From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Tue Sep 16 2003 - 22:19:08 BST
Hey pragmatist
The way a word works depends on how we use it,
e.g. epistemology, no law that epistemology has to
worry about truth, mind you I would never say that
to a non-pragnmatist. As I read Rorty 15 years ago
I am more interested in pushing past him than establishing
what he's got right.
Ha ha
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2003 8:43 PM
Subject: Re: MD A metaphysics
> David,
>
> David said:
> Sure pragmatism has an epistemology, you do some creative language and you
say 'it works' test rather than 'its truth' test.
>
> Matt:
> Well, either you are begging the question or you're using a different
definition of epistemology. I think begging. Epistemology as some
traditional variant of "What is knowledge"" would ask the question "How do
we know you have knowledge?" As David says, the epistemologist says "Its
true" whereas the pragmatist says, "it works". However, I think that saying
that pragmatism has a metaphysics or epistemology is to pick pragmatism up
by the entirely wrong handle. The answer "it works" never satisfies the
epistemologist because "it works" amounts to "I don't know" or a shrug.
That's the effect the pragmatist wants, but the pragmatist acknowledges,
with the epistemologist, that its a non-answer. Saying the pragmatist has a
metaphysics or epistemology puts the pragmatist in an awkward position, a
position he doesn't want to be in. You want to read the pragmatist as
continuing the epistemological conversation, but the pragmatist wants to end
it. And I have no idea how epis
> temology would continue with an answer like "it works". "It works" isn't
a test on our praxis to see if we are doing it right, its just our praxis,
its just what we do.
>
> As for nature being non-human, pragmatists think the only philosophically
interesting notion of non-human isn't tenable because we don't think it
possible to unwind the human from the nonhuman and hold the two apart, which
is what both Foucaultian social constructionism and Sellarsian psychological
nominalism stand for.
>
> Matt
>
>
>
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