From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@tiscali.co.uk)
Date: Sat Aug 30 2003 - 18:09:24 BST
Hi Wim,
It's good to have a spare few moments to catch up on some correspondence.
You said:
> It will have become clear to you too, that discussing your and my versions
> of the MoQ will not lead to either of us convincing the other, but only to
> clarification of (the differences) between these two MoQ versions. That's
> o.k. with me and I guess with you.
That's very OK with me. Hopefully the dialectic will improve the quality of our thinking, even if it
is divergent directions.
>
> You seemed to agree 23 May that we were talking past each other, because for
> you 'pattern of value' is synonymous with 'scale of values' while for me
> 'pattern of value' is synonymous with 'pattern of experience'.
Hmm. Not sure about that - I think I'd prefer 'pattern of experience' to 'scale of values' as well.
What I do think the MoQ says is that the various patterns can be aggregated and sorted according to
a scale of Quality. There is a distinction between that scale of value and the patterns themselves.
Perhaps we could talk about a 'scale of Quality' to refer to the four levels, to avoid that
confusion?
> You disagreed that your interpretation only makes sense within SOM. You
> argued this point by appealing to supposed agreement that the laws of
> physics describe the values of the inorganic level, the laws of Darwinian
> evolution describe the values of the biological level etc..
> In my version of the MoQ these 'laws' describe 'patterns' however and not
> (scales of) values. So that doesn't convince me that your interpretation can
> do without SOM (subjects valuing objects).
Firstly, do you disagree that there are higher and lower levels? That would seem to be the logical
implication of your argument here.
Secondly, I don't understand why accepting higher and lower levels necessitates SOM. I'm happy to
redescribe 'laws' as 'patterns' - but I think that runs the risk of further confusion, ie you're
talking about patterns of patterns. The 'law' is only the regularity of observed phenomena after
all, and a useful intellectual rule of thumb.
>
> You doubted whether you agree with my:
> 'All experience is "pattern experience" and those patterns cannot be
> analyzed in different values (except "stability" and "versatility" or
> comparable twins denoting the double face of the concept "pattern" when
> compared with absolutely and exact determinated repetition on the one hand
> and chance repetition on the other).'
> In your reply you asked:
> 'Do you think there can be a typology of value? Is a value (i.e. a value
> judgement) something discrete? When the amoeba flees the acid is this not a
> discrete experience for the amoeba?'
There is a passage in Lila where Pirsig talks about the amoeba, but I can't find it at the moment.
It was in the back of my mind when I made that comment. Could you find it in your text? (BTW I'd
appreciate an electronic copy if you could send it across. Thanks)
> For me 'experience' implies only a few types of 'values' in the sense of
> 'value judgements': only 'stability' and 'versatility' of the pattern and
> possibly 'harmony' with higher-level patterns of value. Even these 'value
> judgements' are post-experience constructions
That I agree with...
> : the Quality/experience first
> has to create a subject and an object before the subject can judge the
> stability, versatility and harmony of the pattern of experience.
That I think is where we may differ. To my mind the reaction is already a value. But I think that's
your position too....
> 'An amoeba
> fleeing acid' can be seen as a pure MoQ description of a pattern: a pattern
> that connects movements of the amoeba and rises in acidity of its immediate
> surroundings. 'An amoeba experiencing acidity and consequently fleeing it'
> is a way of describing that requires SOM. Without SOM (the supposition of a
> subject and an object) nothing meaningful can be said about 'the experience
> for the amoeba'.
What I think is required is simply an intellect performing an observation of the phenomenon in hand.
It doesn't require SOM (it can use another metaphysic, or none, pragmatically). I think there is
ambiguity between us about what 'experience' is - you seem to imply that it requires consciousness,
either on the part of the amoeba or on the part of an observer. I was using it to refer simply to
the phenomenon. To go back to your original comment, I think I'm fairly happy with 'all experience
is pattern experience' (isn't it a tautology?) - it's the comment that we can't analyse those
patterns according to a typology of value that I am dubious about.
