From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Tue Aug 12 2003 - 16:27:55 BST
Scott, Sam,
Scott said:
I've been toying with a three-level system, where the social and intellectual are collapsed into one level, called the semiotic level. The general idea is that all social patterns are semiotic (it is the badge that signals that this biological organism is a cop and can arrest you according to some other signs called laws, etc.), and of course, all normal intellectual activity consists of playing language games, each of which has to be -- per Wittgenstein -- a social game. So that leaves two things to deal with: the fact that higher animals engage in semiotic activity as well, and of course, what happens to social/intellectual conflicts.
Matt:
If one were to stick to having non-human animals at the biological level, then collapsing the social and intellectual level seems the best bet for dealing with signs. The problem I have still is keeping animals at the biological level. The fact that higher complexity animals engage in non-linguistic semiotic activity seems to me reason enough to distinguish linguistic from non-linguistic.
Scott said:
On the first -- which is actually more germane to your question -- the answer is to qualify the third, semiotic level, with the word "open". All animal "language" is a closed system. There is a finite list of sounds/actions that an animal can perform, and a finite (usually one) way another animal can respond. Changes take place at the species level, not on the individual. With humans, there is the possibility of new responses, of lying, of creating new meanings, etc.etc. So the full name for the third level would be "open semiotic". The commonality between cells and lions is that they both can be characterized as simple responders to stimuli, whether the stimulus is a food particle or a dominance-establishing roar. There is no choice involved.
Matt:
I see the way you are trying to distinguish animal semiotic activity from human, but I don't think animal semiotic acitivity is closed. It is finite, for sure, but as complexity increases, so does their ability to add new signs vary. As I see it, finitude and closure are two different things. What matters is complexity.
I think there are several places where we disagree on the placement of animals and such, but here's one: when you stress the commonality between cells and lions, you're right, but I think the difference is still great enough to warrant a distinction. I don't think the lion is quite as instinctual as the cell, but more importantly, like I said before, you can't describe lion behavior by reference to their cells. To me, that marks an important point in development.
Inorganic level - non-replicating persistence
Biological level - replicating persistence
Social level - non-linguistic semiotic behavior
Intellectual level - linguistic semiotic behavior
Eudaimonic level - autonomous behavior
I see a pattern here in my short descriptions of the levels, not completely intentional, but I'm not sure if that really means anything.
Matt
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