From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@tiscali.co.uk)
Date: Mon Sep 08 2003 - 10:05:05 BST
Hi Wim,
> You wrote 30 Aug 2003 18:09:24 +0100:
> 'I think I'd prefer "pattern of experience" to "scale of values" as well.
> What I do think the MoQ says, is that the various patterns can be aggregated
> and sorted according to a scale of Quality. There is a distinction between
> that scale of value and the patterns themselves.
> Perhaps we could talk about a "scale of Quality" to refer to the four
> levels, to avoid that confusion?'
>
> Very good. So we agree (to the extent that you are sure about it), that a
> 'pattern of value' is to be understood as a 'pattern of experience' rather
> than as a 'scale of values'.
I don't recall disagreeing about that - I'm curious as to how the discussion shifted on to this.
Given your expertise at searching the archives, perhaps you could point me to where I denied
'experience'?
> According to Pirsig 'All life is a migration of static patterns of quality
> toward Dynamic Quality'. ('Lila' ch. 11) That seems to mean that those
> 'patterns of experience' can at least be graded on the scale of how near
> they
> are to DQ or how dynamic they are. Is that what you mean with 'a "scale of
> Quality" to refer to the four levels'?
All I mean is that there are higher and lower levels of Quality. You seem(ed) to be denying that.
>
> That leaves to be clarified whether ALL 'patterns of value' of a level
> occupy the same spot on this scale or whether the 'patterns of value' of the
> same level can also be graded this way.
All I want to claim is that there are two senses of 'value' - one that can be put on a scale, with
however fine a 'mesh' you like, and one that is a synonym for experience within the MoQ.
>
> So I do not disagree that there are higher and lower levels. I don't see how
> such disagreement is a logical implication of my argument. As you have by
> now (more or less) conceded that a 'pattern of value' is a 'pattern of
> experience' rather than a 'scale of values', your earlier argument that the
> laws of physics describe the values of the inorganic level, the laws of
> Darwinian evolution describe the values of the biological level etc. should
> be rephrased as these 'laws' describing the 'patterns' of these levels.
I suspect I'm being particularly obtuse here, but I don't see any need to 'concede' anything which I
wasn't denying in the first place - at least, I don't think so. See my comment above, which to my
mind is the sticking point between us. Perhaps I've got the wrong end of the stick. And I think
you're confusing (same point) what a 'pattern' is. The laws are 'meta-patterns' describing the
primary stuff, they are not equivalent. That seems to be the principal disagreement between us, as I
see it.
>
> I wrote:
> 'the Quality/experience first has to create a subject and an object before
> the subject can judge the stability, versatility and harmony of the pattern
> of experience.'
>
> You replied:
> 'That I think is where we may differ. To my mind the reaction is already a
> value.'
>
> I don't understand what you mean. What reaction is already a value?
> The point was, whether 'value' should be understood as 'value judgement'.
I don't think we agree on what the point was. Perhaps it would be good to get a little clarity on
that.
> Not the Quality/experience that is supposed to precede distinguishing
> subjects and objects, I argued.
>
> I wrote:
> '"An amoebae fleeing acid" can be seen as a pure MoQ description of a
> pattern: a pattern that connects movements of the amoebae and rises in
> acidity of its immediate surroundings. "An amoebae experiencing acidity and
> consequently fleeing it" is a way of describing that requires SOM.'
>
> You replied:
> 'What I think is required is simply an intellect performing an observation
> of the phenomenon in hand.
> It doesn't require SOM'
>
> My point was, that without SOM, that intellect can only observe "an amoebae
> fleeing acid". It requires SOM to describe that observation as "An amoebae
> experiencing acidity and consequently fleeing it" (a subject experiencing an
> object and acting on that experience).
Disagree. To say 'an amoebae experiencing acidity and consequently fleeing it' does not - to my
mind - necessitate the postulation of amoebic subjectivity. I think it's possible to describe a
reaction occurring (as with the hot stove). The description is always after the event, therefore
time dependent, and therefore - I would argue - it's legitimate to use a notion like 'causation' -
the acid causes the fleeing. I don't see why that requires SOM.
>
> You continued:
> 'I think I'm fairly happy with "all experience is pattern experience" ... -
> it's the comment that we can't analyze those patterns according to a
> typology of value that I am dubious about.'
>
> My point was, that if experience and value are understood as synonymous and
> if we only experience patterns, then this experience expresses only one type
> of value: the existence of the pattern itself. The only way I see to analyze
> that value, is by distinguishing its stability (observable as continuity),
> its versatility (observable as continuity despite ...) and possibly its
> harmony with higher level patterns of value (somehow lending it 'more' or
> 'stronger' continuity). All other types of value you could name and analyze
> are not synonymous with experience (not ontologically given), but dependent
> on a SOM-based distinction between a valuing subject and a valued object.
I don't see any room for distinguishing a hierarchy of levels with your stability/versatility
typology. That seems quite a big step away from the MoQ.
>
> You wrote:
> 'What makes a symbol "intellectual" rather than "social"? Are symbols only
> available on the intellectual level? (possibly - but I suspect that the
> concept of "truth" is a late arrival on the scene)'
>
> In the end symbols are "intellectual", because of defining "intellectual" as
> "everything symbolic". Symbols are not only available on the intellectual
> level. There's nothing else available there. The CONCEPT of "truth" is for
> sure a late arrival on the intellectual scene, but the EXPERIENCE of "truth"
> (as a quality of 'standing for' relationships) was there from the beginning.
> Only when you can 'think about your thinking', when you can create symbols
> that stand for other symbols, the concept of "truth" can appear.
> I understand 'created in the brain' in 'the collection and manipulation of
> symbols, created in the brain, that stand for patterns of experience' not as
> restriction on the type of symbols used to define the intellectual level.
> (In which case other types of symbols could be "social".) For me it's just
> an (inessential or -indeed- redundant) explanation of what a symbol is. The
> real definition of what a (any) symbol is, is that it is something that
> stands for something else. It is (only) the 'standing for' experience that
> is intellectual.
So how do you distinguish between a symbol and a sign (if you do)? I think I'd like to come back to
this point once we've gained some clarity as to exactly what we're arguing about above. I've changed
the thread name because we've come a long way from the eudaimonic stuff.
Cheers
Sam
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