From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Thu Oct 23 2003 - 22:32:48 BST
Dear Andy,
You wrote 22 Oct 2003 16:10:10 +0000:
'All intellectual ideas are dangerous to social values and patterns. But
some more dangerous than others'
I'd like to maintain that FROM A SOCIAL LEVEL POINT OF VIEW all intellectual
patterns of value are equally dangerous (for social patterns of value). This
danger is implied in the their ability to motivate people to break habitual
behaviour, not in their content.
It is only from an intellectual point of view, or rather from the point of
view of a specific intellectual pattern of value that motivates people to
support a specific social pattern of value, that we can say that some
intellectual patterns of value are more dangerous (to that specific
'conservative' intellectual pattern of value) than others. (In some sense
every intellectual pattern of value is to some extent 'conservative' in that
it wants to support one or more social patterns of value, even if only the
social pattern of parroting a cry for more 'individual freedom'.) Only
patterns of value of the same level can be dangerous to each other in a
gradable sense. They are too discrete from patterns of value of other levels
to distinguish them in 'more or less dangerous' to these other patterns of
value.
You continued:
'Platt and I might disagree about which social values should be preserved
and which intellectual ideas might replace them.'
Yes, you participate in different intellectual patterns of value (motivating
support for different social patterns of value).
No, intellectual patterns of value cannot replace social patterns of value
(a set of symbols cannot replace a set of behaviours).
You continued:
'What we don't want is for social patterns to be changed by motivated
actions of Nazis. ... It might have been better if the motivated actions of
the Peace movement who made massive demonstrations before the outbreak of
the latest Iraqi war were able to do better than marginal change.'
It's not social patterns that are changed differently by actions motivated
by Nazism than by actions motivated by 'Peace'. It is only individuals'
understanding of their social roles that is changed differently. Their
potential to make people substitute copying the behaviour of one leader for
copying the behaviour of another one is equal. The (intellectual) content of
the copied behaviour is irrelevant for the social pattern of following a
leader (either a Nazi or a 'peacemaker').
Your example:
'many of the damages caused to Americans and others around the world by [the
unilateral arrogance of the Bush Administration] are [irredeemable/more than
marginal]'
Yes, beause you are referring to damage caused to individuals, not to
damaged societies. It is not 'unilateral arrogance' (understood as
describing 'unilateralist' content), but consistent behaviour that damages
societies that are held together by other patterns of behaviour (other sets
of consistent behaviour).
Finally you conclude:
'for individuals living within these societies, I think it is relevant what
political system, ideologies, or social structure people adhere to. And I
think moral progress is the result of the motivated actions of certain
individuals to create better systems under which people can adhere to.'
Sure, for individuals it does. Moral progress at the intellectual level IS.
Moral progress at the social level is the result of unmotivated behaviour
being copied between people, e.g. the American frontier habit of NOT
following a leader.
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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