues - and
therefore to achieve eudaimonia, the good and flourishing life - depended
upon education and effort. It required emotional maturity - wisdom. Instead
of the Socratic contemplation of abstract universals, 'Being mortal, let us
think mortal thoughts'. So to return specifically to the MoQ, my contention
is that the values which dominate the fourth level, which are separate from
social level values (which see human beings as useful only in so far as they
are a productive social unit) are the values of eudaimonia - and the
intellectual values are one component within a balanced eudaimonic life.
Intellect comes in as an aid to the interrogation of social values, and the
discernment of your own individual values. (Hence the Delphic maxim 'know
thyself'.) I see reason as dependent on judgement, which is another way of
talking about emotional intelligence or wisdom, the capacity to ascribe
'right' values. I see reason as a tool, to be used in conjunction with other
tools (eg the telling of stories) to educate the individual, and draw out
(educare) the individual's capacity for independent judgement. I suspect
this is what Aristotle called the soul - that which animates the individual
and is their final cause (their telos). So the intellect is one aspect of
the individual, and the defining aspect of becoming an individual is the
capacity for independent judgement. Anything which is the product of
individual judgement is an evolutionary advance on the social level, and
intellectual endeavour is one derivative facet of that individual
judgement - it is that individual judgement employed in the areas of science
(empirical investigation) and logic (including mathematics). Areas which are
not delimited by that description - art, architecture, the writing of
novels, companionship in marriage, geographical exploration, political
philosophy, particular types of religious teaching, even, dare I say it,
something like Lila, which emphasises the biographical elements - all of
these are, I would say, elements of the fourth level that are captured in
talk of eudaimonia that are missed with talk of intellectual.
Obviously it is possible to define 'intellectual' as including all these
wonderful things, but to my way of thinking the title is misleading - just
because of our heritage of SOM thinking that we are trying to get away from.
Judgement (emotional maturity, wisdom) is the DQ innovation and static latch
which represents an evolutionary advance over the social level;
specifically, it is a constituent part of the autonomous individual but
which is not dependent on the intellect - indeed, intellectual DQ is
dependent upon it!
[to be continued]
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