From: Paul Turner (paulj.turner@ntlworld.com)
Date: Thu Sep 18 2003 - 13:25:01 BST
Bo
[Bo:]
You are an expert in throwing quotations at me, relevant no doubt, but
Pirsig has said many things. As you will see.
I just found a Pirsig letter from 1993 wherein I had asked
"As a matter of fact I have always been a little intrigued by this level
(intellect) You pinpoint its "breakthrough" (in the Western World at
least) to the end of the First World War, but its emergence has always
been a puzzle to me".
PIRSIG replied:
"The emergence of the intellectual level is most closely associated in
my mind with the ancient Greek philosophers and particularly
Socrates who continually pitted truth-seeking against social
conformity. This seems why they killed him
[Paul:]
Yes, I saw this in Lila's Child. Either he is using "emergence" to
describe a social pattern becoming an intellectual pattern, which is the
assumption that started this thread, or he is using "emergence" to
describe intellectual patterns beginning to become independent from the
restraint of social institutions in ancient Greece, culminating in the
intellectual domination of society after the first world war.
Either way, it is of little consequence. The intellectual level is
clearly defined by Pirsig as thinking, the collection and manipulation
of symbols that stand for patterns of experience. Whether thinking
started out as a social pattern or a discrete pattern in an evolutionary
level of its own does not change the definition that applies now, which
is when we are applying it to our experience. Pirsig is clear about this
in Lila's Child
"My statement that "Both 'the genius' and the mentally retarded person
are at the social level" is intended to refute the statement that "the
genius appears to be on a higher evolutionary level." A person who holds
an idea is a social entity, no matter what ideas he holds. The ideas he
holds are an intellectual entity, no matter who holds them." [Lila's
Child p.579]
This is a clear definition and I choose to accept it because it is
consistent with the discrete nature of the levels and all but a few
statements in Lila. You will no doubt choose to reject it because it
ruins your SOLAQI proposal, which, as you know, Pirsig also rejects.
[Bo:]
I see that you differentiate between a subjectivity relating to the
socio-
intellect aggregate and a "mind"-subjectivity at the intellectual level
Paul (the 15th in this thread)
> In the MOQ, "subjective" is social-intellectual patterns. Mind is
> intellectual patterns. Pirsig is talking about subject-object
> metaphysics equating subjective with mind, not the MOQ:
...but do you think a living soul is able to understand the nature of
this
difference?
[Paul:]
Yes. People who understand the MOQ should see the difference easily. I
would say that you give thinking too much credit for your actions. When
you become aware of social forces, you wouldn't deny there is a
difference between society and thought. A school is a social pattern,
but it doesn't have a mind. Is the government a big mind? Do governments
exert influence only when you think about them? I think I don't want to
pay tax this month...
[Paul prev cited:]
> "A conventional subject-object metaphysics uses the same four static
> patterns as the Metaphysics of Quality, dividing them into two groups
of two: inorganic-biological patterns
> called "matter" and social-intellectual patterns called "mind". But
this division is the source of the
> problem." [Lila p.177]
[Bo:]
SOM's most "conventional" off-spring is the mind/matter schism,
if this is to be replaced by the MOQ it must be "devoured" properly, it
can't be kept (in one fashion) as an intellectual pattern, in another
fashion as the inorg+org=object ..etc.
[Paul:]
It can and is. You just don't accept the MOQ; it's as simple as that!
[Bo:]
and - above all - its "mind"
"component" can't be made into MOQ's intellect.
[Paul:]
It can and has been, but once we understand the MOQ, we can drop the
term "mind" and replace it with "static intellectual patterns of value"
when talking to others who also understand it.
[Bo:]
In the latter case
one automatically draws this "diagram" of the MOQ:
Inorg+Bio+Socio (=objective)/Intellect (=subjective).
[Paul:]
How can a social pattern be objective? Can you distinguish between an
elected government and a primitive tribe with scientific measuring
instruments?
Again, I accept Pirsig's definitions
"Yes, it's clear I've been of two minds on whether subjects and objects
should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was concentrating
on the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them
entirely to help clarify things. Later I began to see it's not necessary
to get rid of them because the MOQ can encase them neatly within its
structure-the upper two levels being subjective, and the lower two,
objective. Still later I saw that the subject-object distinction is very
useful for sharply distinguishing between biological and social levels.
If I had been more careful in my editing, I would have eliminated or
modified the earlier statements to bring them into agreement with the
latter ones." [Lila's Child p.530]
[Bo quoted Paul:]
> He equates mind, thoughts and ideas with intellectual patterns >
several times:
[Bo:]
Yes, and also says that the "mind" term should be avoided ...which is
impossible, this is the knot that the SOL cuts through:
[Paul:]
"Mind" is a poor term because it used in many different ways both
generally and philosophically. "Static intellectual pattern of values"
describes the mind as the most evolved manifestation of assertions of
value. The mind does not need to be "cut through".
[Paul prev cited:]
> "In Lila, I never defined the intellectual level of the MOQ, since
> everyone who is up to reading Lila already knows what "intellectual"
> means.
