From: skutvik@online.no
Date: Thu Aug 28 2003 - 07:55:33 BST
Hi Scott
26 Aug. you wrote:
> Bo,
> I went back to Peirce to get his definition, and it indicates that I
> need to retract a couple of things I said. Here's Peirce (from Justus
> Buchler, The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings, p. 99):
> "A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a
> more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the
> *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its
> *object*. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in
> reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the
> *ground* of the representamen."
Thanks Scott for taking the trouble to dig into Peirce's original work,
he was notoriously obscure so that is not easy, but as this is a Pirsig
site and it is possible bearings on the MOQ that is of interest I return
to that. First of all don't you see a strong likeness between SIGN and
QUALITY? Every "proof" or indication that Pirsig brings for Qualiy's
predominance goes for Sign too and even the etymological likeness
Sign-Significance-Value is striking.
Further, Jesper Hoffmeye's "triade" example of a child with red spots/
doctor/diagnosis I still find congruous with the early quality/subject/
object "trinity", so much that the first time I came upon it through his
book I jumped in my chair. There is of course no reference to Pirsig in
the said book and even Peirce's metaphysics is merely used for the
development of a "Bio..something." theory. I will bring a little more on
it when I return to my studio and notes.
Pirsig has a little aside in Lila's Child where he says something about
the uselessness of such comparisons, but I don't think he has spent a
second thought on this subject, but is dead sure that no other thinker
has ever been on to the same trail (which goes for 99%). And,
admittedly, Peirce had had no "sign=the-groundsuff-of-reality"
revelation (that I know, but do you Scott know about the background?)
nor does he speak of any "SOM" that his metaphysics is supposed to
replace, but - by Goodness - it's there all over the place!!
> First, note that the interpretant is not a person, or subject. But it
> is within the subject (speaking in SOM) where the creation of the
> interpretant occurs.
I see, but I also see your reference to the subject (of SOM) and as
Peirce's "triade" corresponds to the MOQ of ZMM I still see a great
likeness
> One could think of it as the mental movement
> caused by the sign.
Exactly!
> The object is (still speaking in SOM) in the
> objective world, though it is not necessarily a particular (Peirce is
> above all *not* a nominalist. For him the class of lions is as real as
> a lion). That is, the object is not necessarily, or even very often,
> something perceivable by the senses.
Right, and if you mean that his "object" may as well be called
"objective" or "objectivity", the likeness is even greater.
> The ground might be thought of as the system in which that sign
> operates as a sign. As a simple case where this concept is relevant,
> the string of letters "Fall" means one thing (actually a couple of
> things) in English, and something else in German, and nothing at all
> in Italian.
I have read this and the rest with great interest. There are surely many
differences, but my idea was ...: What if Peirce had gone on from his
triadic stage like Pirsig did from his trinity stage? You did not
comment on my effort on such an imaginary Metaphysics of Sign
description, but I find it extremely useful because it does away with
the "mind" notion that screws up the MOQ for so many ...even for
Pirsig himself at times ;-).
Thanks anyway Scott.
Bo
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