> Pirsig's answer to the question "What is the DQ innovation and static latch
> which enabled the intellectual level to come into being?" seems to be
> 'symbols' to me, because of his definition of the intellectual level as 'the
> collection and manipulation of symbols, created in the brain, that stand for
> patterns of experience'.
OK.
> That doesn't define 'symbols' as 'patterns of experience' (as you wrote 23
> May), but refers to their definition as 'something that stands for something
> else'.
I suspect Pirsig was being more careful here than you give him credit for. What is the word 'that'
doing in your quotation above, if not linking together the symbols and 'stand for patterns of
experience'? Seems to me that Pirsig wasn't trying to give a definition of symbols per se, but of
how they function in the brain. So I disagree. I think Pirsig is giving 'symbol' a particular
technical definition here, as they function on the intellectual level.
> Intellectual quality (the stability and versatility of intellectual
> patterns of value) implies the quality of those 'standing for'
> relationships. Their 'truth' if that which the symbols stand for is supposed
> to be 'reality', their 'goodness' if it is supposed to some 'ideal' and
> 'beauty' if we don't know what it stands for.
What makes a symbol 'intellectual' rather than 'social'? Are symbols only available on the
intellectual level? (possibly - but I suspect that the concept of 'truth' is a late arrival on the
scene)
> Rembrandt's brushstrokes
> definitely stand for something if they often strike us as beautiful even if
> we don't know exactly what it is. Is it our experience of the play of light
> and darkness they remind us of? Or an experience of resignation?
> So I disagree with your conclusion: 'So symbol seems to simply mean 'mental
> content', i.e. something which the brain uses.' The definition of symbol
> hinges on the 'standing for'.
I couldn't follow this line of argument. I recall using Rembrandt as an example, but I can't now
recall what the point was.
> For me the 'created in the brain' part seems inessential in Pirsig's
> definition.
Do you mean it is redundant? (ie symbols can only be made in the brain so that doesn't need to be
further specified?) In which case I think you're rejecting Pirsig's whole point - which is fine, if
you do.
> You wrote 9 June:
> 'I see the levels as useful intellectual patterns; I am agnostic about their
> ontological status.'
>
> Doesn't 'agnostic about their ontological status' imply 'they needn't be
> part of my metaphysics'?!
Not exactly - it means that metaphysics isn't absolute, it's a useful tool, not a claim about
ultimate reality, which, for me, belongs to religious speech, not philosophical speech.
> A SOM can indeed do without a typology of 'scales of values'...
> A MoQ that limits itself to distinguishing static and dynamic quality and
> doesn't distinguish static quality further is a very poor metaphysics, but
> indeed may qualify as such. Given our disagreements (and those of others on
> this list) about how to distinguish static quality further, it is a very
> poor MoQ we share here...
Indeed!
>
> You wrote 9 June:
> 'if you'll remind me ... of your description of levels 3 and 4, I shall try
> and return the compliment of sustained attention that you are paying to my
> ideas.'
>
> I distinguish levels of static quality by the different ways in which
> patterns of value are latched, in which their stability and versatility are
> maintained. 3rd Level patterns of value are maintained by (unconscious)
> copying of behavior. 4rd Level patterns of value are maintained by
> (conscious) copying of motivations for behavior. (To distinguish motivated
> 'behavior' from unmotivated behavior, I often use the verb 'to act' for the
> first and 'to behave' for the latter.)
I will return to this at a later date.
> You asked 9 June:
> 'When would you say history started?'
>
> With the first person telling a story. In other words: with the first use of
> language as 'standing for' previous experience (instead of simply
> expressing/embodying emotion). Probably some 50.000 - 100.000 years ago.
There is some evidence to push it back to about 250,000 years ago. But I'm working on an essay
developing this.
Cheers
Sam
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