Re: MD The Not-So-Simpleminds at play

From: Ray Cox (baroquenviolin@yahoo.com)
Date: Mon Sep 22 2003 - 11:55:28 BST

  • Next message: Sam Norton: "Re: MD MoQ platypuses"

    Matt,

    Excellent response; it corrected me on a few errors I
    wasn't even aware of when writing.

    Matt said:
    Do we trust the insights on morals a molester gives?
    Especially as Pirsig seems to endorse the idea that
    it does matter to a person's philosophy the way they
    act.

    Ray said:
    ... What if we rephrased the question to the
    following: "Would it change our feelings about the
    whole MoQ if Pirsig appeared to have very low social
    quality?" ...

    Matt said:
    ... I think the reason I don't like the categorization
    of people as "he has very low social quality" or "he
    has very high intellectual quality" is that 1) it goes
    against my Sartrean instincts of not labeling people
    as "this" or "that" because the ego, the "I", is too
    fluid. I think we should reject such poor labeling
    because it treats us as overly static, which is
    something the MoQ warns us against. 2) The
    categorization is too abstract to be useful (for which
    Pirsig acknowledges when he says that the MoQ
    shouldn't be used to solve moral dillemmas). The
    monikers "high intellectual quality" and "low social
    quality" are the spoils of war, the people who win the
    argument get the prize of labeling people as high and
    low (which we can still do even after accepting the
    Sartrean point).

    Ray:
    To this, I agree, and I will admit the labeling was
    too general to be useful to my argument. To define a
    person by his/her static patterns (be it biological,
    social, or intellectual) is to ignore their capacity
    for Dynamic Quality.

    Matt said:
    On this question, "Do we trust the insights on morals
    a molester gives?", I think we can make a concrete
    distinction that pans out to an abstract distinction
    between social and intellectual: we make a distinction
    between the person and their books. We can trust
    Lester's books on morality, but we shouldn't trust
    Lester around our children.
    ... What we need are distinctions that are more
    concrete. For instance, Rorty's defence of Heidegger
    by saying that philosophy and politics do not cross
    over that much, and if it isn't blatantly obvious, we
    shouldn't really have reason to think that they do in
    any subtlely dangerous way. Philosophy is the way it
    is because it is abstract, and because it is abstract
    we can co-opt it for many different concrete things.
    ... On this question, "Do we trust the insights on
    morals a molester gives?", I think we can make a
    concrete distinction that pans out to an abstract
    distinction between social and intellectual: we make a
    distinction between the person and their books. We
    can trust Lester's books on morality, but we shouldn't
    trust Lester around our children.
    ... What this means for the MoQ, and this is something
    that Pirsig gestures towards in his passage on the
    death penalty, is that we shouldn't label people
    according to their static patterns. There is always
    the possiblity of Dynamic Quality. What Lila helps us
    see, however, is that, while we shouldn't label people
    according to their static patterns, this doesn't mean
    that we should be paralyzed from taking moral
    precautions because of some people's static patterns.

    Ray:
    So then back to the original question: would our
    feelings about the whole MoQ change if Pirsig appeared
    to be an ugly, child-molesting, cigar smoking bold
    woman? No, I still don't think it should. But rather
    than abstractly concluding that social patterns should
    not have an influence over intellectual patterns, I
    should first and foremost make the distinction between
    the human being and their thoughts, morals, actions,
    past, etc., and then proceed to conclude (if
    necessary) that our treatment of the MoQ should not be
    blindly influenced by this "other Pirsig's" history,
    but it should not be blindly disregarded when
    considering his theories, either. Any thoughts?

    Also for the sake of curiosity, I would like to go
    back to your comments on the abstract quality of
    philosophy. What if we were to discuss another
    pursuit, say physics? Had Albert Einstein been
    sitting on death-row when he came up with his theory
    of relativity, would our dislike for the criminal
    change the reception of the theory? Or art? Had Bach
    been a theif or a swindler, would his music still be
    taught throughout literally every Western music school
    in the world?

    Sincerely,

    Ray

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