From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sun Oct 26 2003 - 14:42:27 GMT
Hi
Seems to me we need to go back to ZMM,
and think about what Pirsig says about cutting
things up in analysis one way or the other, depending
on the cut you get a different reality in which to embed your truth.
The truth you get depends on the system of differance
(Derrida) that you are using. Unlike Derrida I then think
you should take a good look at what the gains and losses
are between the different systems of differance.
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2003 9:42 PM
Subject: Re: MD Begging the Question, Moral Intuitions, and Answering the
Nazi, Part III
> Platt,
>
> > > I think you and Kimball are misunderstanding the concept of truth with
a
> > > small 't'. That a tiger is coming at you is a small 't' truth, yet one
> > > takes it extremely seriously. That totalitarianism is evil is another
> > > small 't' truth, which Rorty thinks should be foisted upon others. All
> > > that Rorty is saying that he doesn't expect *philosophy* to be a means
> > > of coming up with a sure-fire method to distinguish the true from the
> > > false. The methods already exist. Philosophy may help in making them
> > > more explicit, but it won't establish them, in the sense of providing
> > > unshakable foundations.
> >
> > But, you say that sure-fire methods already exist for distinguishing
> > the true from the false. If they are 'sure-fire,' they must be
> > unshakable and foundational, right? Or, are the methods that already
> > exist subject to change by one group or another as Rorty would have us
> > believe?
>
> Sorry, I didn't express myself clearly. I didn't intend to say that the
> methods that exist are sure-fire. They are subject to change, according to
> how well they work. Different methods work well or poorly depending on how
> well they are suited to the particular problem. Do you know of a method
that
> always works in every situation? Do you not think that they should change
if
> they don't give good results?
>
> If a "group" decides to change a method, who is going to stop them? I
> really don't see the significance of that last sentence. Of course you are
> referring to "whatever society lets us get away with", but what is your
> alternative?
>
> >
> > > Big 'T' Truths are things like "God exists". If someone does not agree
> > > with it, there is no way to "compel" him to believe it through logic
or
> > > experience. See below about logic and Truth.
> >
> > So you believe that small t truths are determined by scientific methods
> > rather than "useful vocabularies" or "linguistic conventions" as Rorty
> > claims?
>
> By all sorts of methods, scientific being one of them, when the question
> under consideration fits the method. Some things are true because one has
> never questioned them, and they would come under the heading of linguistic
> convention or final vocabulary or some such.
>
> And, am I correct in assuming Rorty denies the existence of God
> > or any such big T truths?
>
> I would imagine so, but I have never come across a statement like "I
[Rorty]
> do not believe in any big T Truths." He does say that religion should be a
> private affair, and not a part of philosophy. I disagree with him on that.
>
> >
> > > > Agree. People don't need a theory of truth any more than they need a
> > > > theory of value. Just as they have a sense of value, they have a
sense
> > > > of truth.
> > >
> > > So what is your difference from Rorty?
> >
> > Does Rorty say we possess a sense of value and truth like a sense of
> > sight and taste? Pirsig does.
>
> I hope Pirsig understands that a sense of value or truth has a radical
> difference from those of sight and sense, in that the latter are mediated
by
> the body and the former are not. But since Pirsig wants to treat 'subject'
> like 'object' (all SQ) he probably would minimize that distinction. I
don't.
>
> >
> > > > Does Rorty offer any evidence that we can "increase the dynamic in
our
> > > > lives" (whatever that means) by what we can learn from other
cultures?
> > >
> > > Pirsig does: the brujo story.
> >
> > Pirsig's lesson from the brujo story is less what we can learn from the
> > Zuni culture than how DQ influences individuals.
>
> My point is that the brujo learned from another culture, while the priests
> did not.
>
> > > Yes an no. No, I don't seriously think you would find burning at the
> > > stake acceptable. Yes, in the sense of reminding you that belief in
> > > Truth has killed many people, and still does.
> >
> > May I also remind you that refusal to believe in Truth has killed many
> > people and still does? Germans in the 20th century refused to believe
> > the self-evident Truth that "all men are created equal" etc. and
> > suffered the consequences. Depends on whose side you're on doesn't it?
> > Or perhaps more truthfully, whose side wins.
>
> What argument are you going to give when somebody says "it is not
> self-evident that all men are created equal"?
>
> >
> > In response to my follow up question you allowed as how the "logic of
> > contradictory identity" is not a big T truth since it is logic, a
> > pattern of thinking. You then confirmed your concept of big T truth as
> > being beyond definition and thus beyond concepts, like Pirsig's Dynamic
> > Quality.
> >
> > It seems to me, however, that for both you and Pirsig, the postulate of
> > big T truth and/or DQ is itself a big T truth. Just as you pointed out
> > to Matt that his attempt to deny metaphysics was itself a form of
> > metaphysics, so to the attempt to affirm or deny truth requires an
> > appeal to truth, either small t or big T, depending on context.
>
> My position is, like Pirsig's, that "if Quality or excellence is seen as
the
> ultimate reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths
to
> exist. Then one doesn't seek the absolute "Truth"" (Ch. 8).
>
> But what of that ultimate reality? I take it on faith, basically, as a way
> to orient myself towards everything else. What I know I do NOT have is a
> knock-down sure-fire argument to prove it to others. I recommend to others
> that they do a similar reorientation, but if they say "no", there is no
more
> for me to say.
>
> >
> > Like science cannot deny Quality, philosophy cannot deny Truth. Or so a
> > rational, coherent viewpoint would seem to demand.
>
> It looks to me like Pirsig would disagree with you. If one isn't going to
> seek it (in the sense of trying to come up with a definitive statement),
> then why can't a philosopher deny it? Or rather, to neither affirm nor
deny.
> Why not be willing to settle for small 't' truths, as I think Pirsig would
> characterize the MOQ?
>
> - Scott
>
>
>
> MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
> Mail Archives:
> Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
> Nov '02 Onward -
http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
> MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
>
> To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
> http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
>
>
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sun Oct 26 2003 - 15:08:28 GMT