Re: MD mental and neural states

From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Tue Apr 22 2003 - 04:21:16 BST

  • Next message: Wim Nusselder: "Re: MD SOM and the soc/int distinction"

    Sam,

    > Returning to this question! You clarified things for me when you said "I
    > think there is only full-blown consciousness", ie that it is not something
    > which admits of degrees. I don't agree with you on that, but I can see how
    > it holds together. Are you saying that, as consciousness exists, it makes
    no
    > sense to think of any reality whatsoever separately from consciousness;
    > therefore, put differently, all existence participates in consciousness?
    If
    > so, how do you understand the development of consciousness in human
    > development, ie from embryo through childhood to adulthood? Aren't there
    > degrees of consciousness there?

    We are (or at least I am) dealing here with what the Buddhists call the
    doctrine of two truths, conventional (or relative) truth, versus (let's call
    it) the truth of revelation. So when I say there is only full-blown
    consciousness, I am attempting an interpretation of the latter, in
    particular the question of the relation of the finite to the infinite, and
    the resulting theodical problem. My "solution" is (not original) to claim
    that the finite is a temporary occlusion of the infinite, or something like
    that.

    So, conventionally, I don't question that a non-human animal has at its
    disposal a "smaller" consciousness than a human, since the latter has
    self-awareness. But I also conjecture that what I conventionally know of the
    animal is not the whole of the animal. What I would say (realizing that I
    don't really know what I am talking about) is that the species to which the
    animal belongs is itself a conscious entity on a par with a human. Then one
    can say that it is the species' consciousness that the animal tunes into
    when, as we say, it follows instincts.

    Similarly with the development of consciousness in humans. Chomsky argued
    that there just isn't enough data available for a child to learn language in
    a behaviorist model. I agree, though where Chomsky (being a materialist)
    ascribed this magic to a neurally hard-wired "universal grammar", I would
    ascribe it to something like Sheldrake's morphogenetic forms, i.e.,
    something non-physical.

    I recognize that this kind of detail (is instinct a tuning into a species'
    consciousness? are morphogenetic forms for real?) is speculative and
    conjectural, but I am convinced that explanations of this type, even if not
    these in particular, are required. Otherwise, what significant difference is
    there between "A causes B" and "B values precondition A"?

    >
    > Having said that, I do have sympathy with what you are saying. I
    > particularly like your comment "... a rock is word in a language that
    > Quality speaks, but we don't understand. We have some knowledge of that
    > language's syntax (physics), but none of its semantics." I think that's
    > marvellous.

    Thanks. I also once put it as "Quality rocks", for putting on a T-shirt,
    maybe.

    - Scott

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