Re: MD Dealing with S/O pt 1

From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Wed Sep 10 2003 - 19:14:43 BST

  • Next message: Patrick van den Berg: "MD Re: Fractal metaphysics"

    Scott

    Don't understand why you think anti-essentialism=nominalism.

    I am a realist as per essentialism but do not think we can reduce
    reality down to any essential properties.

    But not an anti-realist as per a nominalist. Nor giving priority
    to concrete particulars, as these are indistinguishable without
    language

    I wish to avoid giving priority to either universals or particulars.

    Reality=experience and this includes language as playing
    a role in the emergence of reality/experience and is therefore
    universals+particulars from the first word. This is also a sort
    of curse because we can try and treat language as a synchronic
    achievement and attempt to fix reality once and for all, however
    language is always a living language and closure is never possible.
    I am also happy to go a step further than pragmatism and say that
    there is a equi-primordial Being (static quality) and Becoming(dynamic
    quality)
    character to reality that is a very convincing ontological basis for
    understanding
    experience/reality. Unlike the Platonic bias towards only Being that tries
    to pin reality
    down to an essential-static quality, although the dynamic has always been
    trying
    to force its way back into discussion, usually in the form of the subject.

    Regards
    David Morey

    regards
    David M

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2003 4:10 PM
    Subject: Re: MD Dealing with S/O pt 1

    DM and Matt,

    My point of view is that to be either an essentialist or an
    anti-essentialist is a mistake. Universals and particulars are mutually
    constituting and mutually contradictory. That is, universals make no sense
    without particulars, and particulars make no sense without universals. The
    relation between universals and particulars requires the logic of
    contradictory identity. The error of the nominalist (anti-essentialist) is
    that of continuing to make a language/reality distinction, just as the
    representationalist does.
    If there were no universals there would be no particulars, and vice versa. I
    don't just mean we couldn't say "that is a (particular) flower". I mean
    there wouldn't be a flower. The flower can only exist as a flower because it
    participates in its species' "language", but on the other hand the species
    does not exist except through its expression in particular flowers.

    Pragmatic materialists would likely reply by saying they just want to get
    rid of the universal/particular distinction. But they can only do so by
    privileging reality over language, since language is the embodiment of the
    universal/particular distinction. With just particulars, one can think that
    one can say "There's a tiger". But one needs universals to say "Relax, there
    are no tigers around." To put it another way, you can't get to words about
    things if "originally" there are only things.

    - Scott

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "David MOREY" <us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Monday, September 08, 2003 3:19 PM
    Subject: Re: MD Dealing with S/O pt 1

    > Hey Matt
    >
    > I suggest, we grab what we want, a non-essentialist Pirsig, and insist
    > that's what he really is, so that we can gather as many people on the
    > anti-essentialist side as we can. We are few enough. I never get this
    > emphasising someone's errors thing. Are there any essentialists out there
    > who fancy a discussion with the anti-essentialist faction? Pirsig
    certainly
    > says a lot that is anti-essentialist I believe.
    >
    > Regards
    > DM
    > ----- Original Message -----
    > From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
    > To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    > Sent: Monday, September 08, 2003 9:44 PM
    > Subject: Re: MD Dealing with S/O pt 1
    >
    >
    > Paul,
    >
    > Paul said:
    > I make no apologies for using Pirsig quotes from any of his publications.
    Bo
    > ’s assertion presupposes that there is a “pre-MOQ” and “post-MOQ” Pirsig
    to
    > mix. I don’t think there is such a thing. I’m still waiting for a good
    > reason not to think this.
    >
    > Matt:
    > I love how there is so much disagreement about interpreting the MoQ.
    >
    > For instance, (if I remember correctly) I disagree with Bo about a handful
    > of interpretational issues (some of them major) and (if I remember
    > correctly) I agree with Paul about a handful of interpretational issues
    > (some of them major). But, I agree with Bo that the Pirsig of ZMM is
    enough
    > different from the Pirsig of Lila to warrant a distinction between the
    two.
    > However, I also mix quotes from all of his publications depending on
    > circumstance because I think the dividing line is one of emphasis. I
    think
    > the early Pirsig emphasizes a pragmatist/post-modern reading of philosophy
    > and the late emphasizes a essentialist/modern reading. But there are
    > elements of both in both.
    >
    > Matt

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Sep 10 2003 - 19:19:16 BST