From: abahn@comcast.net
Date: Mon Nov 03 2003 - 16:04:09 GMT
DMB and anyone still hanging in there,
dmb said (11/02/03): "Yes, we can look to Lila for a discussion of Pirsig's pragmatic theory of truth. That would be good. But my beef is with Rorty, which is a much more specific version of neo-pragmatism."
Andy: No, your beef is with Matt. Your obstinate argumentive style does not include the possibility of reaching any sort of agreement with Matt. Your whole style of engagement with him is to refute any contribution or point he has made and to scold him for even daring to bring an author into the conversation that you know nothing about. You have nothing constructive to say about Rorty, because it is obvious to anyone who has read him you do not understand him. And when you do, you reach your own conclusions after completely misrepresenting what he says. btw, why not tell us how specificially pragmatism and neo-pragmatism differ?
DMB said: "Its true that Pirsig is talking about quality when he talks about treating it AS IF it had a concrete existence, but his theory asserts that truth is quality of a particular kind; intellectual static quality. And that should be treated as real too, just as all static patterns are. This is how the mere subjectivity of SOM is turned into something more real in the MOQ. There is nothing very grandiose about Pirsig's theory of truth and it is provisional too, but ideas and explanations attain an ontological status not granted under SOM, or under Rorty. Further, since the primary reality (DQ) is pre-intellectual, it does not figure into this theory of truth. In the MOQ truth is a particular species of static quality."
Andy: And all the Pragmatist is asking is what advantage is gained by treating quality or static quality as if it had concrete existence? AND by treating truth this way? Rorty and Matt have shown that treating it this way has many disadvantages and using a pragmatic theory of truth retains a distinction of right and wrong. But, there is another point. What makes a intellactual static pattern. We can treat these as real, but if intellectual patterns emerge out of society as Pirsig says, then these patterns have some sort of "intersubjectivity" to them. As Pirsig said, again from Mcwatt thesis in a 2003 email, "WIthout society there is no intellect since there would be no one to talk to anyone else and thus no language to speak and thus nothing to contain the idea." It seems to me we have two things at work in the MOQ as far as intellectual patterns go. Quality on the one hand, and intersubjective agreement or society on the other.
dmb says: "I'm pretty sure Pirsig would not agree that truth is a property of true statements, as Rorty asserts."
Andy: I'm pretty sure he would if he regarded true statements also as a particular species of static quality.
DMB: "Rorty's truth is an adjective, Pirsig's is a noun. A more general sense of the word "pragmatic" applies well enough to Pirsig's theory, which is subject to revision, allows for many sets of truth and measures the value of intellectual discriptions in terms of usefulness and explanatory power, but again, my beef is more specific than that."
Andy: It is not. Your beef is not specific at all. Check it out.
DMB: "Its aimed at the idea that truth is an attribute of something else, without an independent existence of its own. I can't see how one can escape the
conclusion that Rorty is saying that truth is merely subjective. He uses
different terms, much fancier terms than that, but the idea is the same. Can
you tell me the difference between intersubjectively agreed upon attributes
and subjective qualities?"
Andy: Matt has done that.
dmb says: "As I see it, the quality that holds static patterns together is very
different than intersubjective agreement. For Pirsig this rightness is a
cosmic order, and it works as well for drinking glasses as it does for
truth. Pirsig's theory of truth fixes those intellectual patterns into a
larger structure. For Rorty, there is little else but intersubjective
agreements, analogies all the way down, as the neo-prag might say.
Andy: It's quite simple. We don't need to agree on quality, Rta, or Intellectual statc patterns. When we talk about truth we can't measure it against anything, because anything someone proposes we measure it against is usually left undefined. And when then define it explicitly they are eventually exposed as a fool. All the pragmatists cares about is whether or not an idea helps us cope. Whether it works. And the best way to choose between ideas is through discussion, persuasion and intersubjective agreement.
dmb says: "Democracy, freedom in the marketplace of ideas, hope in progress. None of this is in dispute.
Andy: Of course it is. WHen you give truth an independent existence alonside of dynamic quality you are saying we don't need a marketplace of ideas for deciding which ideas are right and which are wrong. Truth will decide this all on its own. Democracy is irrelevant.
