Re: MD The final solution or new frustration.

From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@tiscali.co.uk)
Date: Fri Sep 26 2003 - 12:15:04 BST

  • Next message: Dan Glover: "Re: MD Dealing with S/O"

    Hi Bo,

    As you know I share your doubts about the present construction of the 'intellectual' level, but my
    views have been rehearsed enough for the time being (NB to Paul Turner, I'm working on a proper
    response to your 'criticism' paper at the moment. Watch this space!).

    However, although I think you are on to something with SOLAQI I don't think your present position is
    sustainable. The following is why:

    > Not very long after this discussion started I made the observation that
    > the emergence of SOM in "Zen and the Art ..." (ZMM) matches so
    > perfectly with the emergence of the intellectual level in LILA that it
    > couldn't be a mere coincidence. If so, intellect's "nature" has nothing
    > to do with mind or thinking (as such) but is the value of discerning
    > between what's subjective and what's objective.

    I agree that there is a correspondence in Pirsig's presentation in ZMM and Lila, and that there is a
    natural tying together of intellect and SOM as a historical datum. Where I disagree with the
    argument is the conclusion you draw, ie "intellect's "nature" has nothing to do with mind or
    thinking (as such) but is the value of discerning between what's subjective and what's objective."

    To make my objection clearer, lets have an analogy. Imagine the first creature to crawl out of the
    sea was something that could be called a 'walking fish'. This 'walking fish' then begat all the
    myriad creatures that now wander around or above dry land. However, it would not be true to describe
    them all as 'walking fish' - at least, not without rendering the normal use of language irrelevant.
    In sum, it seems to me that you are confusing historical primacy with substantive definition.

    Whereas I would accept that (on Pirsig's presentation in ZMM and Lila) there is a correspondence
    between the emergence of the level and the development of SOM (or at least, the intellectual
    revolution with Socrates - I have doubts about whether that is fairly described as SOM), I don't
    think that all the subsequent developments of intellect share in the S/O pattern. Consequently, I
    don't think that the intellectual level can be *defined* as subject/object logic. For example,
    neo-Platonism stresses 'participation', ie that full knowledge is only gained when there is a union
    between the knower and the known. Not very subject/object oriented that, is it? And I think this is
    why Pirsig rejects the SOLAQI idea in Lila's Child - "many forms of intellect do not have a
    subject-object construction".

    If there was a) an absolutely discrete break between the Socratic method and what came before it (or
    surrounded it) AND b) all other intellectual systems were subsets of that method, then I think
    SOLAQI would be correct. Yet I don't believe either a) or b) are true. Hence, although I accept the
    point linking together Pirsig's dominant presentation (ie without the qualifications that now weigh
    down the 'standard' MoQ), I don't think this implies the conclusion that you draw from it.

    That's my two pennies anyhow!

    > Look, Pirsig first says that Jaynes' idea matches the MOQ EXACTLY!
    > And then that there is no difference between language and
    > THINKING. This I believe ought to satisfy all parties. The intellectual
    > level means THINKING, but it also means that the S/O split was the
    > necessary outcome from the (false yet compelling) impression that
    > thinking takes place on another level of reality than verbal language.
    > Those who see the SOM as a later development are also right: The
    > S/O Metaphysics did not spring directly out of the new faculty. It first
    > manifested as a doubt in the the old social (mythological) order, later it
    > took the form of a quest for the eternal principles, only with Socrates
    > and Plato did things come to a head ...and the rest is history.

    One of the reasons I don't like the 'standard' account of intellect as a fourth level is that I
    don't know what is meant by 'thinking' - that is, in a philosophically rigorous sense. I think it is
    used very loosely in some of our arguments here, but that's really something to pursue another time.

    In the meantime, may I just say that I'm glad you're back and contributing?
    Cheers
    Sam

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