From: johnny moral (johnnymoral@hotmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 15 2003 - 07:09:38 BST
Hi Matt, all,
>Matt said:
>I simply want to add the context to what the Rorty quote refers to. Rorty
>advocates getting rid of the _metaphysical_ distinction of kind between
>morality and prudence, like the one Kant used. In a Deweyan fashion, Rorty
>reads morality and prudence as on a continuum. Prudence describes
>"familiar and relatively uncontroversial ways in which individuals and
>groups adjust to the stresses and strains of their non-human and human
>environment." ("Ethics without Principles") Morality, on the other hand,
>is invented "when we can no longer just do what comes naturally, when
>routine is no longer good enough, or when habit and custom no longer
>suffice." (ibid.) On Rorty and Dewey's account, the continuum between
>morality and prudence is "the degree of need for conscious deliberation and
>explicit formulation of precepts."
>
>The funny thing I find about this whole thing is that I view Pirsig as
>entering into this Deweyan pragmatist strain. The way I see it, when
>Pirsig makes Quality his reality metaphor he obliterates the distinction of
>kind between prudence and morality. He says everything's morality at one
>point in Lila. On the other hand, I think Pirsig does make some
>metaphysical (read: non-pragmatist) moves that compromise this initial
>pragmatist formulation, for instance, the distinction in kind between
>social and intellectual.
>
>Matt
So, if we have to name something as quote "moral", as the "moral thing to
do", rather than just usually unconsciously doing it without explicitly
formulating anything, then we've entered into a realm of prudence. But I
think before, when it was just a static pattern of habit and custom, an
unthinking tendency, it was actually truly moral in a descriptive sense, as
in the mores of a culture. If people might not do what is expected or
habitual, and other people get upset, then what is habitual and expected
gets explicitly named as "moral". And as soon as people start talking about
it, it becomes a question of prudence, because people demand proof from
morality now, it was never really possible to just say "because it is
moral", we have always had to give a prudent reason as well (at least, to
young, immature rebels. wise people accept pure morality as a valid reason,
imo). I think there is a distinction of kind as soon as you start talking
about it, and at that point you are on a continuum between named, explicit
morality and prudence. But unnamed morality is a real distinction from
named morality, and i think it's very insightful of you to make the
connection, it is the same "thinking about" distinction that some of us
decided was the difference between social and intellectual levels. Perhaps
Intellectual level is conscious deliberation and explicit formulation of
precepts found at the social level.
Johnny
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