From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Fri Sep 19 2003 - 01:55:00 BST
Hi Scott:
You offered the following as definitions of "object:"
> "Object n.
> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, expecially by
> vision or touch; a material thing. 2. A focus of attention, feeling,
> thought, or action. 3. The purpose, aim [etc.] 4. [grammatical object]
> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
> (American Heritage Dictionary)
Then went on to conclude:
> But mainly, I object because there is now no way to talk about the S/O
> divide, using "O" as in definitions #2 or #5. It is as if Pirsig wants
> to eliminate the separation between self and other by defining it away.
> Defnitions #2 and #5 exist for a reason. Without them, we just have to
> invent new words.
> The problem is that there is no way to talk about the intellect without
> talking about an X/Y divide, traditionally called the S/O divide. But we
> can't use "object" for "Y" and since subject in the #5 sense is also
> verboten, what do we use instead? Well, in the MOQ one can refer to
> static patterns of value, so we have at least X/SPoV. Now what goes into
> "X"? In the MOQ, the only thing that is not SPoV is DQ, but that is not
> what is traditionally thought of as the "subject". So how do I talk
> about thinking, perceiving, feeling, understanding, willing, etc. in
> general terms, that is, philosophically?
What's missing in definitions #2 and #5 is any identification of by
whom or what. I think it's fair to assume the by whom or what is a
human being. If so, merely substitute Pirsig's definition of a human
being for "subject," namely "A complex ecology of patterns moving
towards DQ," or simply, "A collection of ideas."
> "I understand the MOQ [or don't understand]". That's a case of the S/O
> divide, in the #2 or #5 sense. Me on one side, the MOQ on the other. The
> MOQ is not an object (def. #1), so this statement is impossible,
> according to the MOQ.
Not so. The MOQ statement would be: "This collection of ideas called me
understands (or doesn't understand) the pattern of ideas called the
MOQ."
> The same applies to all his examples, like mathematics. If I think about
> a statement about triangles, and want to prove it, I (subject) treat the
> concepts triangle, line, etc. as objects (sense #2).
In the same way: "This complex ecology of patterns called "I" will now
think about an intellectual pattern called triangles." (or, about
biological patterns called tigers, or social patterns called schools,
or whatever.)
> How are you going to investigate it without the S/O distinction?
Instead of calling the pattern the S/O distinction, call it the E/O
distinction where E stands for a human "Ecology" of value patterns and
S stands for some "Other" value pattern. Then, if E changes for
something new and better, attribute the change to undefinable DQ.
The difference between the S/O divide and the E/O divide is
philosophical, not illogical--unless of course your reject the
assumptions of Pirsig's MOQ.
I know it seems weird to replace "Subject" with "Ecology of Value
Patterns," but it's a lot weirder to assert that Reality is Morality or
that iron filings value movement toward a magnet as Pirsig would have
us believe. All the really great ideas appear weird in the beginning.
Platt
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