From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sat Sep 06 2003 - 12:27:31 BST
Hi
That's all good. I have looked it up, yes Rorty has invented non-reductive
physicalism it seems
I assert that physicalism is the result of various
philosophical theories that take an ontological position.
Therefore to try to create a version of physicalism that is not
reductionist is misleading and difficult. Better to use a new language I
would suggest. I have discovered that Andrew Bowie argues firstly
that the term non-reductive physicalism is a misnomer and secondly
that Donaldson does not hold this view. He quotes Donaldson
in his book on Schelling (a very under rated philosopher who
proposed a theory of indentity 'prior to SOM' -and that's clearly
how he saw it, and was also a big influence on both Coleridge and
Heidegger):
"[I am committed] one important, and, indeed metaphysical theses.
If psychological events cause ane are caused by physical events
(and surely this is the case) and if causal relations between events
entail the existence of laws connecting those events, and these laws are...
physical, then it must follow that psychological evnets simply
are (in the sense of are identical with) physical events. If this is
materialism, we are committed to it."
Bowie then points out: "Rorty COOPTS Davdson as a fellow 'physicalist'...
The last 'if' suggest, though, that Davidson is actaully more circumspect.
...Rather than REDUCING the two sides of the identity theory to one of its
sides,
the physical, as Rorty, despite his claims not to be a reductionist, often
does, Schelling insists
that the identity has to be understood as the link of the two sides, which
cannot be characterised
in terms of one of the sides."
This is my exact point, using the term physicalism is assuming subject on
the one side,
'physical objects' on the other. It assumes ontology and SOM, this is where
the word
come from. And then it wants to say 'I am a physicalist', and what happens
to the irreducible
subject? Lets be better post-modernist and not use terms that are implying
the metaphysics
of subject-object. Come on Mattt you've got to see this. Do you claim there
is a difference between
materilism and physicalism? I can't think up much of one. I do not want to
take one ounce
of scientific knowledge away from anyone, sure talking about cause and
effect has proved very
powerful in terms of knowledge and control, but we don't need it, Hume's
scepticism cannot be
answered, but we carry on provisionally, and what we are really looking at
is repeating patterns
that we can describe in mathematics and can use the descriptions to make
predictions, cause and effect
only really adds an implied metaphysical theory where we don't need one, as
us more consistent
pragmatists say. Give it us, go on, be a more consistent pragmatist, and
drop the metaphysics
associated (its no use sying from now on we won't associated metaphysics
with these terms, this is
anti-historical) with cause, effect and physicalism, go on they are only
words, drop them, you can't be
a pragmatist and stuck with certain words, prove you are free to drop them!
I can't see they have any use, try and convince me if you can, you could
start with distinguishing
physicalism and materialism. Isn't physicalism an 'ism' that's got to sound
like metaphysics to a
pragmatists. I've got no problem about describing motion and interaction
about things knocking together,
except it is rally all about the exchange of enery and particles. What is
the relationship of energy to
physicalism? Physicalism, why does Rorty want this term? The only reason I
can come up with is to throw
a bone to the scientific materialists and reductionists so that he has a few
less enemies to deal with.
I do not despise this, I actually don't blame him, let's ace it the SOM
bully boys are very scary.
PS I believe in your integrity Matt, I think you might just see what I'm
saying! Your motivation
seems honest, have I not made you start to doubt this little bit of
Rorty-ism. I do agree that
this physicalism is a small stain on one of the finest bodies of work we
have in our times.
Regards
David Morey
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 10:18 PM
Subject: Re: MD A metaphysics
> David,
>
> David said:
> So what is physicalism when it is anti-reductionist?
> Does anyone hold this view other than you?
> Does Rorty talk about it anywhere?
> Post quantum theory what is a non-reductionist physicalist?
> I thought physicalsim depended on the ontological concept of matter.
>
> Matt:
> Pretend there are numbers in front of each of those lines.
>
> 1. When physicalism is anti-reductionist, it is a language game. It is
simply a way of speaking. It makes no pretensions about how the way the
world really is. It simply says some things about what works, about how it
helps to think about things when trying to predict and control, say, chairs
and rocks.
>
> 2. and 3. You know, flattery will get you no where with me (or
everywhere, I keep forgetting which). I'm not so intelligent as to come up
with non-reductionist physicalism. The genesis of the idea of non-reductive
physicalism began in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature with Rorty's
discussion of the Anitpodeans (don't have the book, can't remember where).
It became an official, titled position with Rorty's essay, "Non-Reductive
Physicalism" in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. I think it is safe to
say that there are at least two avowed non-reductive physicalists: Rorty and
Donald Davidson. The aforementioned paper is one of a series of essays in
which Rorty draws out consequences of Davidson's work that Davidson either
hasn't yet done or doesn't do for his own reasons. But, unlike some of
Rorty's other interpretations of Davidson, I haven't read anything about
Davidson not being comfortable with non-reductive physicalism, so I think it
is safe to say that they agr
> ee.
>
> As for people other than me, Rorty, and Davidson, I'm sure there are a
growing number of neopragmatists out there. I'm not positive, but I don't
think non-reductive physicalism is one of his more controversial positions,
so I imagine it is more congenial to his readers. But, I could be wrong. I
haven't done any surveys.
>
> 4. I imagine that physicalism after quantum theory looks a lot like
Newton after Einstein and then after Heisenberg. In other words, its fine
for some things (like predicting the movement of a rock), but not for others
(like predicting where an electron is going to land).
>
> 5. Nope. No position requires an ontological commitment unless you want
it to. And if you want it to, then you are begging the question over me,
just as I am to you.
>
> Matt
>
>
>
> MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
> Mail Archives:
> Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
> Nov '02 Onward -
http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
> MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
>
> To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
> http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
>
>
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Sep 06 2003 - 12:31:18 BST