Re: MD The Intellectual Level

From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Mon Jun 30 2003 - 13:51:01 BST

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    Hi Paul,

    You post of June 27 on "The Intellectual Level" was so good it bears
    repeating. Thanks for a wonderful summary of the MoQ.

    Platt

    > Hi Bo, Squonk
    >
    > If I may throw in some thoughts...
    >
    > Bo said:
    > "I would of course have liked Scott to stand firmer
    > against Squonk's idea of
    > an ancient "mind-intellect" that just spawned a SOM
    > around Homer's time"
    >
    > Paul:
    > Squonk's idea of an ancient mind-intellect is direct
    > from Pirsig. Intellect is exactly the same as mind.
    > Intellect is just thinking. By the time anyone living
    > in ancient Greece was able to write the Iliad or talk
    > about mind and matter, the intellect had helped build
    > up a society advanced and organised enough to keep
    > records of what they thought about. The intellect used
    > society to further its evolution, just as social
    > patterns of value used biology, and biology used
    > inorganic nature to do the same.
    >
    > In the MOQ, everything that has ever been written down
    > anywhere in the world is an intellectual pattern of
    > value. Odyssey, the Tao Te Ching, the Bible - it's all
    > intellectual. A mind thought of it and directed a body
    > to write it down in a socially learned symbolic
    > language. The ideas were propagated in society,
    > theatre, school, church, and recorded in scriptures,
    > tomes, tablets and books. The idea of me/not me that
    > appears to have dawned in ancient Greece is a hugely
    > successful way of differentiating experience which
    > seems to have exponentially advanced the intellect but
    > it is not synonymous with intellect. The human body is
    > a hugely successful biological pattern of value but is
    > not mistaken for biological quality itself, the USA is
    > a hugely successful social pattern of value but is not
    > mistaken for social quality itself.
    >
    > Bo said:
    > "but at least Scott sees that - in that case -
    > "....all static patterns are in some
    > sense "intellectual"". Which is good old SOM's
    > "everything is in the mind"
    > and bye to the MOQ."
    >
    > Paul:
    > The MOQ 'description' of patterns of value is 'all in
    > the mind', it is an intellectual pattern of value
    > providing a high quality explanation of experience (to
    > me at least). The value which differentiated the
    > experience which the MOQ describes is not in the mind
    > or in society or in plants or animals or protons or
    > electrons, it is prior to all of those distinctions.
    > Pirsig spends page after page hammering this point
    > because he recognises that it is a cultural blindspot.
    >
    > Mind in SOM is a problem because you either have to be
    > broadly a materialist and say that matter creates mind
    > or broadly an idealist and say that mind creates
    > matter. In SOM, reality is either mind or it is
    > matter, and whichever it is, the other is not real. In
    > the MOQ you can have both without contradiction,
    > because it says that experience creates patterns of
    > value that can be called matter and experience creates
    > patterns that can be called mind. These are static
    > divisions and the experience prior to when it is
    > differentiated is not called mind or matter or
    > anything.
    >
    > Bo said:
    > "In the above quote (and throughout the entire LILA
    > book) Pirsig points out
    > that intellect is out of social value, but the LC
    > comment sounds uncannily
    > like intellect is out of brain."
    >
    > Paul:
    > At the biological level experience creates sensation
    > stored in the brain; at the social level experience
    > creates non-hardwired repetitively learned behaviour
    > stored in customs, relationships and institutions; at
    > the intellectual level experience creates thoughts
    > stored in a repertoire of symbols. Experience creates
    > patterns at all levels but each level is brought about
    > by the same undifferentiated experience.
    >
    > In the evolutionary hierarchy set out by the MOQ, an
    > organism with a brain is a necessity for both society
    > and thinking, experience seems to support this and
    > therefore supports Pirsig's statement that experience
    > that creates intellectual symbols in the mind is also
    > biologically stored in the brain.
    >
    > Intellectual patterns of value are built on top of
    > social value but are not an extension of it. The
    > non-hardwired rituals and routines created and copied
    > as social patterns of value to dominate biological
    > patterns of value provide a selection and valuation of
    > experience which will be created in the brain and
    > symbolised in the intellect. In terms of the emergence
    > of the intellect itself, the notion of 'good' and 'not
    > good' referring to such socially valued experience may
    > be candidates for concepts forming at the beginning of
    > the intellectual level, not the enormously advanced
    > and complex arrangement of experience into an abiding
    > self in a world of seperately existing entities that
    > is assumed by subject-object constructions. Pirsig
    > speculates that the first concept may be 'change', the
    > oldest words seem to refer to 'repetitive order',
    > which seems to indicate an awareness of the pattern
    > based nature of reality rather than the substance
    > based version we were lumbered with.
    >
    > Bo said:
    > "What is not symbols if starting down that lane?
    > Sense impressions in the brain are electric pulses
    > which "symbolize" reality
    > "out there" (patterns of inorganic experience) thus
    > the biological level is
    > symbols too. "
    >
    > Paul:
    > You can choose to cloud the definition of levels and
    > call sensations 'symbols' if you wish but remember
    > that, in the MOQ, the brain doesn't experience
    > "reality out there", it experiences value. If we
    > consider experience in terms of biological patterns we
    > can study sensation or as you put it, electrical
    > pulses. If we consider experience in terms of
    > intellectual patterns we can study symbolic concepts
    > such as "out there", neither necessarily dominates or
    > contains the other, they are discrete patterns of
    > value.
    >
    > Also, when you say that sense impressions are created
    > in a brain as a "symbolic" electrical pulse you have
    > slipped into an assumption that there is a one-to-one
    > relationship between an electrical pulse in a
    > pre-existing brain caused by a pre-existing object.
    > That is a good materialist assumption within limits
    > (although there have been many different explanations
    > offered e.g. Pribram's holographic model and the self
    > organising neural network model which are equally as
    > good) but you could sample and probe the electrical
    > pulse forever and never recreate the 'object' that you
    > have assumed has caused it. In the MOQ, value
    > differentiated experience is the starting point of
    > static patterns, not an object or a sense impression
    > or a brain, they are the patterns and explanations
    > that come after. You can empirically verify the value
    > differentiated experience that 'causes' an electrical
    > pulse and the thoughts brought to mind about an
    > external object, but not the direct correlation
    > between an electrical pulse and an object.
    >
    > Bo said:
    > "If not the "manipulation" term is the key? It
    > indicates a subject having
    > an objective view of things - able to shuffle around
    > with the symbols; to think
    > abstractly.. I'll try to develop this in my next
    > instalment. "
    >
    > Paul:
    > I think "manipulation" refers to the pattern forming
    > process of a repertoire of symbols to organise and
    > explain experience in an attempt to provoke coherent
    > and appropriate activity. If those patterns involve a
    > concept of 'subject' and 'object' then that may entail
    > a subject-object organisation of experience. The mind
    > of an artist (or a good motorcycle mechanic :-)) may
    > organise experience in a non-dualistic way in order to
    > not shut out value.
    >
    > If you maintain that subject-object thinking is the
    > same as the intellect then I suggest that you have
    > devised your own metaphysics and the forum may be
    > willing to discuss its merits (and I must say that
    > after reading page after page of it in LC and in the
    > archives your tenacity for the S/O as intellect theory
    > is staggering), but I would maintain that it is not
    > Pirsig's MOQ as presented in ZMM, Lila, SODV and LC.
    > In fact, Pirsig clearly states in LC that it is not
    > what is meant by the intellectual level in the MOQ.
    > But I don't think that this is the issue anymore.
    >
    > cheers
    >
    > Paul
    >
    >
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