From: Elizaphanian (elizaphanian@tiscali.co.uk)
Date: Mon May 19 2003 - 12:14:14 BST
Hi Wim,
Part 2.
: 1) According to you 'The definition of the intellect used by Pirsig is too
: narrow to function as a description of a fourth static level.'
: I don't see why. 'The collection and manipulation of symbols, created in the
: brain, that stand for patterns of experience' refers for me equally to
: observing, reasoning, empathy and revelation (see also my 26 Nov 2002
: 22:44:43 +0100 post). Both observing and revelation create symbolic
: representations of patterns of experience; both reasoning and empathy change
: these representations. Or as I explained 3/6 22:53 +0200: Sensation,
: thought, emotion and intuition all have an essential role at the 4th level, in the
: creation of patterns of symbols that are experienced as representations of
: other patterns of experience.
Well - I just don't see it as a particularly fruitful way of understanding, eg, Rembrandt
portraiture, to describe it as 'manipulation of symbols' - whereas I do see that description as
excellent when describing maths, logic or linguistics. My view is that the 'eudaimonic' type of
description is more flexible and fertile, but feel free to disagree.
: 2) You write: 'Describing the fourth level as "intellectual" implies that
: much of specifically human quality is classified as social, which is
: significantly counter-intuitive.'
: This is only true if you interpret 'intellectual' as referring only to 'the
: field of logic or scientific thinking' (as you do some sentences later), But
: Pirsig's definition is much broader than that. Creating and passing on myths
: for instance (illogical, unscientific stories) are also forms of collecting
: and manipulating symbols ... etc..
Aren't we returning to our earlier discussion (last Autumn) where we ended up agreeing on the
substance but not wanting to get stuck into quibbling about words? I recall a post then when I went
through some dictionary definitions of what 'intellect' meant, and it supported my general view. As
I have repeatedly stated, if you structure 'intellect' in a different fashion - my favourite example
being Augustine's - then many of my objections are diminished. I would still maintain that
'eudaimonic' is more fruitful than 'intellectual' as a description of level 4, however, as it is
both broader and more specific in describing the Quality involved. Feel free to unpack your terminal
'etc' though.
: 3) You write: 'If human rights are seen as the arena of conflict between the
: third and fourth levels of the
: MoQ then it is incoherent to make the flourishing of intellectual values the
: definition of a fourth level.'
: Conflict over human rights is only an arena of conflict between
: 'intellectual justification of existing social patterns and ....
: [intellectual opposition of] the existing social patterns'. It's one of the
: conflict arena's inside the intellectual level. Human rights (or rights and
: obligations and ..., together making up ethics) or their 'flourishing' do
: not define the fourth level (i.e. the distinction between 3rd and 4th
: level), but only the highest level of DQ it can latch. It says something
: about what intellectual evolution aims for rather than what it starts with.
: See also my 3 Mar 2002 00:00:36 +0100 post and the rest of the discussion
: with Marco back then.
OK. This point was constructed hypothetically (building on the passage in Lila where Pirsig talks
about the struggle in the twentieth century). I think your phrasing is more accurate (and ties in
with Pirsig's revision, obviously, in LC).
: 4) You write: 'There is an explanatory gap in the standard account - what is
: the "choosing unit" of the fourth level, the equivalent of the cell or the
: social unit? Whatever the determinant values are for the fourth level, there
: must be something on which those values operate, which responds to that
: Quality.'
: This makes most clear that the way you write about 'values' presupposes
: subject-object thinking. If values operate on something, there must be
: something (a valuing subject) besides the values. If value/Quality is all
: there is (as the MoQ claims), asking for a 'choosing unit' is just a
: confusing and unnecessary question. Any 'choosing unit' in a MoQ context is
: not 'operated on' and does not respond to Quality, but embodies values. You
: might say that 'choosing units' 'incarnate' DQ into sq, but only if you
: recognize that they already 'consist of', 'participate in' and/or 'depend
: on' static patterns of value.
Again, this is a return to something which we have discussed before, viz my purported 'reification
of patterns of value'. I think this deserves a separate thread all to itself - it has a wider
applicability than the eudaimonic thesis, and (I would argue) the eudaimonic thesis stands
separately to the truth of your point here. If the autonomous individual is seen as simply a 'stable
pattern of [level 4] values' - which is what I think it is - then it can function as a 'choosing
unit' in that this pattern can act as a latch for other patterns of value to be structured around.
: 5) You argue that:
: 'The DQ innovation and static latch which enabled the social level to come
: into being was the development of human language, and human language is par
: excellence an example of symbol manipulation.'
: and that therefore the standard account of the MoQ cannot clearly
: distinguish between the 3rd and the 4th level.
: For me this only proves that the development of symbolic language cannot
: have been the first static latch of the 3rd level (in an MoQ that needs 4
: discrete levels).
Could you expand on this point?
: How are you 'trying to keep to Pirsig's views' (as you write 15 May 2003
: 12:50:55 +0100) if you state that symbolic language was the first static
: latch of the 3rd level? I don't remember Pirsig stating anything like that
: in 'Lila'.
I believe I have now moved away from my 'standard' account - language is a necessary condition for
level 3, in my view (not necessarily in Pirsig's, but I haven't recently investigated that. I'd be
interested to know what others think.) This could be an error in the 'standard account' section.
I don't think either that 'Pirsig is quite categoric in denying
: ... that the rudiments of the social level can exist apart from humanity'.
: Not any more at least. In annotation 45 of 'Lila's Child' (or a bit later in
: the final version) he wrote:
: 'A social pattern which would be unaware of the next higher level would be
: found among prehistoric people and the higher primates when they exhibit
: social learning that is not genetically hard-wired but yet is not symbolic.'
Annotation 49 of LC has Pirsig writing this: "...for purposes of precision in the MoQ, social
patterns should be defined as human and subjective." That's what I was thinking of - but I agree
that there is something of an inconsistency with your quotation (annotation 52 in the published
version).
: So, while for you 'the essence of the fourth level is the existence of an
: autonomous individual', for me autonomous individuals are only a result of
: 4th level patterns of values, not their essence.
Perhaps my language could improve here, because I am happy with the idea that autonomous individuals
are a result of 4th level patterns, ie they are the stable static latches which instantiate those
patterns. In particular, talk of 'essence' raises grim shades of Platonism, which I'm sure you'll
recall my being wary of!
: Conscious motivation of
: actions offers freedom from (autonomy vis-à-vis) unthinking patterns of
: behavior. Conscious motivation of actions is enabled by the existence of
: systems of ideas from which motives can be derived and to which they can
: refer. The autonomy of individuals depends on the autonomy of the
: intellectual level from the social level.
I agree with the last sentence, although (obviously) I would phrase it differently. I don't like
your second sentence however, in the sense that, for me, it can put the cart before the horse. I
think the fourth level patterns can be described as the opposite of this, ie that a judgement made
against a previously existing system of ideas can lead to a new system - ie, it is not that motives
are derived from systems, but that systems are derived from motives (or assessments of
Quality/openness to DQ).
Cheers.
Sam
"A good objection helps one forward, a shallow objection, even if it is valid, is wearisome."
Wittgenstein
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