DMB: The evolutionary relationship asserts that intellect is impossbile without
language as a pre-requisite. There is no such thing as an idea without words
in the same way that there is no such thing as a wolf-less pack or an
organism without atoms. It may seem like Rorty is saying the same thing with
respect to language and truth, but he doesn't draw that line between the
third and fourth levels. This leads him to the theory that the latter is a
property of the former. Pirsig says they are completely different levels and
exist in an evolutionary relationship. Remember the particulars Rorty used
to describe his theory of truth? I nixed 'em long ago for the sake of
brevity, but you may recall that his examples included widely different true
statements like "E=mc2" and "It was good that Jack left Jill". This is just
short of an outright denial that there are distinctions to be made between
true statements, as if Dear Abby and Albert Einstien had something in
common.
Andy: Once again you have missed the point and misrepresented Rorty. Everything you say gives more evidence for agreement between Rorty and Pirsig. Rorty said that none of these statements share a similar trait that makes them true. There is no essence to these statements. Rorty never talks about levels becuase he doesn't see the need for them or how they would help (and he never bothered to finish reading Lila for whatever reason). With as much misunderstanding and opposing interpretations that people at Lila squad and Moq_discuss have had in regards to the disdinction to be made between the third and fourth level that Pirsig lays out, it seems crude for you to come along and say there is a fixed principle that Pirsig laid out and you, alone, understand what this is.
DMB: "I don't know who ever said the MOQ wagoing to save the world, but let's talk about abondoning metaphysics for political reform some other time. Campbell too. Suffice it to say that this approach only marks another difference between Pirsig and Rorty."
Andy: Why? We are talking about truth, are we not? Why shouldn't we include political reform in the discussion. Where is truth in these questions? That is why I care about truth? Do you really think I would care about truth if we were only arguing about what holds a glass together? Or whether or not 2+2 = 4. The only reason to wonder about the truth of these things is to understand the truth in morality and how humans should live. The big questions.
DMB: "Pirsig is convinced that we need his improved metaphysics to grasp the political conflicts of our time.
Andy: And Rorty is convinced that this is exactly what we don't need. So, this should be the point of difference for discussion and not trying to lay out two opposing views of truth.
DMB: "It does the only thing an idea CAN do; it explains things. And there is certainly nothing that prevents us from acting on an MOQ understanding in public life. It works for me. But the reason I think the MOQ is more comparable to Eastern philosophies than neo-pragmatism is not just that it says we ought to do this or that spiritual practice or believe in this or that doctrine, but because it describes a reality that is fundamentally spiritual.
ANdy: Well, maybe, but who says that being more comparable to Eastern philosophies has any inherent advantage. To interpret through Campbell, pragmatism was born in America to fill a particular need. A spiritual need that does not address the individual as eastern philosophy does, but rather addresses communities and society.
DMB: The primary empirical reality (DQ) drives the whole she-bang. Its the heart and soul of the MOQ. Its where we come from and where we are headed. Its the father of all static forms. In a very real sense, the MOQ was born during a mystical experience and describes a mystical reality. So in the MOQ, it doesn't really make any sense to say spirituality is a problem of hyper-individuality, that it should remain in the private sphere, or anything like that. Its an inherent part of the total picture of how everything hangs together.
Andy: I am not saying spirtuality is the problem of hyper-individuality. I am saying that different religions address different needs depending on the cultures they were born in. There is a folly in westerners searching to the East for filling spiritual needs according to Campbell. WE need something else to adress our needs. I think Rorty and pragmatism and the parts of Pirsig that we wouldn't associate with Eastern religions have cleared away the space to develop a spirituality for these needs.
DMB: I don't know if I can convince you of this if Pirsig hasn't already.
Andy: There is nothing to convince me of. Pirsig has convinced me of some things, but obviously different things than he has convinced you of. I take steps towards your view, but you refuse to take any steps toward ours. Or more accurately, you refuse to acknowledge it when you have.
DMB: I certainly do think Pirsig's picture is better than Rorty's, but so far my only hope is to point out the differences, to show where they don't agree. First things first, you know?
Andy: what you have not come to close to doing is taking care of these first things. WHere Rorty and Pirsig disagree is in the point of needing a metaphysics. Matt made this point a long time ago. Every detour from it that you have tried to take has led to a deadend. So, fine, lets stick to first things first.
dmb: Thanks'
Thank you,
Andy
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