RE: MD Dealing with S/O pt 1

From: Paul Turner (paulj.turner@ntlworld.com)
Date: Fri Sep 05 2003 - 10:27:59 BST

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    Hi Scott:

    Scott:
    I won't be responding in detail. You seem to be thinking that what I am
    doing is in effect to partially restore SOM, when all I want to do is
    keep
    the philosophical meaning of subject and object around in our
    discussion, so
    that we can consider them in an anti-SOM way in a deeper way than Pirsig
    does.

    Paul:
    I don't think that. Even if I did, I'm not into "SOM" witch-hunts. This
    thread started with my request to Bo that he described to me what was
    wrong with the MOQ without making reference to the reinterpretation
    required by his solution. To be fair to Bo, his was just a case in
    point. It is my perception that there are more solutions to the MOQ than
    there are problems.

    In response to my request to Bo, you described some problems, and I
    really wanted to understand what they were. As far as I could see, your
    problem with the MOQ was that it doesn't agree with your experience,
    which was fine. I see that below it is also a problem to you that you
    cannot integrate Barfield with Pirsig without changing the MOQ. All I'm
    trying to do is see past the solutions to find the problems for my own
    contemplation and to bring them out on their own. I rarely see the two
    separated out in posts, so I'm trying to zoom in on them to see what the
    problems actually are.

    Scott:
    Except for the lack of, let's say, appreciation for the S/O divide.
    Here, as
    I've said many times, Barfield's account of the rise and value and
    disease-aspect of the intellectual level is superior to Pirsig's, but as
    I've also said, that does not detract from what Pirsig was trying to do
    in
    Lila, namely to show how morals conflict. But with the demotion of the
    S/O
    divide to a static pattern of intellectual quality one loses the ability
    to
    integrate Pirsig with Barfield.

    Paul:
    See, here is something I'd like to go into:

    "But with the demotion of the S/O divide to a static pattern of
    intellectual quality one loses the ability to integrate Pirsig with
    Barfield."

    I was trying to discuss how the S/O divide is laid out in the MOQ to see
    if we agree on that for a start. I don't think we do.

    Scott:
    The same goes with what Bo calls the
    annotating Pirsig's definitions of the intellectual level.

    Paul:
    Also, I think that "annotating Pirsig" is the same as "ZMM Pirsig",
    "Lila Pirsig" and "SODV Pirsig". Again and again I see "annotating
    Pirsig" used to refer to a change in direction but I've yet to see
    anybody explain why this is so.

    Scott:
    And it pops up on analyzing DQ/SQ. Of course these are undefinable (n.b,
    SQ
    is just as undefinable as DQ, though one can categorize instances. How
    does
    one define "pattern" except in some equivalent term, like "form",
    "structure", "system", etc.).

    Paul:
    I would argue that static quality is precisely that experience which we
    can, have and do define, linguistically or mathematically. Of course
    it's not one definition because static quality is all of our familiar
    reality. I would say that our education is pretty much about defining
    static quality or learning methods and language to define static
    quality.

    Scott:
    That they are a polarity can be seen in that
    DQ without SQ would be nothing. It requires SQ to "exist", and of course
    SQ
    requires DQ. But DQ/SQ is more general than subject/object, which latter
    only occurs -- as far as we can tell -- in the human intellect, while
    DQ/SQ
    is at all levels.

    Nor is there any conflict with what I am saying (which is just repeating
    what others have said) with Zen philosophy. Nishida, from whom I got the
    phrase "logic of contradictory identity", was a long-time Zen
    practitioner.

    Paul:
    Agreed, my reference to Zen was simply to illustrate my point about the
    use of immersion in experience to move away from dualistic thought. I
    wasn't making any comments about conflicting ideas.

    Scott:
    The history of the logic goes back to Nagarjuna, one of Zen's heroes.
    The
    logic of contradictory identity is not a thinking that tells us what
    enlightenment is. It is a means of clearing out debris, like SOM. In
    terms
    of the MOQ, it is a way to remind us that the DQ/SQ distinction is also
    self-contradictory. There is no self-existing DQ. There is no
    self-existing
    SQ. There is only their mutual and simultaneous constitution and
    contradiction.

    Paul:
    Are you just saying that it reminds us that our way of conceiving of our
    experience is superimposed by thought upon undifferentiated reality and
    is therefore not corresponding to a fundamental structure of reality? If
    so, I agree.

    Scott:
    Furthermore, since the S/O form is so familiar to us (it *is* us as we
    see
    ourselves in our fallen state), it is our avenue to
    understanding/not-understanding DQ/SQ. As I said a while back, while the
    MOQ
    gets rid of a lot of SOM dualist platypi, it does not get rid of the
    many/one dualism.

    Paul:
    No, it invokes it. And it says that S/O is a further division of the
    many.

    Scott:
    The logic of contradictory identity doesn't get rid of it
    either, but it recognizes it as another name for DQ/SQ. And in the
    subject/object form we experience it in action: Awareness produces the
    many,
    and in the same productive act, turns it back into one.

    Paul:
    This is where I don't get it. Are you saying that DQ=S and SQ=O? Or is
    it that DQ=O and SQ=S? What am I missing?

    Scott:
    All of this is lost if we just try to not think in terms of
    philosophical
    subjects and objects.

    Paul:
    And so we should treat thoughts as objects?

    Scott:
    Indeed, I see that attempt as falling into the
    pre/trans fallacy. We need to work through and transform the S/O form,
    not
    reject it.

    Paul:
    As I have tried to explain, I don't think the MOQ does reject subjects
    and objects, I think it embeds them into a larger metaphysical structure
    as static quality. In doing so, the difference between them is resolved
    into an evolutionary relationship. Pirsig just believes that there are
    better ways to talk about and understand static experience than subjects
    and objects, as four evolutionary levels is one way; the MOQ doesn't
    just pretend the experience isn't there. This is why I want to try and
    stay on the problem side of the discussion before jumping into
    solutions.

    Scott:
    The major act in "working through" it is to see that S/O is
    self-contradictory, that I, as subject, have no permanent
    self-existence.
    But though it is self-contradictory, it is real. Hence pictures 9 and 10
    in
    the Ox sequence. Emptiness is not other than form, form is not other
    than
    emptiness. The S/O form is completely real and completely empty.

    Paul:
    Okay, where does this leave the MOQ? What does it look like after such a
    transformation? DQ/SQ at the intellectual level is synonymous with S/O?

    I'm thoroughly confused, you're obviously way ahead of me :-)

    Cheers

    Paul

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