Re: MD What makes an idea dangerous?

From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Thu Oct 23 2003 - 21:23:08 BST

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    Hi all

    Maybe we should talk about violence. Is
    violence a form of negative DQ where instead of
    creating it's power destroys. Also it can be used
    to improve a situation where it allows positive DQ
    to be released by destroying a blockage caused by SQ,
    or sometimes it can be used to support SQ against the pressure coming
    to release more DQ?

    regards
    David M

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Platt Holden" <pholden@sc.rr.com>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2003 3:35 PM
    Subject: Re: MD What makes an idea dangerous?

    > Hi Wim,
    >
    > > Dear Andy, Platt & others involved in this thread,
    > >
    > > Platt considers (19 Oct 2003 14:57:52 -0400) 'Rorty's theory of truth
    > > (what you can get away with) ... socially dangerous', i.e. (19 Oct 2003
    > > 09:06:41 -0400) 'dangerous to a free society because without confidence
    > > in the concept of truth (and it's companion, logic), the public is
    > > disarmed against lies'.
    > >
    > > Andy is (20 Oct 2003 23:58:07 +0000) troubled by 'also consider[ing]
    > > some people's ideas dangerous' or rather by calling himself a pacifist
    > > and nevertheless 'feel[ing] that society would be better off if certain
    > > individuals who held dangerous ideas would come to meet sudden and
    > > tragic ends'.
    > >
    > > I'm doubting both the tenability of Platt's position and the necessity
    > > of Andy's troubles. If the social level and the intellectual level are
    > > discrete, how can an intellectual pattern of value (e.g. a theory of
    > > truth or other 'dangerous ideas') then be 'socially dangerous'? Will
    > > killing individuals really kill the 'dangerous ideas'? Are ideas that
    > > are countered by force (instead of by persuasion, as advocated by Platt
    > > 21 Oct 2003 11:52:32 -0400) not usually strengthened rather than killed
    > > (e.g. by the 'martyr-effect')?
    > >
    > > Societies are held together by social patterns of value, not by
    > > intellectual patterns of value. Social patterns of value produce
    > > predictable behaviour. Any intellectual pattern of value (e.g.
    > > repetitive expression of a specific idea) is dangerous to social
    > > patterns of value, because it motivates people to behave differently
    > > than before, to break the social pattern.
    >
    > Perhaps we've inadvertently discovered a crack in Pirsigs hierarchy
    > because it's evident that ideas (intellectual patterns of value)
    > influence human behavior (social patterns of value). Otherwise, social
    > patterns would never change. (Example of the Zuni brujo.)
    >
    > My thought about the concept of truth being vital to society reflects
    > society's dependency on honesty and trust in government as well as in
    > individual dealings in a free market. Without confidence that
    > individuals within a community are largely truthful with one another,
    > the community will disintegrate. For example, if the majority in a
    > community discovers that elections of their leaders are rigged, the
    > community will be thrown into turmoil.
    >
    > Tangentially, Pirsig suggests something similar holds the scientific
    > community together. "But can he argue that the moral question, 'Is it
    > all right to fake your scientific data?' is not a scientific question?"
    > (Lila, chp.24)
    >
    > Faking, lieing, misrepresenting, deceiving, falsifying--all related to
    > the concept of truth--will, if practiced on a large enough scale, break
    > up a society as surely as a natural disaster.
    >
    > > The idea that individuals have rights to freedom (which Andy suspects
    > > Platt 20 Oct 2003 23:58:07 +0000 of not respecting enough) is a clear
    > > case. You can forget about any predictable behaviour and any society if
    > > people would act too much upon that idea. We're lucky that even in a
    > > so-called 'free society' people's behaviour is only marginally changed
    > > by motivated actions. Most of it is still 'follow-the-leader' type of
    > > unmotivated behaviour, the behaviour that builds and maintains society.
    > > For social patterns of value (as I understand them) it is hardly
    > > relevant whether people adhere to libertarianism or to fascism.
    >
    > I consider it highly relevant whether social patterns of behavior are
    > relatively voluntary and unconformist in a libertarian society compared
    > to behavior that's involuntary and rigidly conformist in a communist
    > society.
    >
    > Regards,
    > Platt
    >
    >
    >
    >
    >
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