Re: MD The final solution or new frustration.

From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Fri Sep 26 2003 - 14:50:11 BST

  • Next message: David MOREY: "Re: MD The narrator"

    Hi Bo,

    Thanks for further explaining your SOLAQI idea and attempting to
    reconcile differences as to what constitutes the intellectual level.
    I’ve no doubt that SOM and its assumption of an S/O split dominates the
    intellectual level as the most significant part of what the
    intellectual level is –"the manipulation of language derived symbols
    for experience." That’s Pirsig’s own definition that arose when long
    ago you posted the following:

    "A while back we spoke about the emergence of intellect and I said that
    in a way Subject/Object Metaphysics could be seen as identical to the
    intellectual level of the MOQ."

    In Note 50 in Lila's Child, Pirsig was concerned about types of
    thinking your idea excluded:

    "This seems too restrictive. It seems to exclude non-subject-object
    constructions such as symbolic logic, higher mathematics and computer
    languages from the intellectual level and give them no home. Also the
    term "quality" as used in the MOQ would be excluded from the
    intellectual level. In fact, the MOQ, which gives intellectual meaning
    to the term quality would also have to be excluded from the
    intellectual level. If we just say the intellect is THE MANIPULATION OF
    LANGUAGE DERIVED SYMBOLS FOR EXPERIENCE these problems of excessive
    exclusion do not seem to occur. (Note 50. Lila's Child) (Caps added.)

    Also, here’s Pirsig’s Note 129 that Sam referred to:

    "I've always thought this is incorrect because MANY FORMS OF INTELLECT
    DO NOT HAVE A SUBJECT-OBJECT CONSTRUCTION. These include logic itself,
    mathematics, computer programming languages and, I believe some
    primitive languages (although I can't remember what they are.)" (Caps
    added.)

    Pirsig’s point is supported by the following passage in "The Emperor’s
    New Mind" by Roger Penrose:

    "Non-verbality of thought

    "One of the major points that Hadamard makes in his study of creative
    thinking is an impressive refutation of the thesis, so often still
    expressed, that verbalization is necessary for thought. One could
    hardly do better than repeat a quotation from a letter he received from
    Albert Einstein on the matter:

    "'The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem
    to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities
    which seem to serve as elements of thought are certain signs and more
    or less clear images which can be "voluntarily" reproduced and
    combined. The above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and
    some muscular type. Conventional words or other signs have to be sought
    for laboriously only in a second stage, when the mentioned associative
    play is sufficiently established and can be reproduced at will.'

    "The eminent geneticist Francis Golton is also worth quoting:

    "'It is a serious drawback to me in writing, and still more in
    explaining myself, that I do not think as easily in words as otherwise.
    It often happens that after being hard at work, and having arrived at
    results that are perfectly clear and satisfactory to myself, when I try
    to express them in language I feel that I must begin by putting myself
    upon quite another intellectual plane. I have to translate my thoughts
    into a language that does not run very evenly with them. I therefore
    waste a vast deal of time in seeking appropriate words and phrases, and
    am conscious, when required to speak on a sudden, of being often very
    obscure through mere verbal maladroitness, and not through want of
    clearness of perception. That is one of the small annoyances of my
    life.'

    "Also Hadamard himself writes:

    "'I insist that words are totally absent from my mind when I really
    think and I shall completely align my case with Gotten's in the sense
    that even after reading or hearing a question, every word disappears
    the very moment that I am beginning to think it over; and I fully agree
    with Schopenhauer when he writes, 'thoughts die the moment they are
    embodied by words'.'

    "I (Penrose) quote these examples because they very much accord with my
    own thought-modes. Almost all my mathematical thinking is done visually
    and in terms of non-verbal concepts, although the thoughts are quite
    often accompanied by inane and almost useless verbal commentary, such
    as 'that thing goes with that thing and that thing goes with that
    thing'. (I might use words sometimes for simple logical inferences.)
    Also, the difficulties that these thinkers have had with translating
    their thoughts into words is something that I frequently experience
    myself. Often the reason is that there simply are not the words
    available to express the concepts that are required. In fact I often
    calculate using specially designed diagrams which constitute a
    shorthand for certain types of algebraic expression. It would be a very
    cumbersome process indeed to have to translate such diagrams into
    words, and this is something that I would do only at a last resort if
    it becomes necessary to give a detailed explanation to others. As a
    related observation, I had noticed, on occasion, that if I have been
    concentrating hard for some while on mathematics and someone would
    engage me suddenly in conversation, then I would find myself almost
    unable to speak for several seconds.

    "This is not to say that I do not sometimes think in words, it is just
    that I find words almost useless for mathematical thinking. Other kinds
    of thinking, perhaps such as philosophizing, seem to be much better
    suited to verbal expression. Perhaps this is why so many philosophers
    seem to be of the opinion that language is essential for intelligent or
    conscious thought! No doubt different people think in very different
    ways-as has certainly been my own experience, even just amongst
    mathematicians. The main polarity in mathematical thinking seems to be
    analytical/geometrical. It is interesting that Hadamard considered
    himself to be on the analytical side, even though he used visual rather
    than verbal images for his mathematical thinking."

    PH:
    This seems to me to be enough evidence to support Pirsig’s view that
    SOLAQI is too restrictive to fully explain the intellectual level.
    Where I believe you go astray is your assumption that "there is no
    difference between language and thinking" and your connection between
    the intellectual level and verbal language as you expressed by saying
    "the (false yet compelling) impression that thinking takes place on
    another level of reality than verbal language." The latter I take to
    mean that you believe the intellectual level consists solely of verbal
    language. If so, I think I’ve presented sufficient evidence to show
    that such is not the case. The intellectual level is better described
    as man’s ability to use complex symbolic systems to represent
    experience.

    But, if you say SOM dominates the intellectual level today among the
    masses of mankind, especially those in the Western world, I
    wholeheartedly agree. Unfortunately, humanistic SOM cannot explain
    values at all except in touchy-feely bromides like "Don’t be cruel."

    I look forward to your comments.

    Best regards,
    Platt

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Sep 26 2003 - 14:54:36 BST