From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Wed Sep 17 2003 - 19:20:30 BST
Matt
A pattern is developing, you state your position too narrowly, I complain,
and I am happy with your
qualifications.
DM
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Wednesday, September 17, 2003 12:36 PM
Subject: Re: MD A metaphysics
> Hey David
> That's why I said "either you're begging the question or using a different
definition".
>
> If you are using a different definition than the traditional one, the one
that pragmatists find dispensable, then you should produce some reasons for
wanting to rehabilitate it. I probably won't be convinced for the same
reason I wasn't convinced by the attempts to rehabilitate metaphysics,
though.
>
> Matt
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: David MOREY <us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk>
> Date: Tuesday, September 16, 2003 4:19 pm
> Subject: Re: MD A metaphysics
>
> > Hey pragmatist
> > The way a word works depends on how we use it,
> > e.g. epistemology, no law that epistemology has to
> > worry about truth, mind you I would never say that
> > to a non-pragnmatist. As I read Rorty 15 years ago
> > I am more interested in pushing past him than establishing
> > what he's got right.
> >
> > Ha ha
> > David M
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
> > To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
> > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2003 8:43 PM
> > Subject: Re: MD A metaphysics
> >
> >
> > > David,
> > >
> > > David said:
> > > Sure pragmatism has an epistemology, you do some creative
> > language and you
> > say 'it works' test rather than 'its truth' test.
> > >
> > > Matt:
> > > Well, either you are begging the question or you're using a
> > differentdefinition of epistemology. I think begging.
> > Epistemology as some
> > traditional variant of "What is knowledge"" would ask the question
> > "How do
> > we know you have knowledge?" As David says, the epistemologist
> > says "Its
> > true" whereas the pragmatist says, "it works". However, I think
> > that saying
> > that pragmatism has a metaphysics or epistemology is to pick
> > pragmatism up
> > by the entirely wrong handle. The answer "it works" never
> > satisfies the
> > epistemologist because "it works" amounts to "I don't know" or a
> > shrug.That's the effect the pragmatist wants, but the pragmatist
> > acknowledges,with the epistemologist, that its a non-answer.
> > Saying the pragmatist has a
> > metaphysics or epistemology puts the pragmatist in an awkward
> > position, a
> > position he doesn't want to be in. You want to read the
> > pragmatist as
> > continuing the epistemological conversation, but the pragmatist
> > wants to end
> > it. And I have no idea how epis
> > > temology would continue with an answer like "it works". "It
> > works" isn't
> > a test on our praxis to see if we are doing it right, its just our
> > praxis,its just what we do.
> > >
> > > As for nature being non-human, pragmatists think the only
> > philosophicallyinteresting notion of non-human isn't tenable
> > because we don't think it
> > possible to unwind the human from the nonhuman and hold the two
> > apart, which
> > is what both Foucaultian social constructionism and Sellarsian
> > psychologicalnominalism stand for.
> > >
> > > Matt
>
>
>
>
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