RE: MD Begging the Question, Moral Intuitions, and Answering the Nazi, Part III

From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sun Oct 19 2003 - 20:53:33 BST

  • Next message: David Buchanan: "RE: MD Begging the Question, Moral Intuitions, and Answering the Nazi, Part III"

    Scott, Matt, Platt and all:

    Platt channeled David Horowitz:
    It's no mystery why college campuses today have strict, politically correct
    speech codes. It's the predictable consequence of Rorty's "intersubjective
    agreement" which is a simply a not-so-subtle disguise for raw, power
    politics.

    Scott said to Platt:
    I'm not concerned with political correctness crap on college campuses or
    with Clinton's moral failings. I am concerned that you are grossly
    misrepresenting what Rorty has said.

    dmb says:
    Matt is fond of linking Platt's view with mine, but we actually have very
    little in common and this case highlights the difference. We both dislike
    Rorty, but it is usually for different reasons. Platt tends to stress
    morality and likes to voice the angry-white-guy conservative objections.
    While I'd certainly go along with the objection that Rorty's pragmatism is
    morally vacuous and ultimately nihilistic and destructive, I think mysticism
    is really what makes the MOQ so un-Rortyian. And my problem with PC campus
    codes is that they seem to reflect this ridiculous position that we can
    change a person's beliefs by simply altering the terms they use, as if
    forcing a person to use an "enlightened" vocabulary with somehow magically
    make them an enlightened person. At best, all we get there is a false and
    insincere intersubjective agreement, which is pretty much the definition of
    an Orwellian nightmare. Now we turn to more relevant issues...

    Here's the opening of Consequences of Pragmatism:
    "The essays in this book are attempts to draw consequences from a pragmatist
    theory about truth. This theory says that truth is not the sort of thing one
    should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. For
    pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of a property which all true
    statements share. ...Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said for
    this common feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that
    there is much to be said about the common feature shared by such morally
    praiseworthy actions as... They see certain acts as good ones to perform,
    under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful
    to say about what makes them all good."

    Scott said:
    ...what is your "philosophically interesting theory about truth"? Now if you
    have one, the odds are that Rorty will not find it philosophically
    interesting. In that case, when you and Rorty argue you are mutually begging
    the question that that hypothetical theory of yours *is* philosophically
    interesting. That is all that Matt is trying to say.

    dmb says:
    Is truth is a property of all true statements or is truth a species of the
    Good? Is Good a noun, or is Goodness just a feature of morally praisworthy
    acts? Is the MOQ is a philosophically interesting theory of truth or is
    Rorty bored? Hard to imagine how we could have it both ways. Clash, clash,
    clash. But I also wanted to point out that this is probably one of those
    cases Scruton was talking about. It seems pragmatists refuse to engage the
    actual issue at hand and instead responds that its come down to "mutual
    question begging" or that we don't have enough common "vocabulary" and so
    the pragmatists just shrugs and the conversation stops. It is "thrown out of
    court"... And the thing that kills me here is that I find it impossible to
    distinguish between what can simply be called a fundamental disagreement and
    question begging, as Matt's long and tedious explanation described it. And
    while I'm at it, what the difference between "vocabulary" and what is
    commonly known as the "terms" of the debate? It all seems like a painfully
    fancy way to say a very unfancy thing; that people disagree about stuff.

    British philosopher Roger Scruton wrote:
    "In his excellent book, 'Against Deconstruction,' the critic John Ellis
    points out that the normal response of those who advocate
    deconstruction to those who question it is not to reply with argument,
    but to rule both the questions and the questioner out of court."

    Scott said:
    Rorty's position is not "think whatever you like to be true", but
    that he doubts that one can find some method for deciding in all cases what
    is true. So does Pirsig, with respect to finding in all cases what is moral.
     ...Do you have access to God's opinion on the matter? If not, what is your
    method for determining whether it is good or bad -- and what assumptions to
    you bring to bear to make that determination? ... Do you know of some
    absolute standard by which one can determine whose opinion is closer to the
    truth?

    dmb says:
    Decide in all cases? Access to God's opinion? Absolute standard to measure
    the truth of opinion? This must be the kind of thing Blackburn was talking
    about when he asked if it is "really possible to hold that only
    old-fashioned metaphysical prigs talk unblushingly of truth anymore". I
    still don't know who these divinely inspired absolutists are, but surely
    Pirsig is not one of them and so I fail to see the relevance. And just
    because we don't have access to God's opinion or the absolute truth,
    whatever that is, it simply does not follow that we should abandon the
    philosophical quest. It seems to me that the post-modern thing to do is live
    with a certain level of uncertainty and ambiguity and work that into our
    quest. Maybe that's what will make it philosophically interesting.

    > Simon Blackburn wrote:
    > "Non-philosophers who dip into his (Rorty's) writings may come away
    > intoxicated by the scale, but also astonished by the message. How could
    > anyone, for example, seriously hold, as Rorty has, that 'truth is what
    > your contemporaries let you get away with,' or that 'no area of
    > culture, and no period of history, gets Reality more right than any
    > other.'? Is it really possible to hold that only 'old-fashioned
    > metaphysical prigs' talk unblushingly of truth any more?"

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