From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Wed Sep 03 2003 - 01:57:09 BST
Paul,
[Paul sensibly said:]
> There are two things being discussed here, so let's try and do this
> properly:
>
> a) Define and demonstrate the problems existing in Pirsig's MOQ without
> making reference to the interpretation required for your "solution"
>
> then
>
> b) Demonstrate that your "solution" solves the problems you have defined
> and demonstrated
Here's my version, Bo's will likely differ.
a). Pirsig (in Lila) describes the S/O divide as a static intellectual
pattern. In SOM, this pattern can be expressed as "everything is a subject
or an object" (or the idealist and materialist variants). In the MOQ, he
attempts a redescription: subjective is social and intellectual, while
objective is inorganic and biological.
My first complaint is that the MOQ definition is ok for the common use of
"subjective" and "objective", but lousy for the philosophical use of
"subject" and "object". For example, if I think about what I just wrote, in
the philosophical use, the "what I just wrote" is an object, but the MOQ
calls it subjective. So things get confusing. However, if it is the case
that the S/O divide is a static intellectual pattern, that confusion can get
resolved.
My second, and in my opinion unresolvable complaint, is that if we then
inquire into this supposed static intellectual pattern (the S/O divide), we
run into problems. The first problem is that all my experience is of an S/O
form. I cannot think of my experience in a non-S/O way. All the MOQ says is
that prior to it all is Quality, and the DQ/SQ split. I have to take this on
faith, since in my normal consciousness, I do not experience this splitting,
just the result, which I inevitably describe in S/O terms (I see the tree, I
proved the theorem).
Now, in other reading, which makes sense to me, I find that while it is
acknowledged that the S/O divide is of high value -- giving us science,
notably -- it also brings suffering. Redefining the S/O divide as a static
intellectual pattern is a (failing) attempt to treat the symptom, but does
not cure the disease. For that we need to examine the S/O divide more
deeply. The first thing to notice is that I, a self, a subject, do not feel
static. The S/O form of experience is dynamic, so it doesn't make much sense
to call the S/O divide a static anything. (Strictly speaking, Pirsig calls
SOM a static pattern of intellectual quality, but since he doesn't
explicitly distinguish SOM from S/O thinking, and because of his definition
of 'subjective' and 'objective', one concludes, like Squonk, that "there are
no subjects and objects in the MOQ".)
Furthermore, in analyzing subjects and obejcts, one finds something
curious...
b) Whenever we attempt to analyze mental operations, we run into what I call
(following Nishida) the logic of contradictory identity. For example (one
I've used before), we are aware of time as a succession of events, and of
time as duration. These two awarenesses are mutually contradictory, but also
mutually constituting: awareness of succession requires the awareness of
duration, and vice versa. This logic also applies to the DQ/SQ split, though
Pirsig does not go into this. So rather than multiply entities, I propose
that the S/O divide be seen as a case of the DQ/SQ split. Awareness creates
subject and object, thinking creates thinker and thought, and so on. Normal
mental activity is DQ/SQ tension, which we know as subject/object tension.
In applying the logic of contradictory identity to subjects and objects we
accomplish two things: we deconstruct the self (and objects) without
destroying it (and them), and we gain insight into the DQ/SQ split.
- Scott
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