[Bo:]
Right, but the dictionaries does not define intellect/intellectual as
"mind". My "Oxford Advanced" says: "Power of the mind to reason,
contrasted with feeling and instinct". Which means that there is an
emotional MIND as well as an instinctive MIND.
[Paul:]
As I said, "mind" is a poor term.
[Paul prev cited:]
> For purposes of MOQ precision, let's say that the intellectual
> level is the same as mind. It is the collection and manipulation of
> symbols, created in the brain, that stand for patterns of experience."
> [Lila's Child p.64]
[Bo:]
Yes, and it creates an intellectual level where experience is an
abstract variety of the real experience at the other levels ...exactly
as
the SOM.
[Paul:]
If you chop out the "real" from that statement then it reads:
"it creates an intellectual level where experience is an
abstract variety of the experience at the other levels"
Which I would say is correct. Intellectual patterns are as real as any
other experience. This is the difference between the MOQ and materialist
versions of SOM. Mind and matter are co-existing levels of value
patterns but neither is fundamental. He has never denied mind or matter
an existence; he just doesn't make it the primary division of
experience. This is basic MOQ.
> [Paul:]
> "Intellect is simply thinking, and one can think without involving the
> subject-object relationship." [Lila's Child p.289]
[Bo:]
Yes, one can "think", and that was/is done when we are at the social
level. But one cannot REASON without it and that is intellect defined
by dictionaries.
[Paul:]
There is no thinking required in assertions of value at the social
level. Again, you give thinking too much credit.
> ..you refer to your interpretation of Pirsig as if it is what he
> secretly intended. I have no problem whatsoever with discussing
> interpretations, modifications, even pragmatist strong misreadings as
> long as we are clear on where we have knowingly changed the meaning of
> Pirsig's [or anyone else's] terms to suit our proposal. For example,
> your argument above could read:
> "It would be better if "thinking" was not the definition of the
> intellectual level because..."
[Bo:]
I stand corrected, but we would soon tire of such a "caveat" at the end
of each sentence.
[Paul:]
I guess I value maintaining integrity over avoiding being tiresome. It's
a personal choice though.
[Bo:]
And about Pirsig's intentions. Except for the cited
letter, there are many indications of an intellect that fits the S/O
interpretation, for example this from.
Lila Chapter 20:
> Perhaps in Homer's time, when evolution had not
> yet transcended the social level into the intellectual....
You have surely denied it before, but at Homer's time (4000 years
ago) the intellectual level had not been established and he wrote the
"Iliad" without having "symbol manipulation" at his disposal?
[Paul:]
This sentence [are there others?], with a certain meaning of
"transcended" being used, supports your interpretation that the
intellectual level did not emerge until Socrates, as stated by Pirsig in
his letter to you. There are quotes from Pirsig that don't support your
interpretation and are much less ambiguous
"A social pattern which would be unaware of the next higher level would
be found among prehistoric people and the higher primates when they
exhibit social learning that is not genetically hardwired but yet is not
symbolic." [Lila's Child p.546]
And in terms of "writing"
"Those aspects of a language that a microphone or camera can pick up are
objective and therefore biological. Those aspects of a language which a
microphone or camera cannot pick up (i.e., meaning) are subjective and
therefore social. If the gorilla understands what is meant in ways that
are socially learned, then the gorilla is acting socially. If the
gorilla can read and write and add and subtract then it is acting
intellectually." [Lila's Child p.576]
What this comes down to is that I find the MOQ makes perfect sense when
you take his definitions [as provided in Lila's Child, SODV, and letters
published in Ant McWatt's papers] and read ZMM and Lila with them in
mind. You don't.
You have only succeeded in demonstrating that Pirsig contradicts himself
at times. Well done. My response to that is to take the least ambiguous,
most direct and recent statements [such as those above] and iron out
inconsistencies in agreement with them.
Your approach is to take the inconsistencies and use them to demonstrate
that he has radically changed his vision from the original one that only
you have picked up on. You then build your interpretation from a few
inconsistent statements, ultimately requiring us to accept modifications
which Pirsig has refuted.
Nevertheless, by ironing out inconsistencies, you can argue that I am
also putting forward an interpretation. I accept that. I would simply
argue that I have taken into account all of his work in assembling my
interpretation with nothing like a "SOLAQI" of my own to force me to
exclude much of his later writing.
Anyway, I think I've devoted enough time to your project. Looking at the
archives I am just the latest in a long line of contributors to say the
same things to you so I am under no illusion that you would begin to
accept anything I say. It would be good if we could discuss Pirsig's
ideas without [just for once perhaps] having to bring your SOLAQI idea
into the debate.
I recently asked you to take the time to define just what it was about
Pirsig's MOQ that you find so objectionable and without reference to
your solution. You didn't take me up on that, other than saying that
"the difficulties have emerged with the mind-definition of the
intellectual
Level" without saying what those "difficulties" are. So I take it you
can't. Until you do, I take it you just like the sound of your own idea
and keep looking for ways to convince us it is better than anything
Pirsig has come up with. Keep trying if you wish, there are plenty of
people on this forum, but I'm afraid I've stopped listening for now.
Paul
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