From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Tue Oct 07 2003 - 07:29:07 BST
Dear Sam,
You wrote 4 Oct 2003 18:11:45 +0100:
'I see all things (ie everything static) as being patterns of value - a
product of the interaction between Quality and other static patterns, which
occasionally react fruitfully - ie with dynamism - to produce something new,
ie a new configuration of patterns.'
O.k., if I may substitute 'Dynamic Quality' for 'Quality'.
You wrote 8 Sep 2003 10:05:05 +0100:
'there are two senses of "value" - one that can be put on a scale, with
however fine a "mesh" you like, and one that is a synonym for experience
within the MoQ.'
You clarify 4 Oct 2003 18:11:45 +0100:
'the "scale" I'm talking about is simply the differentiation between the
different levels of the MoQ. If all is value then the existence of the
different levels implies a scale of value ... That is a second order
description compared to the first order description that all is value; that
all things which exist are patterns of value.'
Why not just 'a second order pattern of value? An intellectual pattern of
value, because it makes a symbolic image of 'levels' stand for different
types of patterns of value. For me 'scale of value' is unnecessary and adds
risks of reverting to subject-object thinking when you neglect the first
order descriptions. But indeed, it may not necessarily imply such reversion.
I wrote 4 Oct 2003 00:03:55 +0200:
'No, the stability/versatility scale just determines the degree of
"patternedness", the amount of static quality. In my version of the MoQ
levels are distinguished by the different ways in which patterns are
maintained/latched. Their hierarchy (which is "higher" and which "lower") is
simply a matter of historical chronology and -by combining with the idea
that "all static patterns of value migrate towards DQ"- a suggestion that
"later" patterns of value have more (or "are more had by") Dynamic Quality.
(No more than a suggestion, because of the undefinability of DQ.)'
You comment 4 Oct 2003 18:11:45 +0100:
'I can see that this is a very useful tool for analyzing Quality. However,
it seems - perhaps just a suggestion - that you don't have the discrete
levels any more. Is that right? (Do you accept that there are levels, some
"higher", some "lower"?)'
In my version of the MoQ the levels are as discrete as the ways in which
their patterns of value are maintained/latched. The more recently a way of
maintaining/latching is developed, the 'higher' the level.
Strange that this was not clear to you from what I wrote 4 Oct 2003 00:03:55
+0200!
More interesting to me, you started to comment on my way of distinguishing
the levels:
'You define the third level as unconscious static latching?
To my mind that is a good description, but it is - or may be - a description
of something epiphenomenal, ie not of the essence of the third level. In
other words, I think that you are pointing out something which is true, but
which doesn't give a full account; it is necessary but it is not sufficient.
I think that a full account of the third level needs to make some reference
to the governing milieu within which the unconscious copying takes place, ie
the field of language and culture, narratives, rituals and mythology. So I
think you've latched(!) on to a part of the explanation (which hasn't been
adequately addressed before) but I think there is more to be added on to
make it comprehensive.
Similarly, I think you conceive the fourth level to be conscious copying of
behaviour patterns?
Again, I don't think this is a sufficient account of the fourth level, for
similar reasons.'
I summarized my views 23 Aug 2003 15:07:56 +0200:
'I distinguish levels of static quality by the different ways in which
patterns of value are latched, in which their stability and versatility are
maintained. 3rd Level patterns of value are maintained by (unconscious)
copying of behavior. 4rd Level patterns of value are maintained by
(conscious) copying of motivations for behavior. (To distinguish motivated
"behavior" from unmotivated behavior, I often use the verb "to act" for the
first and "to behave" for the latter.)'
I agree that the terms 'unconscious' and 'conscious' are epiphenomenal.
That's why I put them in between brackets. In some senses the terms
'unconscious' and 'conscious' can help to indicate what I mean. There are
(for my purposes) too many wrong ways of interpreting them to make them
essential parts of my definitions (e.g. 'unconscious' in 'Lila was lying on
the cabin floor unconscious'...).
So you can read my definitions as 'copying behaviour' and 'copying
motivations'.
Symbolic language was not present when people (i.e. early hominids) only
copied behaviour.
Culture is a too vague word to be of much use here. I'm fine with Pirsig's
definition of culture from 'Lila's Child' as the sum total of 'social and
intellectual values' (which I translate as 'social and intellectual patterns
of value').
Narratives and mythology require symbolic language and are part of the
governing milieu for 'copying motivations', not for 'copying behaviour'.
Rituals are complex sets of behaviour. Some of them may have formed the
threshold between social and intellectual patterns of value, because they
may have made the insight dawn on early homo sapiens that they might be
performing those (religious) rituals 'because' somehow 'cosmic order'
required them to (because it had to be maintained or because they had to
stay in line with it or whatever).
With friendly greetings,
Wim
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Tue Oct 07 2003 - 07:35:03 BST